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Abstract 
This dissertation examines television news coverage of the Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street 
movements.  Theories regarding the relationship between media and social movements are 
mostly based on outdated models of media and journalistic norms.  In addition, the literature on 
framing is underdeveloped in that it has focused on the process of creating frames and the 
implications of collective action framing; less is known about the process of frame usage in non-
print media.  My dissertation addresses these two problems.  I develop the partisan media 
paradigm, an improved framework for understanding media coverage of social movements, by 
reformulating a dominant theory of media protest coverage, the protest paradigm, to account for 
the realities of today’s ideologically segmented media landscape.  I contribute to the under-
theorized area of framing by conceptualizing frames as gateways and identifying trajectories 
frames can take in mass media discourse.  This research is important for three main reasons: a) it 
contributes to knowledge across the disciplines of sociology, political science, and 
communications studies; b) it compares a right-wing and a left-wing movement to help explain 
how for-profit media’s adherence to the status quo bounds the mainstream news field with 
hegemonic limits that confine political discourse at both ends of the right-left spectrum; and c) it 
provides important insights into the process of media framing for other types of political and 
cultural discourse, beyond that of social movements.   
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
Mass media coverage of social movements is the primary way that the public and political elites 
become informed about movements’ existence, message, and actions (Koopmans 2004; 
McCombs and Shaw 1972; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012), but the field of mass media in the 
U.S. has changed dramatically since many of the theories sociologists use to describe the 
relationship between media and movements were first developed.  According to data from the 
General Social Survey,1 84% of Americans read a newspaper at least a few times a week in 
1972.  By 1982, just after the first 24-hour cable news network began broadcasting, this number 
dropped to 75%.  In 2010, the number had plummeted to 54%.  Americans have relied on 
television for most of their news for the past several decades,2 yet most research on media 
coverage of social movements focuses on newspaper coverage.  To complicate matters further, 
two of the three major cable news networks, Fox News Channel and MSNBC, have a blatant 
ideological bias, and market their programs to viewers who adhere to one particular political 
ideology or the other.  Journalistic norms of objectivity identified by scholars in the 1970s no 
longer apply to all journalists across media outlets.  Taken together, these facts complicate our 
understanding of media coverage of social movements. 
                                                 
1 See https://gssdataexplorer.norc.org. Accessed September 3, 2017.  2016 data on Americans’ 
newspaper consumption shows that just 34% read a newspaper at least a few times a week. 
2 Kohut et al., “Americans Spending More Time Following the News.”  Pew Research Center, 
September 12, 2010 at http://assets.pewresearch.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/legacy-
pdf/652.pdf. Accessed September 3, 2017. 
  2 
 The purpose of this research is to develop a more complete framework for analyzing 
media coverage of contemporary social movements.  As a political institution, media have 
influence over political discourse (Cook 1998; Sparrow 1999) and media frames have an affect 
on public opinion (Detenber et al. 2007; Walgrave and Vleigenthart 2012).3  The institutional 
power that mainstream media wield in American politics deserves to be examined closely, but 
has not received adequate attention from social movement theorists.  Although social movements 
target various institutions (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008), and many are not concerned with the 
state at all (e.g. Rupp and Taylor 2003; Taylor and Van Dyke 2004; Van Dyke, Soule, and 
Taylor 2004), this research focuses on political movements that target the state.  Because of the 
highly partisan political climate of post-9/11 U.S. and the relatively recent phenomena of 
ideologically driven media outlets dominating the mass-consumed news media field 
(Levendusky 2013), it is important to reconsider the relationship between the media and political 
movements.  
In this dissertation, I build on theories of media power based on framing processes in an 
ideologically stratified television news field, using the case of news coverage of two social 
movements.  I ask: What factors influence how coverage of social movements changes over 
time?  How can existing theories of media coverage of social movements, developed decades 
ago, apply to the contemporary movement and media fields?   What is the process by which 
media actors (e.g. news anchors, field reporters, political pundits) use frames to describe social 
movements, and what can this process tell us about political discourse in general? 
 I examine two movements that have a slight overlap in motivations, with very different 
goals and tactics.  The two movements began their activities during the first term of the Obama 
                                                 
3 Admittedly though, the relationship between media and public opinion is dialectic; see Gamson 
and Modigliani 1989 
  3 
administration, about two years apart.  The Tea Party Movement (TPM hereafter) started in early 
2009; it is a conservative, right-wing movement focused on limited government, decreased 
taxation, and increased states’ rights (Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Zernike 2010).  The “TEA” 
in tea party is often cited as an acronym standing for “Taxed Enough Already,” which framed 
taxes as the movement’s overriding concern.  The most common refrain heard from TPM 
activists in 2009 and 2010 was that they wanted to “Take America Back,” which framed ridding 
government of liberals and restoring a constitutionally limited government as their overall goal.  
The Occupy Wall Street (OWS hereafter) movement began over two years later, in the fall of 
2011; it is a progressive, primarily leftist (though anarchists and libertarians played a large part 
as well) movement concerned with limiting corporate control of government and financial 
institutions, and increasing social welfare (Gitlin 2012).  The rallying cry of OWS, “We are the 
99%,” framed class inequality as the movement’s overriding concern. 
 In the next two sections, I briefly describe the origins, goals, motivations, and tactics of 
the two movements.  I then compare the two movements and their relationships with the media, 
and explain what TV news coverage of these two movements can tell us about the process of 
media framing.  I chose the TPM and OWS because they each represent one side of the left-right 
political divide in the U.S., they were both active during the first term of President Barack 
Obama, and they each received a great deal of media coverage over an extended period of time.  
I then define some key terms, and conclude this chapter with an overview of the dissertation. 
The Tea Party Movement  
 Despite considerable attention from ethnographic researchers (e.g. Braunstein 2014, 
2015; Prior 2014; Rohlinger and Klein 2014; Skocpol and Williamson 2012; Zernike 2011), the 
origins of the TPM are difficult to untangle.  Small, local tea party protests were held as early as 
  4 
January 2009.  However, the grassroots 2008 Ron Paul presidential campaign, as well as tax 
protests such as those that took place in Connecticut in 1991 and California in the 1970s, were 
concerned with similar issues and used imagery such as the Gadsden flag (see Image 1), which 
came to be a symbol of the contemporary TPM.  These are all very much tied to the principles 
and ideologies of the U.S. Libertarian Party.  The organizers of “porkulus” protests in early 2009 
claim to be the original Tea Partiers, and they are mostly libertarians (Bennet 2010; Zernike 
2010). 
The TPM as we know it today began in February 2009, shortly after CNBC commentator 
Rick Santelli delivered an live on-air, soapbox-style rant against the Obama administration’s 
proposed stimulus package (Quayle 2009).  Santelli’s live and unexpected statements were 
widely publicized and led dozens of small groups that formed as early as 2007 to coalesce online 
and organize the first national Tea Party protest on February 27, 2009.  Thousands of protesters 
took to the streets on February 27 bearing tea bags and signs with slogans such as “Taxed 
Enough Already” and “Free Markets, Not Free Loaders.”  Throughout 2009 and 2010, TPM 
affiliated groups held scores of large-scale protests and smaller rallies.   
From early 2009 through at least 2016, the TPM was made up of many small, grassroots 
groups,4 and a handful of nonprofit organizations such as Americans for Prosperity, the Tea 
Party Express, FreedomWorks, and the Tea Party Patriots (Skocpol and Williamson 2012).  
Though the focus of particular groups may vary, the TPM is known for supporting “free market” 
capitalism, a static and literal reading of the constitution that limits federal government power 
but protects individual states’ rights (Schmidt 2011), and American patriotism.  According to 
                                                 
4 In 2010, there were at least 2 thousand such groups listed on 
http://www.teapartypatriots.org/allgroups.aspx, last accessed March 9, 2011.  Vanessa 
Williamson claims that just over one thousand of them were active groups that held regular 
meetings and many others were “just a guy with a website” (quoted in: Gordon 2013). 
  5 
Image 1. The Gadsden Flag is a Revolutionary War symbol used by the Tea Party Movement 
and other right-wing groups 
 
 
their mission statements,5 many of the groups opposed taxes, “big government,” socialism, 
communism, and the Obama administration.   
The TPM did not utilize disruptive tactics in their protest events.  In a book about the Tea 
Party published in 2009, Bruce Bexley lists “four easy steps to throwing your own Tea Party” 
(pp. 72-79).  Step three instructs readers to contact local town officials to get permission for any 
event: “contact your local government to find out if you need a permit.  Call both city hall and 
your county commissioner.  Tell them you’re planning a peaceful demonstration and would like 
to know if you need to file any paperwork… Also tell them you’d like police present at the event 
if possible” (p. 73).  Anecdotal evidence, including my own ethnographic research of a TPM 
                                                 
5 Downloaded from http://www.teapartypatriots.org/allgroups.aspx March 9, 2011 and analyzed 
in my Masters thesis (Taylor 2011). 
  6 
group in New England in 2010, suggests many TPM groups followed this advice.6  The TPM’s 
open embrace of law enforcement is evidence of their pro-status quo stance and sharply contrasts 
the Occupy movement’s relationship with police.  
Beginning with the 2010 mid-term elections, the TPM shifted from a protest movement 
to a wing of the Republican Party.  In 2010, 138 Tea Party-affiliated candidates ran for seats in 
Congress, and 44 of them won their races.7  That year, Congresswoman Michelle Bachmann of 
Minnesota founded the Tea Party Caucus, a congressional caucus for members of the House of 
Representatives who support the TPM.  The Caucus has been effectively inactive since 2013, 
though many of its original members are now members of the House Freedom Caucus, which 
was founded in 2015.  According to Gary Jacobson, professor of political science at UC San 
Diego, there were between 50 and 80 “true believers” of tea party values serving in Congress in 
2013.8  Many of those who won in 2010 and 2012 are still serving as of October 2017.   
Scholars have shown that as movements become professionalized, their use of disruptive 
tactics decreases and their use of institutionalized tactics such as lobbying or filing lawsuits 
increases (Kreisi et al. 1995; Meyer and Whittier 1994; McCammon 2003; Staggenborg 1988).  
                                                 
6 For example, the Richmond Tea Party requested a refund from city of Richmond, Virginia for 
$10,000 in October 2011. Richmond Tea Party activists claimed they spent this money on 
permits and police presence for three rallies they held at the same site where Occupy Richmond 
activists set up their encampment (and Occupy activists did not pay for permits).  The city 
responded by conducting a tax audit on the group; see https://richmondteaparty.com/city-of-
richmond-responds-to-our-refund-request/ (accessed August 30, 2017). 
7 According to The New York Times, 129 Tea Party candidates ran for seats in the House of 
Representatives, and 9 ran for Senate seats.  40 won House seats and 4 won Senate seats. See: 
Kate Zernike, “Tea Party Set to Win Enough Races for Wide Influence.” The New York Times, 
October 14, 2010.  Accessed August 21, 2017 at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/15/us/politics/15teaparty.html  
8 Gordon, Claire. “By the Numbers: The Tea Party.” Al Jazeera News, November 5, 2013. 
Accessed August 14, 2017 at: http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-
tonight/america-tonight-blog/2013/11/5/the-tea-party-bythenumbers.html  
  7 
The TPM began moving away from protest tactics and toward institutionalized tactics in 2010, 
when they began to formally infiltrate the Republican Party.  TPM activists also ran for local and 
state offices, and started non-profit organizations.  There are 24 Tea Party-affiliated nonprofit 
organizations listed at Pro Publica’s Nonprofit Explorer website.9  All but one is a 501c(4) – the 
Tea Party Patriots Foundation, Inc. is a 501c(3).10  Only two – First Coast Tea Party, Inc. and 
North East Tarrant Tea Party, Inc. – filed 990 documents with IRS for 2016 as of August 2017.   
 As the movement grew, there was infighting as some groups engaged in a power struggle 
to control the message and image of the TPM.  For example, the co-founders of the Tea Party 
Patriots had an internal struggle over the direction of the group and sued each other over control 
of the group’s website and logo (Kochheiser 2011).  The February 3, 2010 episode of American 
Morning on CNN includes a story about the power struggles within the TPM.  CNN 
correspondent Jim Acosta says that some tea party activists fear that their movement “is about to 
be hijacked by one of the established parties,” and activist Jim Knapp is quoted as saying “I 
don’t think there’s any question the GOP has their tentacles into the tea party.”  The story goes 
on to explain how the Tea Party Express is run by Republican elites who have infiltrated the 
TPM.  The Tea Party Express began as a bus tour across the U.S. in the summer of 2009, but by 
early 2010 had raised hundreds of thousands of dollars, which it contributed to Republican 
congressional candidates.  It is currently branded as “the largest and most successful political 
                                                 
9 Tigas, Mike, Sisi Wei, and Alec Glassford. August 10, 2017. Pro Publica Nonprofit Explorer. 
Accessed August 24, 2017 at: 
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/search?utf8=✓&q=tea+party&state%5Bid%5D=&ntee
%5Bid%5D=&c_code%5Bid%5D= 
10 A major difference between these two types of nonprofit organizations is that 501(c)3s cannot 
endorse candidates or engage in political activities, while 501(c)4s can. 
  8 
action committee within the Tea Party movement.”11  As of this writing, the Tea Party Express 
most recently endorsed Republican Karen Handel in her 2017 bid for Georgia’s 6th 
Congressional District (which she won), and Josh Mandel in his bid for the 2018 Senate seat in 
Ohio. 
The Occupy Wall Street Movement 
The Occupy movement in the U.S. began with Occupy Wall Street in September 2011.  
Because the Occupy movement was typically referred to as Occupy Wall Street, even when 
protests were held in other locations under local names such as “Occupy Oakland” and “Occupy 
Boston,” I will use “Occupy Wall Street” (OWS) as the moniker to denote all Occupy protests 
and the movement in general.  
Similar to the TPM, OWS seemed to have begun as the brainchild of several unrelated 
people within the course of a year, and ended up converging due to the influence of a mass 
media outlet.  According to Todd Gitlin’s (2012) well-researched account of the origins of OWS, 
freelance journalist David DeGraw called for a “99 percent movement” in February 2010.  This 
led to bank protests in June 2011, in which people across the country protested big banks such as 
Wells Fargo and Bank of America, closed their accounts, and moved their money to local credit 
unions.12  Almost simultaneously, anti-corporate magazine Adbusters put out a call to occupy 
Wall Street in Manhattan and chose the date of September 17, 2011 to gather.  The call was 
presented as a poster in the July issue of the magazine, which depicted a mash-up of phrases such 
                                                 
11 Tea Party Express, “History.” Updated 2016. Accessed August 31, 2017 at: 
http://www.teapartyexpress.org/history  
12 On November 5, 2011, after OWS had picked up steam, activists organized another Bank 
Transfer Day, which they claimed as a great success. See: 
http://www.alternet.org/story/153019/move_your_money_day_a_success%3B_over_%2450_mil
lion_withdrawn_from_big_banks, accessed September 4, 2017. 
  9 
as “social justice” and “protest plutocracy” in the shape of a fist.  The bottom of the poster read 
“#OCCUPYWALLSTREET September 17th” and advised: “Bring tent.”   
While Adbusters is an alternative media outlet and CNBC is as pro-capitalist and 
mainstream as media gets, each were responsible for giving an emerging movement a name and 
a date to begin national protests.  In the case of OWS, activists ended up converging at Zucotti 
Park in Manhattan.  They occupied that space from September 17 through November 15, 2011, 
living communally and sleeping in tents.  Within weeks of the first occupation, cities across the 
U.S. – and even internationally in the U.K., Australia, Hong Kong, and elsewhere – had their 
own Occupy encampments. 
Disruptive tactics are those that interrupt normal routines (Tarrow 2011).  By occupying 
public (or in the case of Zucotti Park, privately owned) spaces for days, weeks, and even months 
at a time, OWS’s entire strategy was disruptive.  OWS groups in various cities also held marches 
in which they disrupted traffic13 and even commerce activity.14  OWS attempted to shut down 
the New York Stock Exchange on November 17, 2011, but local authorities found out about their 
plans beforehand and were able to prevent them from doing so with blockades and a large 
physical presence of riot police.  With the exception of a few isolated events in which individual 
protesters vandalized buildings or threw rocks or bottles at police, all OWS tactics were non-
violent.  However, that did not stop many media outlets from focusing on those isolated 
individuals and framing OWS activists as violent. 
                                                 
13 For example, Occupy Wall Street activists in Manhattan blocked vehicular traffic on the 
Brooklyn Bridge for hours on October 1, 2011, resulting in the arrests of over 700 protesters. See 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/blog/2011/oct/03/occupy-wall-street-brooklyn-bridge-
arrests. Accessed September 2, 2017. 
14 Occupy Oakland marched to the port of Oakland on November 2, 2011, effectively shutting 
down operations at the nation’s fifth busiest port for hours. See 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/occupy-oakland-shuts-down-port/. Accessed September 3, 
2017. 
  10 
Because OWS approached protest from the virtually opposite political ideological 
orientation as the TPM, they did not seek out permits for their protest events.  As scholar and 
Occupy Oakland activist Michael King (2013) argues, the protest permit itself is a form of state 
repression.  Without permits, however, the state had even more ammunition to justify their 
oppression of peaceful protesters.  Thousands of OWS activists were arrested in just the first few 
weeks of activity.  
The majority of OWS arrests occurred after protesters had occupied a space for weeks at 
a time.  OWS protesters occupied their spaces non-stop, overnight, for weeks or months, and 
police would eventually ask them to vacate.  Those that did not vacate were usually arrested.15  
There are exceptions to this rule, of course.  Activists at OWS protests that took place at 
foreclosed homes were often arrested the day of the first protest for refusing to leave.  There 
were also arrests for violent behavior, though whether protesters or police instigated the violence 
was not always clear.  Some other charges include disturbing the peace or disorderly conduct, 
which sometimes occurred when small groups of protesters shouted really loudly, sometimes 
with bullhorns, to interrupt political speeches and foreclosure auctions.16  In contrast, no TPM 
activists were arrested at TPM protests; however, there is no record of TPM protests lasting more 
than a few hours long, let alone days or weeks or months. 
An overarching message of OWS was the direct critique of capitalism.  Through 
interviews with 192 OWS organizers, Mark Bray (2013: 4) found that 78% were anticapitalist.  
Anarchist leaders of the movement fought to keep their messaging palatable to a wider range of 
                                                 
15 A lot of arrests were justified by activists’ illegal use of tents on public land. See quote from 
police here: http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/11/3-arrested-after-police-raid-occupy-
riverside-.html. Accessed September 10, 2014.  
16 Martin, Adam. January 25, 2012. “The Weirdest Things Occupy Protesters Get Arrested For.” 
The Atlantic. Available at: https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/01/weirdest-
things-occupy-protesters-get-arrested/332658/. Accessed September 4, 2017. 
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constituents without losing sight of their true goals, which were far more radical than liberal 
ideas of social justice (Bray 2013).  Like the TPM, the OWS movement did target the state; 
however, and in contrast to the TPM, OWS also targeted corporations, the banking industry, and 
capitalism in general.  It is hard to say whether the state was the primary or secondary target 
(Wang and Piazza 2016), but there is no denying that OWS targeted the state. 
Like the TPM, OWS had its fair share of infighting (Gitlin 2012: 94-99), though no 
lawsuits were filed.  Most OWS encampments had dispersed by winter of 2012, though May Day 
protests affiliated with OWS were held across the U.S. in 2012, and many OWS activists 
continue to converge at their original spaces every September 17 to mark the anniversary of the 
first occupation. 
While the TPM turned from street demonstrations to electoral politics, OWS turned from 
street demonstrations to direct actions to create the societal change they want to see.  OWS 
activists around the country helped people who had their homes foreclosed, Occupy Sandy 
activists helped victims of Hurricane Sandy, and Occupy Madison, the one non-profit 
organization affiliated with OWS,17 provides tiny houses for the homeless.  As I will argue later, 
the prefigurative politics of the OWS movement tend to not be digestible by the mainstream 
media, and so these tactics fail to garner much mainstream press. 
Comparison and Relationship with Media  
 
 Despite being ideologically opposed in terms of the goals each seeks, both movements 
were at least partly, if not substantially, motivated by concerns about government spending.  
Where TPM activists decried government spending on social programs and stayed silent on 
                                                 
17 Tigas et al. 2017. Accessed August 24, 2017 at: 
https://projects.propublica.org/nonprofits/organizations/461581696.  See  
https://occupymadisoninc.com/about/history/ (accessed August 24, 2017) for more information 
about Occupy Madison, Inc. 
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government spending on things such as corporate welfare and the military, OWS activists 
demanded more spending on social welfare and decried corporate bailouts, military spending, 
and political campaign financing.  Both TPM and OWS protesters cited the bank bailouts as one 
of their main grievances, but each movement had a different motivation for protesting the 
bailouts, with OWS blaming government and Wall Street bankers, and the TPM blaming 
government alone.   
While their grievances have some overlap, their goals are distinct (see figure 1).  TPM 
goals include electing like-minded people to political office in order to achieve legislative goals 
such as lowering taxes, decreasing social welfare spending, and lowering the national debt.  This 
stands in contrast to OWS statements that claimed they wanted nothing to do with political 
parties and rejected support from political elites of the Democratic Party (Fouhy 2011; Palmer 
2011).   OWS goals focused on economic justice and social welfare.  As a way of further 
explaining the backgrounds of these two movements and describing the relationship between the 
media and each movement’s constituents, I use public opinion data to discuss the ideological and 
cultural differences between OWS and TPM supporters and their media consumption choices in 
Appendix A. 
In addition to their different goals and motivations, the movements employed different 
tactics.  TPM activists conducted protests and rallies with permits and had no incidents of 
violence and no arrests, while OWS occupied spaces either without requesting permits or after 
permits had expired; thousands of OWS activists were arrested.  Scholars have argued that 
institutionalized tactics such as those taken by the TPM should lead to outcomes that favor 
movements (Amenta and Young 1999), while others argue that disruptive tactics such as those 
used by some OWS activists are more likely to lead to success (Gamson 1975; Piven and  
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Figure 1. Some Goals and Grievances of the Tea Party and Occupy Movements 
 
 
Cloward 1979), but mass media frames could have just as much impact on outcomes as protest 
tactics alone. 
Both movements were spurred to action, at least in part, by mass media outlets.  The 
original idea and call to action for OWS came from Adbusters magazine (Gitlin 2012), and OWS 
received positive coverage from progressive media outlets, including cable news network 
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MSNBC, nationally syndicated radio shows Democracy Now! and The Thom Hartmann 
Program, and The Nation magazine.  The TPM, by contrast, had help from far more mainstream 
media outlets.  Rick Santelli’s original call for a “Chicago tea party” aired on the business-
focused cable news network CNBC.  By April 2009, cable news network Fox News Channel 
(FNC) began promoting “tax day tea parties,” with program host Glenn Beck going so far as to 
ask his viewers to register online at his website if they planned on attending a tea party protest.18 
There is also an intriguing relationship between the TPM, television news, and public 
opinion research.  In March 2009, Fox News/Opinion Dynamics conducted a national poll of 900 
registered voters in which they asked: “Would you be willing to join a symbolic tea party to 
protest excessive government spending on April 15 2009?”  Thirty-six percent of respondents 
said yes.  Shortly thereafter, FNC program hosts Sean Hannity, Glenn Beck, Neil Cavuto, and 
Greta Van Susteren announced that they would be doing live versions of their shows at Tea Party 
protests on April 15, a symbolically significant date because it is the deadline to file taxes in the 
U.S.  During the week leading up to April 15, FNC began heavily promoting what it called “FNC 
Tax Day Tea Parties.”19  
 These ties with mass media outlets have implications for the ways movements are 
presented by the media, with outlets that promote mobilization of a movement being more likely 
to provide biased, positive coverage of movement events.  At the same time, media outlets that 
                                                 
18 On the April 8, 2009 episode of The Glenn Beck Program on FNC, Beck promoted the tax day 
tea party protest in San Antonio, where he would be attending and broadcasting his program live. 
He said “If you are going to the San Antonio tea party Wednesday, make sure you go to 
“GlennBeck.com” and register right now.”  He ended that day’s program with: “Hopefully, the 
folks all around the country will join us at these tea parties.” 
19 For example, on the April 12, 2009 episode of Fox News Watch, anchor Bill Hemmer 
promoted what the on-screen chyron called “FNC Tax Day Tea Parties” hosted by the four 
network personalities:  “Can’t get to a tea party? Fox Nation hosts a virtual tea party. You can 
check it out on the site for the tea party in your area.” 
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target audiences from the opposite side of the political spectrum may be more likely to provide 
negative or delegitimizing coverage of a movement.  The current reality of our ideologically 
segmented television news marketplace complicates the way scholars have traditionally 
explained media coverage of social movements.  In this dissertation, I combine insights from the 
political science, communications, and sociology literatures on mass media and social 
movements in order to provide a unique framework for analyzing media coverage that is 
applicable to the contemporary U.S. media field.  
Significance of the Study 
 In this dissertation I develop an improved framework for understanding news coverage of 
social movements, which I call the partisan media paradigm, and a framework for understanding 
the framing process in television news coverage, which I call the gateways model.  The partisan 
media paradigm has two components.  First, as I demonstrate in chapter 3, the extent to which a 
media outlet covers a social movement in a negative or positive way is dependent on the 
perceived ideology of the media outlet’s intended audience.  The second component, 
demonstrated in chapter 4, is that substantive coverage of social movements can, and often does, 
occur even when negative frames are used in news reports, and regardless of whether or not the 
coverage is focused on protest activity.  In chapter 5, I pull from the partisan media paradigm to 
develop the gateways model for understanding the process by which framing devices act as 
gateways to either open paths to substantive coverage or to shut off communication.   
My framework reformulates a dominant model for understanding media coverage of 
protests, the protest paradigm.  The protest paradigm, which I describe in great detail in chapter 
two, was developed in the early 1990s and has come under scrutiny over the past 5 years, yet no 
critics have been able to offer an improved framework for understanding protest coverage.  My 
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proposed solution, which accounts for the realities of today’s ideologically segmented media 
landscape, overcomes the problems recently identified in the protest paradigm literature without 
tossing the theory out entirely, and contributes to knowledge across the disciplines of sociology, 
political science, and communications studies.  In addition, identifying the trajectories frames 
can take will contribute to sociology’s subfield of collective behavior and social movements by 
providing important insights to our understanding of media framing processes for social 
movement coverage.  Understanding these processes will help scholars understand the process of 
media framing for other types of political and cultural discourse, and will help activists tailor 
their messages in such a way that the message falls within the hegemonic limits of television 
news while still communicating the problems and potential solutions they have identified.   
Definitions 
Throughout this dissertation, I use a few words and phrases that can have different 
meanings across and within disciplines.  In this section, I provide definitions for each word or 
phrase that is important to my overall argument but could have a contested meaning.   
Status quo 
Literature on media and social movements that I cite throughout this dissertation tends to 
discuss media coverage of social movements in terms of whether or not the movement 
challenges the status quo; however, they all neglect to define the term “status quo” (Boyle et al. 
2012; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999; McFarlane and Hay 2003; Reul et al. 2016; 
Smith et al. 2001; Trivundza and Brlek 2017; Weaver and Scacco 2013).  Therefore, I provide a 
definition of status quo that can apply to the movements described in prior research, as well as to 
the TPM and OWS. 
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The New Oxford American Dictionary defines status quo as “the existing state of affairs, 
especially regarding social or political issues.”  Some take this to mean the political state of 
affairs on a micro scale that changes depending on which political party occupies the White 
House or holds the majority of seats in Congress (e.g. Cook 1998).  When I use the phrase, I 
mean the existing social and political state of affairs in the U.S. on a macro scale.  For example, 
statements or concepts that uphold the status quo in the U.S. include: capitalism is the best 
economic system, people who serve in the U.S. military are patriotic and heroic, the U.S. 
government is legitimate, the middle class is the most important class, the economy should 
always be growing, American patriotism is a virtue, the constitution should be revered, etc.  
Those who challenge the status quo by offering a critique or suggesting an improvement to the 
overall system tend to be marginalized in mainstream media, if they are paid any attention at 
all.20 
I do not mean to suggest that there is and always has been one and only one status quo; 
the concept itself is a social construction.  What can be considered “status quo” is unique to each 
nation-state and varies across time and society.  Clearly, cultural norms change over time in any 
society, and the status quo changes along with it—albeit both tend to happen at a relatively slow 
pace.  In addition, “status quo” may not carry the same meaning to all actors within a single 
society or subculture.  For instance, some in the U.S. might say that same-sex marriage 
challenges the status quo of the “traditional,” heterosexual family structure, while others argue 
that it upholds the status quo of marriage as a state-sanctioned institution (e.g. Conrad 2014).  
The question of whether advocates for same-sex marriage are challenging or upholding the status 
quo may be blurry or ambiguous, and convincing arguments can be made on either side.   
                                                 
20 Gitlin (1982: 250) refers to this as “the hegemonic limits” of television.   
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However, most OWS and TPM goals, like the goals of social movements that “protest 
paradigm” scholars have typically used in case studies, clearly fall on one side or the other of this 
somewhat blurry pro- and anti-status quo divide.  For instance, a statement like “unregulated 
capitalism is the best economic system for a free and fair society” upholds the economic status 
quo in the U.S.  While TPM activists would agree with this statement, OWS activists would 
firmly disagree.  Scholars tend to concur: the TPM is a pro-status quo movement (Haltinner 
2016; Weaver and Scacco 2013), and OWS is an anti-status quo movement (Bray 2013; Morgan 
and Chan 2016).  
There are some exceptions: some TPM activists held more radical views, and some OWS 
activists were more moderate.  TPM activists who advocated for abolishing the Federal Reserve 
and those who were blatantly racist were pushed out of the mainstream TPM and cast as “fringe 
elements.”  Likewise, some liberal and progressive OWS activists had no desire to overthrow 
capitalism; instead, they argued that the system could be improved through government 
regulation.  Like any large social movement, both the TPM and OWS had some heterogeneity 
and not all members agreed on everything.  In both cases, the activists who aligned more closely 
to the status quo, or were at least capable of framing their arguments in hegemonically 
acceptable ways, were the ones who were most respected by mainstream media outlets such as 
FNC and MSNBC.  As media and communications scholars have long shown, mainstream media 
always support the status quo, whether consciously or not (Donohue et al. 1995; Lee and 
Solomon 1990; McFarlane and Hay 2003; McLeod and Detenber 1999; Sparrow 1999). 
For example, TPM activists were consistently framed as patriotic by most TV news 
outlets, based on the way they dressed (American flags adorned many of their t-shirts), some of 
the protest signs they carried (e.g. “Stop shredding our Constitution”), and the words they used to 
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describe themselves (many local groups included the word “patriots” in their monikers).  OWS, 
on the other hand, was only presented as patriotic by some alternative media outlets and by 
MSNBC—that is, until Iraq war veteran Scott Olsen was badly inured by police at an Occupy 
protest in Oakland, CA.  Because American hegemonic norms tell us that anyone who serves in 
the U.S. military is inherently patriotic, Olsen’s injury and subsequent hospitalization was 
presented by most TV news outlets as a heroic and patriotic stand against an oppressive and 
overly aggressive police force.  The one consistent message across media outlets, which aligns 
with the status quo, is that patriotism is a good thing.  An argument that patriotism is a negative 
quality that divides and dehumanizes citizens of the world, for example, would be a challenge to 
the status quo. 
Mainstream and Alternative Media  
Protest paradigm literature, which I reference throughout this dissertation, dichotomizes 
media into mainstream and alternative categories (Boyle et al. 2012; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 
1999; Shahin et al. 2016; Trivundza and Brlek 2017), but fails to provide a clear definition for  
either of those terms.  Hertog and McLeod (1995: 3) are the only ones to offer a clear definition: 
The mainstream press—influenced by the hiring of traditional journalists, powerful social 
actors and institutions, and the expectations of mass audiences—produces content that is 
generally consonant with mainstream social values and ideology (Lippman 1965). This 
content contrasts with that provided by the alternative press, which services a very 
different audience and draws creative talent who view the world in a very different way. 
 
To be more clear, I add that mainstream media reach a large audience and are for-profit and 
corporate-owned, while alternative media are smaller scale, targeted to niche audiences, and 
offer critiques of the status quo or hegemonic norms.  In this dissertation, I only examine 
mainstream media coverage. 
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Some might argue that FNC and MSNBC should not be considered mainstream media.  
Indeed, FNC anchors regularly criticize what they call mainstream media, thus positioning 
themselves and their network as an alternative media source.  Although both MSNBC and FNC 
present information in different ways based on what they perceive their target viewers deem 
acceptable, both reach millions of viewers, are run by for-profit corporations, and neither of them 
challenge the status quo.  Anchors on MSNBC will agree with OWS activists who say there is a 
problem with the current capitalist system, but they stop short of anything beyond regulating that 
system.  They would not support, nor give serious airtime to, activists who argue for a complete 
restructuring of the entire economic system.  Likewise, anchors on FNC agree with TPM 
activists who criticize the Obama administration’s economic policies, but stop short of 
publicizing the “fringe” elements of the movement that have called for abolishing the Federal 
Reserve.  As I will argue in chapter 3, FNC and MSNBC are neither mainstream nor alternative 
in terms of the dichotomy presented by protest paradigm scholars; instead, they fall into a third 
category of mainstream, yet ideologically driven, news. 
Alternative media outlets are those that directly challenge the status quo.  On the right, 
there are radio programs such as The Alex Jones Show, magazines such as The New American, 
and websites such as infowars.com and breitbart.com.  On the left are radio programs such as 
Democracy Now!, magazines such as Adbusters and Jacobin, and websites such as 
shadowproof.com and truth-out.org.  All of these cater to narrow audiences and offer direct 
critiques of hegemonic norms.  
Frames and Framing 
Originally conceived by Erving Goffman (1974), framing involves the social construction 
of a social phenomenon; he defined frames as “principles of organization” (p. 10).  To 
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sociologists David Snow and Robert Benford (1992: 137), a frame is “an interpretive schemata 
that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding 
objects, situations, events, experiences, and sequences of actions within one’s present or past 
environment.”  Media scholar Robert Entman (1993: 52) is more succinct, defining the verb form 
of the word: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text.”  In general terms, a frame is a boundary that focuses on some 
elements while leaving other elements out of view.   
 Drawing attention to these different definitions of frames and framing (along with even 
more definitions I do not list above), communications scholars have recently called for a 
realignment of our understanding of framing.  Cacciatore, Scheufele, and Iyengar (2016: 8) urge 
scholars across the disciplines of sociology, communications, and political science to “abandon 
the general term ‘framing’ altogether and instead distinguish between different types of 
framing.”  In this dissertation, I focus on media frames and media framing. 
Media framing explains how one event can be described in completely different ways by 
different journalists without altering any facts about the event.  For example, if 100 activists 
gather in a public space and 90 of them stand peacefully, holding protest signs that clearly 
articulate their message, while 5 of them are dressed in fairy costumes and engage in some sort 
of performance art, and another 5 throw glass bottles at police, three distinct stories can be 
produced.  Depending on which frames journalists choose to present, one might tell the story of 
peaceful protesters who have an important message, another might tell the story of a few 
ridiculous individuals dressed in costumes that have no apparent meaning, and another might tell 
the story of a violent protest in which activists viciously attacked police.  The act of creating and 
telling each of these stories is media framing in practice. 
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Media frames are the words and phrases used by journalists and other media actors to 
convey their interpretation of some phenomenon.  In the example above, the journalist who tells 
the story of the peaceful protest will use a “peaceful” frame, along with other frames that might 
normalize or legitimize the movement (e.g. “normal,” or “patriotic”).  The journalist who tells 
the story of the activists in fairy costumes will use frames that highlight individuals’ appearance 
or behavior (e.g. “freak,” or “ignorant”).  Finally, the journalist who tells a story of activist 
attacks on police will use frames that demonize protesters (e.g. “violent,” or “radical”).   
Chapter Outlines 
 In chapter 2, I outline my theoretical framework for analyzing the relationship between 
mass media and social movements.  I give an overview of the literature on the relationships 
between social movements and mass media, where those approaches are lacking, and how I will 
address and develop them in later chapters.  I integrate literature on media power (Cook 1998; 
Hallin 1986; McChesney 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Schudson 2002; Sparrow 1999), the 
protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999), and framing (Benford 
and Snow 2000; Maney et al. 2009; Snow et al. 1986) in order to form the partisan media 
paradigm, a more complete framework for analyzing U.S. television news coverage of social 
movements in the 21st century.  The partisan media paradigm views the television news field as a 
source of power that promotes and upholds hegemonic norms, which affects social movements 
and, ultimately, social change. 
 In chapter 3 I use mixed methods, analyzing over eleven thousand TV news transcripts to 
track the ways in which TV news media discuss social movements and the characteristics of 
activists over time.  I ask whether the protest paradigm framework is still relevant in a 
contemporary TV media field in which some networks target narrow niches based on political 
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ideologies.  The protest paradigm is widely cited in sociology, communications, and political 
science research on media coverage of social movements.  It argues that all mainstream media 
cover protest events in ways that marginalize protesters, commensurate with how radical a 
movement is perceived to be (McLeod and Hertog 1999).  I find that news coverage of each 
movement differs in measurable, patterned ways depending on the tactics of each movement and 
on their respective alignments with the status quo.  In line with the protest paradigm (McLeod 
and Hertog 1992, 1999), coverage of OWS is driven by violence and arrests, while coverage of 
the TPM switches from largely adhering to the protest paradigm to ignoring TPM protest events 
and focusing on a more legitimized form of electoral politics coverage.  Additionally, and in 
contrast to the protest paradigm literature, I find that some TV news outlets shift between 
mainstream and alternative categories (McLeod and Hertog 1992) depending on whether they are 
covering the TPM or OWS, and that this shifting can best be explained using an adapted version 
of Hallin’s (1986) theory of spheres of political discourse.  My findings lead to the formulation 
of the partisan media paradigm, which accounts for an ideologically segmented mainstream 
media field. 
 In chapter 4, I use quantitative methods to test whether TV news transcripts covering the 
TPM and OWS support or contradict prior research on framing and substantive coverage of 
social movements (Amenta et al. 2012; Boykoff 2006; Taylor and Gunby 2012).  While some 
scholars have argued that coverage of violent protests opens the door to more coverage of the 
underlying issues (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002), others found that the violence 
frame does not lead to more substantive coverage (Boykoff 2006).  Still other research has found 
that coverage of protest events does lead to increased activist quoting and paraphrasing, but that 
coverage of social movements engaged in institutionalized tactics leads to more coverage of the 
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movement’s overall message (Amenta et al. 2012).  While my results support some of these 
findings, they contradict others.  My results also add to existing research by expanding on the 
negative frames used in prior research (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Taylor and Gunby 
2012), and adding positive frames.  Taken together, these results provide a more nuanced picture 
of the relationship between various framing devices and substantive reporting than prior research 
has offered.  
 In chapter 5, I use discourse analysis to examine the framing process.  I move the under-
theorized framing literature forward and uncover the processes through which specific framing 
devices lead to substantive coverage.  I illustrate how positive frames are used to emphasize 
aspects of a social movement that adhere to hegemonic norms on most TV news networks.  On 
TV networks whose target audience views a social movement as outside of the sphere of 
consensus, negative frames are used more frequently and emphasize aspects of a social 
movement that violate hegemonic limits.  Nevertheless, both positive and negative frames occur 
alongside substantive coverage of movements’ issues.  My explanation of the gateways model 
shows how negative and positive frames take specific paths to substantive coverage, exposing a 
communication pattern in which one frame opens up the path for other frames to be used. 
 In the final chapter, I explore the implications of these findings.  I give further 
interpretations of my results, including what those results mean in the context of the 
contemporary media field and how they apply to broader political discourse beyond social 
movements.  I also suggest directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER 2.  
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: MEDIA AS POLITICAL INSTITUTION 
 
Introduction 
In this dissertation, I integrate literature on media power (Hallin 1986; Iyengar, Peters 
and Kinder 1982; McChesney 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 
2012), the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999), and framing 
(Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986) in order to form a more complete framework for 
analyzing media coverage of social movements in the 21st century.  Based partially on Cook’s 
(1998), Sparrow’s (1999), and Schudson’s (2002) conceptualizations of news media as political 
institutions, this framework views the media field as a source of power that promotes and 
upholds the status quo, which effects social movements and, ultimately, social change. 
In this chapter, I provide a summary of the theoretical framework that guides this project.  
I start with the theoretical foundation of the news media system as a political institution.  I then 
give an overview of the state of the literature on the relationships between social movements and 
mass media, where those approaches are lacking, and how I will address and develop them in 
later chapters.  Next, I explain the “protest paradigm,” the problems with this framework, and 
how I incorporate insights from the organizational, political economy, and cultural models of the 
news in order to improve the protest paradigm model so that it is relevant to our contemporary 
media field.  Finally, I give an overview of the literature on media and social movement framing 
and argue for a theoretical reorientation that pushes framing beyond the typology of diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivating, toward a processual understanding of the trajectories of some 
framing devices. 
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News Media as Political Institution 
 Mass media are linked to political, business, educational, and religious institutions and 
are therefore embedded in society’s power structure (Tichenor, Donahue and Olien 1973; 
Donohue, Olien, and Tichenor 1985; Paletz and Entman 1981; Altschull 1984).  The power 
wielded by the American mainstream media, though limited, is treated as a taken-for-granted fact 
these days.  However, numerous scholars in sociology, communications, and political science 
have developed theories that attempt to explain media power in the U.S.  Cook (1998) argues 
that the news media are essentially an “intermediary institution” in American politics; media 
occupy spaces inside and outside of government, and perform roles similar to those of political 
party organizations and interest groups (pp. 109-110).  The power media have to shape the 
public’s understanding of political and economic issues has been questioned by some, but 
enough empirical research has been conducted since the 1970s to give us a good understanding 
of just how powerful the news media, as an institution, really is. 
 There are four dominant approaches to understanding news media that cut across the 
sociology, political science, and communications literatures: the organizational approach, the 
political economy approach, the cultural approach, and the agenda setting approach.  The first 
three are primarily concerned with how the news is made, while the agenda setting model is 
concerned with the effects of the news on consumers.  However, none of these are mutually 
exclusive; indeed, all are essential for explaining how media function as a political institution.  I 
give a brief overview of each in order to provide a baseline for my overarching framework of 
media as political institution.  I argue for a theoretical reorientation of two lines of research – the 
protest paradigm and media framing of social movements – each reorientation utilizes this 
framework as a theoretical base. 
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The Organizational Approach 
 The organizational approach to the news views the professional norms of journalism  
(Tuchman 1978; Gans 1979; Shoemaker and Reese 1996) and the organizational practices of 
media outlets (Clayman and Reisner 1998; Shoemaker and Reese 1996) as the main determinants 
of what ends up getting covered in the news.  This approach sees journalists as gatekeepers; they 
decide what news is worthy of being reported, and they choose which sources to use for their 
stories.  The organizational practices of journalists and their editors are key to deciding whether a 
social movement event will make it into the paper or onto the television screen (Clayman and 
Reisner 1998).  In order to get media attention, social movements must either take action that is 
spectacular enough to be considered newsworthy (Wouters 2013), or must have elite allies that 
help them gain access to make their news available to journalists (Amenta et al. 2009).   
The organizational approach recognizes that who journalists rely on as sources impacts 
what qualifies as news and how that news is presented (Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Schudson 
2002; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006).  Political and corporate elites are the main source of news 
in the U.S., and so the information that journalists receive for their stories is first filtered through 
those elites (Gans 1979; Shoemaker and Reese 1996).  Journalists rely on political and corporate 
elites because they are considered “official” sources; elites have an unspoken legitimacy that 
adds importance to news stories.  It is also efficient; these elites want their version of events to 
be told, so they make themselves available to journalists.  This added legitimacy and increase in 
the efficiency of news production ultimately means that mass media, inadvertently or not, 
supports the status quo21 (Detenber et al. 2007; Fishman 1980; Sigal 1973; Soley 1992).  
                                                 
21 Of course, reliance on official sources is not the only ‘cause’ that leads to the ‘effect’ of media 
supporting the status quo.  There is a structural bias inherent in journalism “that favors only 
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The organizational approach also recognizes the importance of professional ethics; most 
journalists pride themselves on being neutral observers and strive for objectivity in their 
reporting (Gans 1979).  The professional and ethical codes journalists abide influence how a 
social movement is presented in a media report—as violent, peaceful, rational, or crazy, for 
example.  Because the fundamental operational mode of journalists is to support the status quo, 
any social movement that challenges the status quo will likely get negative coverage while a 
social movement that supports the status quo is likely to get positive coverage; that is, if either 
movement receives any coverage at all.   
There are several problems with the organizational approach.  First, it is limited in that it 
underestimates forces that constrain social movements, and overestimates possibilities for 
change (Ryan 1991).  In addition, the view that journalists strive for objectivity is contradicted 
by the fact that two different media outlets can present the same event in vastly different ways 
(Shoemaker and Reese 1996).  It also places too much emphasis on the power of institutionalized 
norms in news routines.  Boydstun (2013) found that while institutional norms in newsmaking 
have by far the greatest influence on headlines, public opinion also has a significant effect on the 
news stories that end up getting front-page billing.  Finally, it treats news corporations as isolated 
worlds, and fails to locate news practices in the larger political economy.  However, as I will 
explain in the next subsection, the organizational model of news media is not contradicted by the 
political economy approach—it is strengthened by it. 
The Political Economy Approach 
Economic power inequality is the central theme of the political economy approach to 
news media.  Shoemaker and Reese (1996) illuminate a link between the organizational 
                                                                                                                                                             
certain political actors, political events, political programs, and political issues” (Cook 1998: 
111).  This structural bias is rooted in culture and inherently supports the status quo. 
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perspective and political economy perspective: “the larger and more complex a media 
corporation is, the less influence professional routines will have on content” (p. 266).  The 
political economy approach sees media as controlled by corporate monopolies, and a media field 
that acts as a propaganda machine for those who hold power in society.  While the organizational 
approach emphasizes the news routines of journalists, the political economy approach recognizes 
that many of those routines are controlled by a small number of very powerful people whose 
ultimate goal is to maintain that power. 
In order for a for-profit news media outlet to stay alive, it must sell advertisements.  
Therefore, for-profit media is, to a certain extent, beholden to the corporations that buy 
advertisements.  This can prevent journalists from reporting news that might reflect badly on 
some corporations.  For example, in 1998, investigative journalist Roberta Baskin of CBS was 
banned from airing her exposé on Nike sweatshops after Nike offered to financially sponsor the 
Olympics programming airing on their network (Tremblay 2012).  In a similar vein, the rise of 
“infotainment” or soft news (Schudson 2003) might be partly due to higher ratings for such 
television programming and higher readership of tabloids; a bigger audience means that a media 
outlet can charge advertisers more, which means more profits for the corporate media.  
Infotainment is aired at the expense of more hard-hitting stories that would strengthen 
democracy by educating the public (McChesney 1997). 
Some social movements have anti-capitalist agendas; their ultimate goals are very much 
against the interests of a for-profit corporate media structure.  This suggests that anti-capitalist 
social movements will get shallow or negative coverage – if any coverage at all – and pro-
capitalist or corporate-sponsored movements will receive more coverage than other types of 
movements, or more positive coverage than negative.  Movements that are not politically 
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oriented and do not challenge the status quo might enjoy the same advantages.  Movements 
opposed to specific corporations or corporate practices may not get any coverage if those 
corporations also have controlling interests in a television network, newspaper, magazine, or 
radio station. 
The political economy approach to media centers on ownership; because media 
ownership is centralized in the U.S., with 6 corporations currently controlling 90% of all media 
consumed in this country, the powerful are able to easily maintain the status quo.  Bagdikian 
(1997) argues that the lack of diversity in media ownership is directly responsible for the lack of 
diversity in the media marketplace of ideas: “A public used to a narrow range of ideas will come 
to regard this narrowness as the only acceptable condition” (p. 67).  This view would lead us to 
expect that pro-capitalist activists will be covered positively or depicted as peaceful and patriotic 
on the news, and anti-capitalist activists will be covered negatively as ignorant troublemakers 
and shown being arrested or engaging in violence.  We would then expect the majority of media 
consumers to accept these depictions as reality, thereby reinforcing the status quo.  
Capitalism also affects which news stories become major topics of discourse.  Because 
news outlets must compete with each other, when a “hot” story is covered on one outlet it tends 
to be repeated across multiple outlets that fear losing their audience if they fail to cover the story 
(Boydstun 2013).  However, the capitalist economy has led to an evolving media structure in 
which cable news channels attempt to appeal to narrow audiences (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013; 
Levendusky 2013; Guardino and Snyder 2012), so those media outlets with ideologically narrow 
audiences may offer versions of the same story that diverge from mainstream broadcast news.   
 A major limitation of the political economy approach is that it denies the importance and 
possible effectiveness of alternative media.  News generated by not-for-profit outlets is available, 
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though it is not as easily accessed as for-profit media.  Nevertheless, the Internet now provides 
greater access for newsmakers and consumers alike to gather information—be it factual 
information or not.22  The corporate media are not the be-all and end-all of news in the U.S.; 
however, the medium of television news is overwhelmingly dominated by for-profit 
corporations. 
Critics note that, using the logic of the political economy approach, a social movement 
protesting against economic inequality should not get any news coverage since their cause 
undermines that of the corporate media owners; yet, those movements do sometimes get 
attention from mainstream media.  However, these critics ignore the fact that coverage of 
protests that oppose the status quo is almost exclusively marginalizing and negative (Dardis 
2006; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999; Shoemaker 1984).  Positive coverage occurs 
only if a movement does not challenge the status quo (Barker-Plummer 2002; Boykoff and 
Laschever 2011; Kensicki 2001).  In addition, the majority of social movement actions never get 
any press at all (Sobieraj 2011; Wouters 2013).  By giving negative coverage to anti-status quo 
movements, or ignoring them altogether, the corporate owners’ interests are not undermined.  In 
chapter 5, I explain how different television networks focus on aspects of social movements that 
either adhere to or violate hegemonic norms, and use either positive or negative frames to 
describe characteristics of the movement depending on the target audience of the network.  
The Cultural Approach 
The cultural model of newsmaking views power as interwoven with social practices, not 
just nested in economics as the political economy approach sees it, and not confined to work 
routines as the organizational approach sees it.  Tuchman (1978) argues that the news is a social 
                                                 
22 The dissemination of “fake news” on social media became a major concern in the aftermath of 
the 2016 U.S. Presidential election (Isaac 2016). 
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construct (shaped by the organizational practices of reporters) and the media create and modify 
shared meanings, thereby shaping public definitions.  That does not mean media producers alone 
control culture; the cultural approach recognizes that media are embedded in existing cultures, 
and use existing cultural symbols to shape their stories and reinforce stereotypes (Schudson 
2002: 260-1).  
A cultural approach sees “media as an arena of ideological struggle in which social forces 
contend to define an issue and its significance” (Ryan 1991: 18; see also Ferree et al. 2002).  
Social movements attempt to frame issues in ways that help their cause, but news producers can 
shape a social movement’s message, possibly distorting it.  Even if media are not the sole 
producers of culture, they are still central to public discourse; journalists and news producers are 
the mediating factors between social movements and their targets (Koopmans 2004; Ferree et al. 
2002).  The way a movement is framed in the news has an impact on the public’s perception of 
the movement, and activists have little control over the way media choose to frame them 
(Sobieraj 2010).  For example, in his study of the media’s representation of Students for a 
Democratic Society (SDS), Gitlin (1980) argues that, although coverage of the movement 
increased mobilization at first, the delegitimizing frames the media used to depict SDS 
eventually led to its unraveling. 
A cultural approach to the news also includes an understanding that news producers make 
assumptions about what their audience will find interesting or acceptable, and journalists cover 
the news in ways that align with these assumed cultural values.  Hallin (1986) developed the 
concept of “spheres of discourse” to explain why some issues get serious media attention; if a 
social movement’s goals are in line with hegemonic norms, news media will cover the 
movement in a serious way rather than a delegitimizing way.  Hallin described news items as 
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falling into one of three spheres of political discourse: a sphere of consensus, a sphere of 
legitimate controversy, and a sphere of deviance.  Topics in the sphere of consensus are those on 
which there is widespread agreement; because of this perceived agreement, news producers take 
for granted that the audience will agree with the journalist’s view on a topic and do not feel the 
need to present an opposing view.  Topics in the sphere of legitimate controversy are those on 
which the public holds differing opinions; recognizing this, journalists report on those topics in 
balanced and objective ways.  Topics in the sphere of deviance are perceived by journalists to 
fall so far outside of traditional norms that they are portrayed negatively, or not portrayed at all.  
  Critics of the cultural approach claim that it denies the consuming public’s agency in 
interpreting and defining situations.  For example, Gamson and Modigliani (1989) argue that 
audiences also make their own meanings out of what they see in the media; people are not 
passive consumers.  Entman (1989) acknowledges the agency of the media’s audience, but 
argues that neither the media nor the audience alone can control the ways in which media mold 
public opinion.  In addition, while Hallin (1986) applied his “three spheres” theory to 
mainstream media in general, I recognize that not all media outlets attempt to appeal to the 
widest audience possible.  Wade (2011: 1181) makes the case for the idea that “under the 
conditions of consensus, reporters can act much like activists.”  She argues that, “By choosing 
frames that facilitate consensus, journalists can engage in advocacy and still make claims to 
objectivity” (ibid.: 1182).  In chapter 3 I argue that – although journalistic norms require 
objectivity for controversial issues – FNC and MSNBC cater to partisan audiences, and so their 
professional norms allow journalists to advocate for causes and social movements when the 
cause or social movement falls within the sphere of consensus for that specific audience.  I offer 
a reinterpretation of Hallin’s spheres that sees the spheres as applying to each individual media 
  34 
outlet’s intended audience.  Thus, news media geared toward a conservative audience will have a 
different sphere of consensus than one that targets a more liberal audience. 
Media Agenda Setting 
 While the organizational, political economy, and cultural models focus on the 
newsmaking process, agenda-setting theory focuses on the effects of that process.  Agenda-
setting theory borrows from the cultural and political economy approaches; six large 
corporations control mainstream media outlets in the U.S.—they set the agenda and mold culture 
(McChesney 1997).  According to this theory, the media do not tell us what to think, but what to 
think about (Cohen 1963; McCombs and Shaw 1972).  The more an issue or topic is covered in 
the media, the more that issue or topic will be seen as important by the public.   
Experimental and longitudinal research has provided evidence to support agenda-setting 
theory; TV news does affect which problems American viewers take to be important (Cook et al. 
1983; Iyengar et al. 1982; Iyengar and Kinder 2010).  The relative agenda setting power of TV 
versus newspapers differs depending on the situation, with newspapers usually having the 
stronger effect (McCombs 2004).  Researchers have also found that the media’s power of agenda 
setting is weakened among those who are more politically engaged in general, “presumably 
because their priorities are more firmly anchored” (Iyengar and Kinder 2010: 118).  In other 
words, those who are more informed about politics in general are more likely to hold strong 
opinions about what is or is not important, regardless of whether it is being covered in the 
mainstream news.  However, the majority of Americans are not very politically engaged, and are 
thus more easily swayed by mainstream media to think that the most important issue is whatever 
is getting the most attention in the news (see Alexander 2010).   
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  This is pertinent to social movements because media control whether a movement’s 
agenda gets publicity.  Whether the news coverage is negative or positive, getting publicity puts 
the issues that the social movement is concerned with on the public agenda.  Even if the coverage 
is shallow, and does not offer an in-depth look at the issues (Boykoff 2006; Sobieraj 2010), the 
movement itself becomes fodder for public debate.  Are the Tea Partiers a bunch of right-wing 
extremists?  Are the Occupiers a bunch of filthy anarchists?  Agenda-setting theorists believe 
that if these movements are covered in the news, then news consumers will see them as 
important and might look further into topics to decide for themselves whether or not the issues a 
movement is fighting for have merit. 
 Members of the general public are not the only consumers of news, of course.  Political 
elites also consume news media, and are affected by it as well.  Walgrave and Vliegenthart 
(2012) found that media act as an intermediary between social movements and government in 
Belgium.  Their analysis of a large data set encompassing seven years of protest events and 
parliamentary and legislative actions showed that the more media coverage a protest gets, the 
more likely it is to make it on the political agenda.  The authors conceptualize the political 
agenda as an increase in votes held on an issue rather than votes cast in favor of an issue.  While 
it may not always lead to legislative changes, the attention alone is indicative of a change in the 
political agenda.  Thus, protests can affect the political agenda, but they do so by first getting 
media attention.  
The Contemporary U.S. Media as Political Institution 
 
Taken together, these four dominant models of the news point to the general idea that the 
news media are a political institution.  While it may appear oxymoronic to refer to the plural of 
medium as a singular institution, sociologists define institutions broadly as “social practices that 
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are regularly and continuously repeated, are sanctioned and maintained by social norms, and 
have a major significance in the social structure,” and political institutions as those that “regulate 
the use of, and access to, power” (Abercrombie et al. 2006: 200).  The mass media is a social 
institution in the sense that it acts as an agent of socialization, perpetuating societal values and 
norms (Croteau and Hoynes 2003), and a political institution in the sense that media gatekeepers 
(i.e., producers and owners) decide who gets access to this particular arena of the public sphere 
(see Ferree et al. 2002) and thus who has the power to shape definitions of what constitutes 
“news.”  Although some scholars refer to the media as a set of institutions (e.g. Schudson 2002; 
Starr 2004), the meaning is the same: this “set” is bound together and functions as a single 
institution on a broad level.  The biases, sociocultural and economic worldviews (cultural 
model), and professional practices of journalists (organizational model), along with the 
organizational and economic considerations of media corporations (political economy model) all 
lead media to perpetuate hegemonic norms (Gitlin 1982), or what some call “the status quo” 
(Detenber et al. 2007; Dimmick and Coit 1982; Herman and Chomsky 1988; Hertog and 
McLeod 1995; Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Tichenor, Donohue, and Olien 1973).  This sets the 
agenda, not only for what the media-consuming public takes to be important, but for the 
legislative agendas of political elites as well (Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). 
While political scientist Douglass Cater (1959) was the first to argue that the news media 
are a “fourth branch of government,” Timothy Cook (1998) was the first to set forth “a clear 
model that sees the news media as a coherent intermediary institution without which the three 
branches established by the Constitution could not act and could not work” (p. 2).  Cook justifies 
this assertion by detailing the symbiotic relationship between the three branches of government 
and the media, showing that government relies on the media to disseminate the news. 
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Although he does touch on the political economy and cultural perspectives, Cook relies 
most heavily on the organization model of the news to justify his assertion that news media are a 
political institution.  Though he acknowledges differences between media outlets, Cook argues 
that the process of newsmaking, dictated by professional and organizational norms of journalism, 
causes news outlets to be more alike than they are different.  For example, news organizations 
“converge on official sources to benefit from information subsidies, which gives them all a 
similar reliance on political power” (p. 76).  In addition to similarities in news processes, news 
content is similar across outlets and “likeness is at its height among those news organizations 
that partake of the same format and conceptions of an audience, such as the three broadcast 
networks [ABC, CBS, and NBC]” (p. 80).  As an important aside, Kerbel (1994) found that 
coverage of the 1992 Presidential election on ABC (one of the three major broadcast networks) 
was very similar to CNN (one of the three major cable networks).  This indicates “the strong 
similarities of news processes and news content across modalities (television, radio, newspapers, 
and newsmagazines), size of organization, national or local audiences, etc., [which] point to the 
news media as a single institution” (Cook 1998: 84).  
While he makes a persuasive argument for his theory, Cook fails to note that mainstream 
media support the status quo.  He even goes so far as to criticize other scholars for asserting that 
mainstream media do support the status quo (p. 97).  This could stem from his orientation as a 
political scientist.  As a sociologist, I see the status quo as the existing social structure and 
values, on a macro level (see chapter 1 for my full definition).  Cook seems to see status quo on a 
micro scale, specifically entailing the existing state of affairs according to whoever is in political 
power at a given point in time.  Thus, Cook might see a reporter criticizing a Republican-
controlled Congress for drafting a bill without holding hearings as anti-status quo because of its 
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criticism of the party in power, while I would argue that it is supporting the status quo by subtly 
perpetuating the idea that Congress has legitimate authority to hold hearings, draft bills, and 
debate and vote on them.  Rather, a criticism of the existence of Congress would be anti-status 
quo.  In fact, when Cook (1998) writes: “journalism, as a collective enterprise across individuals 
and indeed across organizations, implicitly contains an entire series of assumptions about how 
the world works, and how the world should work, that bring with it a limited set of political 
interpretations” (p. 166), I see that as an implicit acknowledgement that news media uphold the 
status quo. 
Another political scientist, Bartholomew Sparrow (1999), relies on the organizational, 
cultural, and political economy models about equally in his rationalization of the news media as 
a political institution.  In contrast to Cook, Sparrow shows “that the media may be considered 
essentially conservative in the sense of upholding the status quo” (p. 137).  He comes to this 
conclusion from a political economy perspective that focuses on media ownership, advertising, 
the profit motive, and conflicts of interest, but also the culture of news organizations, the 
hierarchical relationship between media owners, executive producers, and the journalists who are 
subordinate to them both, reliance on a limited number of “official” sources – i.e. political elites 
– and the limited repertoire of news frames.   
Sparrow argues that the news media are not “public guardians, able to protect the national 
interest against government corruption” (p. 2).  Rather, the media are highly constrained in their 
coverage of politics and economics because they are subject to external control from political 
elites who choose what information to give journalists, and from corporate executives who make 
the final decision on what will be printed or broadcast.  Referring to the limited repertoire of 
frames journalists use, Sparrow claims (p. 124): 
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[T]he casting of news in nationalist, democratic, pro-capitalist, anti-communist, and 
individualist frames is consistent with the pro-market and strong-defense positions of the 
U.S. government… these frames are also consistent with the continuation of existing 
budgets and administrative configurations.   
 
Thus, the way journalists frame news stories also supports the status quo.  This is true of 
mainstream media, including mainstream news outlets that cater to partisan audiences. 
 Although the press in the first hundred years of America’s existence as a sovereign nation 
is described as being highly partisan (Ladd 2012; Starr 2004), today’s press, especially cable 
news networks Fox News Channel and MSNBC, is even more polarized and contentious 
(Levendusky 2013).  This is important to consider because partisan media outlets cover issues so 
differently, which suggests that there is not a singular public that is affected by media coverage, 
but a segmented public that is affected by only the specific media they consume.  Although the 
partisan media tend to cover the same stories, they each advance different interpretations of those 
stories.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, Arceneaux and Johnson (2013) found that the effects of partisan 
media are minimal; rather than changing people’s minds, partisan media simply attract those who 
are already politically like-minded, and reinforce their existing views.   
 The ideologically segmented television news field and the status of news media as 
political institution have implications for social movements.  The cultural, organizational, and 
political economy aspects of newsmaking each influence which movements receive coverage, 
how much coverage they get, and the quality of that coverage (e.g. shallow or substantive, 
positive or negative).  In the next section I review the relevant literature on the specific 
relationship between news media and social movements. 
Social Movements and the News 
The best explanations for the relationship between media and social movements 
incorporate more than one of the newsmaking models described above.  Coming from the 
  40 
organizational, political economy, and cultural perspectives, scholars have examined how news 
routines, media ownership, and social movement goals and tactics explain why movements seek 
media attention, why and how movements get media coverage, what kinds of coverage they get, 
and how that coverage influences some social movement outcomes.  In this section I give a brief 
overview of the state of the literature on media and social movements and identify areas in need 
of further development, which I address in this dissertation. 
Researchers have found that most social movements receive little to no news coverage 
(Sobieraj 2011; Wouters 2013) and those that do get media attention tend to receive negative or 
shallow coverage (Amenta et al. 2009; Boyle et al. 2012; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1999; 
Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011).  News media tend to focus on drama and spectacle rather than 
substance; descriptions of protests focus on the activities and behavior of activists, especially if 
violence is involved, while largely ignoring the issues being protested (Amenta et al. 2009; 
Boykoff 2006; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011).  Coverage can bring public attention to the 
movement itself, but rarely to the substantive issues the movement would like to be brought to 
the public’s attention; this undermines movement agendas (Smith et al. 2001).  However, some 
research shows that favorable coverage does occur in some circumstances (Amenta et al. 2012; 
Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Weaver and Scacco 2013), and in-depth coverage can occur even 
when negative framing devices are used in that coverage (Taylor and Gunby 2016).   
Many studies have shown that news media are critical of groups that challenge the status 
quo (e.g. Entman and Rojecki 1993; Gitlin 1980; Hertog and McLeod 1995; McLeod and Hertog 
1992, 1999; Murdock 1981; Shoemaker 1984; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011) while other 
types of movements tend to be covered positively (e.g. Kensicki 2001; Milne 2005; Rohlinger 
2002; Walgrave and Manssens 2000).  Shoemaker (1984) found that movements that are 
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perceived as anti-status quo, or deviant, (such as the KKK and the Communist Party) are 
delegitimized by media, and movements perceived as mainstream or low in deviance (such as the 
League of Women Voters, the NRA, and the NAACP) are legitimated.  There is a relative 
consensus among scholars of media and social movements that the more radical change a 
movement seeks, the less impartial and objective news coverage is, and movements have little to 
no control over how the media frame their issues (Baylor 1996; Entman and Rojecki 1993; 
McCarthy et al. 1996; Sobieraj 2011). 
 Most research on the relationship between movement outcomes and media focuses on the 
media’s effect on movement mobilization.  It has been established that more mass media 
coverage, no matter what kind, leads to increased movement mobilization (Andrews and Biggs 
2006; Banerjee 2013; Koopmans 2004; Lipsky 1968; Myers 2000).  The consequences of 
negative or positive coverage have not received as much scholarly attention as the consequences 
of coverage in general, but negative coverage may lead to movement disintegration if the issues 
the movement attempts to bring into the public consciousness are ignored or ridiculed to the 
point of damaging a movement’s credibility (Gitlin 1980).  In addition, if the movement has 
political goals, the elites who are capable of changing legislation to address movement concerns 
may not take the movement seriously, and will ignore their concerns.   
Others conceptualize media coverage as a movement outcome in itself, asking questions 
such as why some movements get more media coverage while others get less (Amenta et al. 
2009; Andrews and Caren 2010).  Scholars have found that protests that are violent and/or 
involve arrests get more news coverage (Amenta et al. 2009; Amenta et al. 2012; Earl et al. 
2004; Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993; McCarthy et al. 1996; Murdock 1981; Sobieraj 2011).  The 
focus on violence at social protests may be explained by cultural values – the American 
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consumer’s “deep fascination with violence and transgression” (Schudson 2002: 262) – just as 
much as organizational journalistic norms.  Some suggest that when media cover violence and/or 
arrests, they fail to cover the issues or to give activists the chance to speak for themselves (Boyle 
et al. 2012; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  Other scholars have argued that coverage 
of the violence at the 1999 WTO protests in Seattle actually led to more in-depth coverage of the 
issues being protested (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002).  Boykoff (2006) challenged 
this argument directly, and found no correlation between the violence frame and substantive 
coverage.  However, he did not examine different types of the violence frame, instead combining 
descriptions of actual violence, the potential for violence, and a lack of violence into one broad 
frame.  In chapter 4, I test whether various forms of the violence frame are correlated with 
substantive coverage. 
Despite the problems with negative and shallow coverage, social movements still seek 
out media attention.  Although there are multiple public spheres (Habermas 1996), mainstream 
media is the dominant force, or “master forum” (Ferree et al. 2002), and movements see mass 
media as the primary mode of access to the public sphere (Sobieraj 2011).  When a social 
movement gets media attention, it informs the public of the movement’s very existence and can 
increase mobilization just by making it known to the public that such an organization is out there 
(Gitlin 1980; Vliegenthart et al. 2005).  News coverage is also necessary for achieving outcomes 
such as standing and positive framing, which can help social movements to influence political 
agendas (Koopmans 2004; Walgrave and Vliegenthart 2012). 
 Indeed, some movements are covered positively or legitimized by mainstream media. 
Positive coverage of a movement with political goals can lead to political elites taking those 
concerns seriously and making at least symbolic gestures to address the concerns (Walgrave and 
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Vliegenthart 2012).  However, positive coverage has only been found to occur if a movement 
does not challenge the status quo (Barker-Plummer 2002; Kensicki 2001).  Barker-Plummer 
(2002) argues that the National Organization for Women was seen as legitimate and not as big a 
challenge to the status quo as radical feminists; they operated through institutionalized means, so 
they got positive coverage.  Kensicki (2001) argues that the uniformly positive coverage of a 
deaf students’ movement relied on the following factors: organized protests were peaceful; elites 
were assimilated within the protest movement; the movement had corporate sponsors; activists 
worked well with, and had access to, journalists; and the focus of the movement was narrow (one 
goal). 
While not challenging the status quo can help a social movement get good press, the 
perception that a movement is for or against the status quo can vary by media outlet.  Hallin  
(1986) developed the “spheres” concept to explain why some issues are not covered objectively 
by mainstream media, and explained how protests against the Vietnam War moved over time 
from the “sphere of deviance” through the “sphere of legitimate controversy” to the “sphere of 
consensus,” although the public’s view of this changed faster than the mainstream media’s.  As I 
will explain in more detail in chapter 3, not only can perceptions change over time, but different 
media outlets can present opposing perceptions simultaneously.  For example, a program airing 
on Fox News Channel might present the Tea Party movement as a group of average Americans 
holding a patriotic rally, but flip the channel to MSNBC and you might see the Tea Party 
movement presented as a bunch of racist freaks who hate the President, protesting policies they 
do not understand. 
While news coverage of protests is important, relatively few scholars have paid attention 
to the fact that movements are often covered for reasons that have nothing to do with protest 
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events.  Some suggest that news outlets operating in competitive capitalist systems imitate each 
other, often chasing the hot new story of the day (Baumgartner and Jones 2009; Boydstun 2013; 
Vliegenthart and Walgrave 2010).  This can lead to a social movement becoming a story in itself.  
Seguin (2016) argues that this kind of media attention to social movements is due to positive 
feedback:  “like other positive feedback systems, media attention is path dependent and routinely 
punctuated by large cascades of attention” (p. 998).  If one movement becomes the “hot new 
story,” journalists sometimes go out of their way to mention the movement in relation to some 
other news item; in other words, “past attention encourages future attention” (Seguin 2016: 
1016).  This happened with both the TPM and OWS, but the TPM “cascade” lasted much longer.  
News coverage of protest events changes over time and is sensitive to ongoing political 
processes such as the response of the government to contentious protest behavior (Gottlieb 2015; 
Oliver and Maney 2000).  In chapter 3, I explore how TV news coverage of the TPM and OWS 
change over time in patterned ways related to the tactics of each movement and with their 
respective alignments with the status quo. 
Amenta and colleagues (2012) examine both protest and non-protest focused coverage, 
and take a “story-centered” approach to evaluating the quality of media coverage a social 
movement gets.  They find that when a story is initiated by disruptive social movement action 
(which the authors define as any protest, march, or demonstration, whether or not it includes civil 
disobedience), the movement’s message is less likely to be covered.  In contrast, when a story is 
initiated by institutional action such as running candidates for office or fighting to pass 
legislation, the movement’s message is more likely to be covered (p. 89).  Their study is limited 
in two important ways: they are looking solely at the case of the Townsend Plan, which was 
active in the first half of the 20th century, and the only form of media they examine is newspaper 
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coverage.  In chapter 4, I test whether this theory holds for two 21st century movements and their 
television (TV) coverage.   
While it is important to consider news coverage that does not center on protest events, the 
fact remains that most coverage of social movements does focus on protest events.  One strand of 
theory that I have not touched on yet, but which has significantly contributed to our 
understanding of how and why social protests get such negative coverage, is the protest 
paradigm.  This model is based on the idea that media outlets adhere to different journalistic 
paradigms, an organizational approach that recognized multiple journalistic routines (Chan and 
Lee 1984).  In the next section, I describe the origins of the protest paradigm and explain how it 
developed, recent critiques of the model, and how I intend to address those critiques. 
The Protest Paradigm 
The idea that there are three distinct journalistic paradigms of protest coverage originated 
with Chan and Lee (1984) and was further developed by a handful of U.S. scholars in the 
communications field into what is now known as the protest paradigm.  A product of news 
production traditions and norms, the protest paradigm is “a routinized pattern or implicit 
template for the coverage of social protest” said to be followed by mainstream media outlets in 
the U.S. (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 311).  In contrast to the three journalistic paradigms of 
protest coverage that Chan and Lee (1984) describe, McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999) argue that 
mainstream U.S. media outlets tend to adhere to one paradigm when covering social protest.  
Once thought of as a rather straightforward framework that applies to all mainstream news 
coverage of protest events, the protest paradigm has recently come under scrutiny (Reul et al. 
2016; Trivundza and Brlek 2017; Weaver and Scacco 2013).  In this section, I give an overview 
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of the protest paradigm literature and offer a modification of it that addresses the problems 
highlighted by these recent critics. 
Origins of the Protest Paradigm 
Chan and Lee (1984) developed their theory based on the reality that the press in Hong 
Kong “is linked to political party organizations, is loyal to party goals, and caters to partisan 
audiences” (p. 185).  Chan and Lee use the concept of a paradigm to mean “a ‘metaphysical’ 
world view or gestalt that defines the entities of concern, indicates to journalists where to look 
(and where not to look), and informs them about what to discover” (p. 187).  Arguing that 
political ideology structures journalistic paradigms of protest coverage, the authors observed 
three distinct journalistic paradigms: the rightist paradigm was more likely than the leftist and the 
centrist to support the status quo, to politicize civil protest that does not support the status quo 
(i.e. to compare it to other political events and to blame it on external manipulation rather than 
genuine grass-roots activity), and to define protests as defying traditional morality.   
Journalistic paradigms “make newspapers attribute different cause-and-effect 
relationships to civil protests and assign varying degrees of support to protesters” (Chan and Lee 
1984: 188).  In Hong Kong, the rightist paradigm “cannot condone civil protests in which the 
low rises against the high” and stands closer to “the status-quo-minded policies of the Hong 
Kong government” while the leftist paradigm represents the exact opposite of the right (ibid.: 
189).  Centrist newspapers would “support a mild civil protest participated in by a large segment 
of potential readership with a clearly just cause” (ibid. 190, emphasis in original).  I agree with 
Weaver and Scacco (2013) that the U.S. media landscape of today looks far more like what Chan 
and Lee describe of Hong Kong in the 1980s than it did in the 1980s and 90s when U.S. 
communications scholars began formulating the protest paradigm.  However, Weaver and 
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Scacco, who correctly point out that the TPM is a status quo-oriented movement, fail to connect 
this concept to journalistic paradigms of FNC, MSNBC, and CNN.  
Scholars in the U.S. saw journalistic paradigms as a foreign phenomenon and 
reconceptualized this framework as “the protest paradigm” to fit the U.S. context.  To Chan and 
Lee (1984), the political ideology with which each media source is aligned constitutes a distinct 
paradigm, while McLeod and Hertog (1999) conceptualize the protest paradigm in the U.S. 
context to be a form of social control that all mainstream media exert over society.  Rather than 
three journalistic paradigms of protest coverage, McLeod and Hertog argue that there is one 
paradigm of protest coverage in the U.S. media, which they call “the protest paradigm.”  The 
work of other protest paradigm scholars focuses on what factors determine adherence to the 
protest paradigm (e.g. Boyle et al. 2012), how closely mainstream media outlets adhere to this 
specific paradigm (e.g. Reul et al. 2016; Weaver and Scacco 2013), whether media outlets in 
other countries adhere to the protest paradigm (e.g. Shahin et al. 2016; Trivundza and Brlek 
2017), and how adherence to the protest paradigm affects viewers (e.g. Detenber et al. 2007).  I 
argue that this U.S. media context has changed, and that the TV news landscape in the 21st 
century U.S. now looks very much like the newspaper landscape of Hong Kong in the 1980s.  
Thus, recent claims that the protest paradigm is no longer a useful framework (Weaver and 
Scacco 2013) are misguided, while claims that it cannot be applied across all media (Reul et al. 
2016) are on the right track but do not offer a solution. 
The U.S. Protest Paradigm 
McLeod and Hertog are widely credited with developing the protest paradigm for the  
U.S. context.  Inspired by research on media and protest movements from a decade earlier (e.g. 
Chan and Lee 1984; Shoemaker 1984), McLeod and Hertog developed the protest paradigm to 
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explain how negative coverage of social protest comes about.  Shoemaker (1984) argued that the 
more radical a movement is perceived by journalists, the more likely that coverage the group 
receives will be negative.  McLeod and Hertog (1999) used this as a base from which to argue 
that the more radical a movement is perceived to be, the more closely journalists will adhere to 
the protest paradigm when covering the group (p. 311).  McLeod and Hertog theorized that the 
more a social movement challenges the status quo, the more forcefully the mainstream media 
will exert social control by using marginalizing frames (i.e., adhering to the protest paradigm) in 
its coverage of the movement.  This was supported by Boyle and colleagues (2012), who also 
found that a group’s tactics are the main determinant of whether journalists will adhere to the 
protest paradigm when covering a social movement; more extreme or militant tactics led to 
stronger adherence to the protest paradigm.   
Where Chan and Lee focus on a Hong Kong news press that can clearly be divided into 
left, right, and centrist camps – each with more than one newspaper to act as a loudspeaker – 
McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999) focus on a U.S. press that they see as entirely centrist and 
driven by journalistic norms, as the organizational model of media would lead us to expect.  
Although they also include what they call “alternative media” – newspapers produced by and for 
narrow subcultures (e.g. the anarchist press) – McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999) assume 
uniformity across mainstream media outlets that does not apply in today’s ideologically 
segmented media field.   
Hertog and McLeod (1995) compared coverage of anarchist protests across media types 
and formats and found that the differences between mainstream and alternative media accounted 
for far more variance than different forms of media (TV vs. newspapers) and news organizations 
(e.g. city- vs. state-wide newspapers).  However, TV news today is far different from what it was 
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in the 1990s.  In part due to the neoliberal shift in U.S. media (Guardino and Snyder 2012), it is 
segmented in such a way that different networks have different journalistic norms (what Chan 
and Lee refer to as journalistic paradigms).  Therefore, a social movement could be seen by one 
network as deviant while another network finds it within the sphere of consensus (Hallin 1986).  
The protest paradigm was developed using the cases of anarchist and left-leaning social 
movements, but it can apply to any movement.  Weaver and Scacco (2013) were the first to test 
whether the protest paradigm can be applied to a right-wing movement.  They found that it can, 
and that the application of marginalizing frames is conditional on the ideological leaning of each 
media source (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 62).  However, their explanation – “Marginalization 
tactics once used against left-leaning protests have now been adopted by a left-leaning cable 
news outlet” (ibid.: 74) – is rather simplistic and misses the larger point.  They could have used 
this case to argue that mainstream media outlets can sometimes act much like alternative media 
outlets.  Instead, they conclude that “news coverage of protest movements can no longer be 
discussed in terms of ‘the’ protest paradigm if use of legitimation and marginalization frames 
continues to fall along the lines of party or ideology” (ibid.: 78). 
While I agree that the original conceptualization of the protest paradigm needs to be 
readjusted to account for today’s evolved media landscape, I disagree with Weaver and Scacco’s 
(2013) argument that “the” protest paradigm needs to be thrown out entirely.  While they see 
marginalizing and legitimizing framing devices falling along the lines of partisan political 
ideology, I argue that these framing devices fall along the lines of spheres of consensus.  Each 
political party or ideology has its own sphere of consensus – what is considered acceptable or 
deviant.  Indeed, McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999; also see Hertog and McLeod 1995) did not 
claim that all media adhere to the protest paradigm; rather, they distinguished between 
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mainstream and alternative media, and made many of the same claims that Weaver and Scacco 
(2013) make.  Thus, it is not the protest paradigm as a general framework that needs to be thrown 
out, but the idea that media outlets fall into either one of two categories – mainstream or 
alternative – and that those categories are static.  
The protest paradigm can still be a useful framework, but criticisms against it need to be 
addressed.  Reul and colleagues (2016) are on the right track when they say that we need to “let 
go of the notion that the protest paradigm is an univocally applied set of social control 
mechanisms occurring in similar ways across media” (p. 4).  But they fall short of offering a 
solution to the problem.  Trivundza and Brlek (2017) come closer when they argue that a major 
shortcoming of the protest paradigm is that it focuses exclusively on negative framing and 
neglects the potential for positive coverage.  They mention Hallin’s spheres, but fail to articulate 
a redefinition of the protest paradigm that accounts for all variations of legitimizing and 
delegitimizing coverage.  They also fall into the same trap that Weaver and Scacco (2013) find 
themselves by ignoring the fact that the concept of journalistic paradigms originated with the 
idea that different media outlets can cover the same movement in opposite ways (Chan and Lee 
1984).  Likewise, Boyle and colleagues (2012) admit that the rise of partisan news networks such 
as FNC and MSNBC “suggests that the notion that more extreme groups will be treated more 
critically needs continued review and analysis as the nature of news production and 
dissemination continues to evolve” (p. 139).   
In today’s TV news field, cable news outlets FNC and MSNBC may act more like 
alternative media or more like mainstream depending on what they are reporting.  It is not just 
that alternative news sources treat protesters who challenge the status quo in a sympathetic 
way—it is that each news source has its own political orientation; some protest movements will 
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be against it, others in support of it.  In Hallin’s (1986) terms, each news outlet has its own 
sphere of consensus.  In chapter 3, I develop an integration of Hallin’s spheres and the protest 
paradigm to explain how today’s TV news field will treat a given social movement. 
Framing 
One cannot discuss media coverage of social movements without discussing framing.  As 
Entman (1993: 52) succinctly states: “To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality 
and make them more salient in a communicating text.”  The framing perspective was conceived 
by Erving Goffman (1974) and was developed by social movement scholars to explain 
mobilization (e.g. Benford and Snow 2000; Snow et al. 1986).  Frame analysis, the empirical 
compliment to the framing perspective, has been developed by sociologists and communications 
scholars since Goffman’s (1974) seminal work.  While decades of scholarship have brought us a 
depth of knowledge on frame development and framing effects, framing still remains under-
theorized and conceptually vague across disciplines (Cacciatore et al. 2016).  In this section I 
give a brief overview of framing as it applies to social movements and media research, and 
identify areas in need of further development. 
A Brief Overview of the Framing Perspective in Social Movement Research 
David Snow and colleagues, inspired by Goffman’s (1974) work, developed the social 
psychological perspective on collective action framing.  Collective action framing refers 
specifically to the tactics social movement actors employ to organize their ideas in order to 
mobilize potential activists (Snow et al. 1986; Snow and Benford 1988).  To Snow and Benford 
(1992: 137), a frame is “an interpretive schemata that simplifies and condenses the ‘world out 
there’ by selectively punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, experiences, and 
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sequences of actions within one’s present or past environment.”  In other words, frames are 
boundaries that focus on some elements while leaving other elements out of view.   
Snow and Benford (1988) identified three components to collective action framing.    
Activists identify the problem (diagnostic framing), identify a course of action (prognostic 
framing), and create a call to action (motivational framing).  These diagnostic, prognostic, and 
motivational frames are actively created and re-created through social interaction among activists 
and between activists and constituents, the media, and other power holders (Evans 1997).  
Gregory Maney and colleagues (2005) added to our understanding of collective action framing 
by showing how activists can construct their frames as a challenge to hegemony, harness 
hegemony for their own subversive purposes, or use both strategies as a hybrid form of framing 
(see also Coy et al. 2008; Maney et al. 2009).   
A movement puts its own frames forward, hoping media outlets will pick up on them and 
use these frames in their coverage.  A frame must have resonance – similar to what Snow and 
Benford (1992: 140) call “potency,” qualities that culturally resonate with constituents – if it is to 
succeed in provoking reactions from the media or the public (Koopmans 2004).  Coordinating 
and testing frames for cultural resonance at the national level has been a successful strategy that 
movements have used to get media to focus on their preferred frames (Rohlinger 2002).  
Drawing on master frames is the most effective way of doing this because master frames are 
those that are most culturally relevant and accessible (Snow and Benford 1992).  For example, an 
OWS master frame was economic injustice and a TPM master frame was out-of-control 
government spending.  Journalists and pundits whose voices are amplified by media outlets use 
competing frames, which “chip away at the mobilizing potency of the original master frame” 
(Snow and Benford 1992: 150). 
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 Marc Steinberg (1998: 845-846) critiqued Snow’s and Benford’s perspective for focusing 
on “deliberate and focused persuasive communication” and argued for more examination of 
framing’s discursive foundations.  Steinberg, inspired by the work of sociocultural psychologists 
(e.g. Wertsch et al. 1995), views framing as a type of discourse that can both empower and 
constrain the production of meaning;  “hegemony can be achieved by drawing on interpretive 
repertoires to bound the dilemmas that can be represented…a cornerstone of hegemony, is the 
capacity to construct silences within common sense” (Steinberg 1998: 855).  In chapter 5, I show 
how some frames can create silence, in effect shutting down dialog.  In addition, Steinberg calls 
on researchers to investigate “how the boundaries of the field shape the construction of their 
repertoire” (ibid.: 858).  In chapter 5, I examine specifically how TV news as a bounded field 
shapes the way frames are used in a discursive process.  
Media create meanings that are consumed by the public, thus the way that media frame 
issues and events has consequences (see Detenber et al. 2007; Iyengar 1991; Gamson and 
Modigliani 1989; McLeod and Detenber 1999; Nelson et al. 1997).  While we know a lot about 
the process of creating frames, and the implications of collective action framing (e.g. Burke and 
Bernstein 2014; Coy et al. 2008; McCammon et al. 2001; Prior 2014; Snow and Benford 1992; 
Snow and McAdam 2000; Zoch et al. 2008), we know less about the process of frame usage in 
non-print media.  In his “Insider’s Critique of the Social Movement Framing Perspective,” 
Benford (1997: 410) called for “the development of a sociology of framing processes” that has 
yet to be fully addressed.  In chapter 5, I move beyond the processes of diagnostic, prognostic, 
and motivational framing to explain the process of framing that occurs within TV news 
discourse, which I call the gateways model.  My analysis of media framing of two different 
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social movements over multiple years of coverage addresses Benford’s (1997: 411) call for 
“systematic empirical studies across cases, movements, and time.” 
Frames and Framing in Media Research 
It is important to consider the ways in which media frame social movements since news 
reports are often the first way that the public hears about a movement and its grievances 
(Andrews and Biggs 2006; Stryker et al. 1999), and research has suggested that the way media 
frame issues has an affect on the potential for movement success (Banerjee 2013; Gamson 1998).  
“The movement-media transaction is characterized by a struggle over framing” (Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld 1993: 118) in which activists put forth their collective action frames, and media 
outlets adhere to journalistic and organizational norms to frame their news stories.  Social 
movements attempt to transform dominant discourses (Naples 2003) but media elites attempt to 
shift those discourses back to the status quo. 
Some communications scholars see framing as equivalent to agenda-setting (e.g. 
McCombs et al. 1997), while others see framing as complimentary to but distinct from agenda-
setting (e.g. Scheufele 1999).  Scholars who agree with this second line of thought argue that, 
rather than setting the agenda, frames prompt news consumers to think about issues in a desired 
frame of mind (Iyengar 1990, 1991).  Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143) define a frame as a 
central theme or “organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of 
events, weaving a connection among them.”  In chapter 5, I analyze the framing devices used on 
a “strip of events” to uncover how central themes are presented by journalists, and how those 
themes can be modified by guests on TV news programs, thus prompting the audience to switch 
frames of mind.   
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The concepts of thematic and episodic framing, developed by Shanto Iyengar (1991, 
2005), describe the two broad ways news media present topics to the public.  Episodic framing of 
social movements focuses on individual protest events, while thematic framing focuses on the 
broad context of the issues a movement is protesting.  Episodic news frames divert attention 
away from the issues and make the public less likely to support measures to resolve those issues 
(Iyengar 1991).  In chapter 4, I test whether event-related coverage is more likely to include 
more episodic or thematic framing.  Smith and colleagues (2001) found that arrests and violence 
at protest events generated more episodic and less thematic coverage of movements than did 
demonstrations that were not violent; events with violence or arrests “were about half as likely as 
nonconfrontational events to be framed in a way that favored demonstrators” (p. 1414).  In 
chapter 5, I ask how those frames come about, and describe the process of TV news framing that 
can open paths from one frame to another, and transform episodic coverage to thematic 
coverage.  
My analysis is informed by the concept of discursive legacies, which are “well-
established, repetitive, restrictive, and culturally recognized ways of talking and writing about a 
particular issue over time” (Coy et al. 2008: 163).  Even though the TPM and OWS represent 
opposite ends of the political spectrum, used different tactics, and are opposite in terms of 
support for the status quo, the frames journalists use are limited and framing devices for both 
movements should be more similar than different (Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  In 
chapter 3, I present evidence that nearly all of the same frames were used in coverage of both the 
TPM and OWS, but the frequencies of each frame vary by TV news outlet and movement tactics.  
Movement actors are typically delegitimized in the media with discursive legacies in the form of 
frames such as violent, freak, ignorant, insane, or extremist.  This delegitimation is the most 
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common kind of coverage that has been documented by social movement researchers (e.g. 
Boykoff 2006; Gitlin 1980; Sobieraj 2011).  In prior research (Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 
2016), I tested whether negative frames and substantive coverage were mutually exclusive.  I 
examined TV news coverage around protest events specifically and found that negative frames 
such as freak and ignorant correlate strongly with substantive coverage of social movements.  I 
build on this in chapter 4 by examining positive frames as well as negative frames.  In addition, 
scholars are beginning to question the assumption that frames are static across time and media 
outlet (Trivundza and Brlek 2017).  In chapter 5, I show how some frames can be used to 
different ends by competing media outlets. 
I add to our understanding of framing by looking at TV news, where most others look at  
newspapers.  This is important because TV news is less scripted, and guests on TV news 
programs can challenge the journalists’ narrative, which opens up discursive space in ways that 
are not possible in print media.  Framing devices combine to communicate an overall frame (Pan 
and Kosicki 1993; D’Angelo 2002; Entman 1993), but in TV news conflicting framing devices 
can be presented by several speakers, thus communicating a more complicated story.  I extend 
the work of Maney and colleagues (2009), who theorize the ways in which activists and the 
power-holders they challenge attempt to persuade the public, by examining the ways that 
participants in TV news discourse use frames to extend or cut off paths to other frames, and thus 
to alternative ways of understanding social movements and the issues with which they are 
concerned. 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I gave an overview of the literature on the relationships between social 
movements and mass media, where those approaches are lacking, and how I will address and 
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develop them in later chapters.  In this dissertation, I integrate literature on media power (Cook 
1998; Hallin 1986; McChesney 1997; McCombs and Shaw 1972; Schudson 2002; Sparrow 
1999), the protest paradigm (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999), and framing 
(Benford and Snow 2000; Maney et al. 2009; Snow et al. 1986) in order to develop the partisan 
media paradigm, a more complete framework for analyzing U.S. television news coverage of 
social movements in the 21st century.  This framework views the news media field as a source of 
power that promotes and upholds the status quo, which effects social movements and, ultimately, 
social change. 
The theoretical foundation of news media as political institution grounds this research 
(Cook 1998; Schudson 2002; Sparrow 1999).  This grounding takes into consideration the power 
for-profit media have to maintain the status quo through their coverage of social movements.  
This dissertation puts the communications and political science literature into dialog with 
sociological literature on media and social movements, advancing social movement theory by 
focusing on the interplay between culture and power in media coverage of social movements, 
similar to the way that Maney and colleagues (2009) highlight the same interplay in the 
production of collective action frames.  It also advances our knowledge of the relationship 
between social movements and the contemporary TV news field by reframing the protest 
paradigm in terms of Hallin’s spheres in order to account for the ideological segmentation of TV 
news outlets.  Finally, it advances framing by outlining the process by which a given framing 
device can take several paths of discourse that vary by the speaker, the media outlet, and the 
topic of conversation.  I argue for a theoretical reorientation that pushes framing beyond the 
typology of diagnostic, prognostic, and motivating, toward a processual understanding of the 
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trajectory of framing devices when used in an ideologically segmented, pro-status quo, non-print 
media field. 
In chapter 3, I develop the partisan media paradigm, an integration of Hallin’s spheres 
and the protest paradigm that explains how today’s TV news field will treat any given social 
movement.  In chapter 4, I examine the implications of the partisan media paradigm by testing 
whether various negative framing devices are correlated with substantive coverage.  I extend 
prior research by testing whether news coverage initiated by protest action will be more likely to 
include standing, whether news coverage initiated by institutionalized action such as 
electioneering will be more likely than protest coverage to include the message behind the 
movement (Amenta et al. 2012), and whether negative framing devices are more likely to be 
correlated with substantive coverage than positive framing devices (Taylor and Gunby 2016).  In 
chapter 5 I explain the gateways model, which moves beyond the processes of diagnostic, 
prognostic, and motivational framing to explain the process of framing that occurs within TV 
news discourse.   
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CHAPTER 3.  
TV NEWS COVERAGE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OVER TIME 
 
 
Introduction 
 One of the goals of any political social movement is to sway public opinion in some way. 
For example, one of the most common goals stated by the local Tea Party groups that were active 
in 2009 and 2010 was to “make our voices heard,” and another was “to educate the American 
people” (Taylor 2011).  Examining the amount and quality of media coverage is a way of 
measuring the infusion or reach of social movement frames into culture and social 
consciousness.  As renowned sociologist and mass communications scholar Robert McChesney 
says: “The media system is not simply an economic category; it is responsible for transmitting 
culture, journalism, and politically relevant information” (McChesney 2008, p.421).  When 
activists take some action – such as staging a protest or demonstration – some people are directly 
affected by that action or witness that action, but the vast majority of people who hear about the 
action become aware of it through mass media.   
While social movements depend on media coverage to get their message out there, the 
media control the message, and it is not always – nor is it usually – favorable to the protesters. 
Much coverage adheres to the “protest paradigm” (Chan and Lee 1984; McLeod and Hertog 
1992, 1999).  Protest paradigm coverage emphasizes actions rather than issues and focuses on 
activists’ norm violations, thus framing movements in negative ways (McLeod and Hertog 1992; 
McFarlane and Hay 2003).  Researchers acknowledge that the protest paradigm is adhered to by 
mainstream and not by alternative media outlets; however, I argue that the definitions of 
“mainstream” and “alternative” media need to be reconsidered in light of the contemporary TV 
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news landscape.  In addition, the vast majority of protest paradigm literature focuses on leftist or 
anarchist movements and neglects right-wing movements (see Weaver and Scacco 2013 for 
exception), and has not explored whether coverage of a movement changes over time. 
 In this chapter, I ask: Does television news coverage of each movement differ in 
measurable, patterned ways?  How does coverage of each movement change over time?  Is the 
protest paradigm framework still relevant in a contemporary TV media field in which some 
networks target narrow niches based on political ideologies? 
I track the ways in which TV news media discuss social movements and the 
characteristics of activists over time.  I use TV coverage because, despite the recent surge in 
using the Internet as a news source, TV is still the main source of news for Americans today, and 
has been for many years (Pew 2012; Mitchell et al. 2016).  The format of TV news allows 
reporters to be more interpretive than they can be in print news (Sparrow 1999), which affects 
the way discourse unfolds in a newscast.  I find that, in contrast to popular assumptions about 
media’s relationships with the political left and right, there are many similarities in the substance 
of coverage of OWS and the TPM.  However, I find that news coverage of each movement does 
differ in measurable, patterned ways that have to do with the tactics of each movement and with 
their respective alignment with the status quo.  In line with the protest paradigm, coverage of 
OWS is driven by violence and arrests, while coverage of the TPM switches from largely 
adhering to the protest paradigm to ignoring TPM protest events and focusing on a more 
legitimized form of electoral politics coverage.  Additionally, and in contrast to the protest 
paradigm literature, I find that some TV news outlets shift between mainstream and alternative 
categories depending on whether they are covering the TPM or OWS, and that this shifting can 
best be explained using Hallin’s (1986) theory of spheres of political discourse. 
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Data 
 Most research that examines the relationship between social movements and media uses 
newspapers as the primary media source (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Amenta et al. 2009; 
Andrews and Caren 2010; Amenta et al. 2012).  Because the majority of Americans have relied 
on TV for their news over all other sources for the past several decades (Pew 2012), it is more 
appropriate to study TV news coverage of social movements because its influence on cultural 
outcomes such as public opinion will be stronger than that of newspapers, which have steadily 
declined in readership over the past several decades.  In order to measure the content of TV news 
coverage of each movement, I count all nationally televised news transcripts from ABC, CBS, 
NBC, Fox News Channel (FNC), MSNBC, and CNN that cover the TPM and/or OWS.  I 
examine TPM coverage from February 19, 2009 through December 31, 2012, and OWS 
coverage from September 16, 2011 through December 31, 2014, about three years for each 
movement.  Each transcript covers a maximum of one hour of broadcasting, and I measure the 
amount of coverage as a count variable, TV programs.   
 I acquired all TV news transcripts from the LexisNexis News online database. 
LexisNexis offers full transcripts of news programs broadcast in the U.S.23; it captures all events 
during each 24-hour period for all networks in this study, with the exception of both FNC and 
MSNBC, which are only represented during the primetime hours and additional “Special 
Reports” that infrequently occur during the day.  Because these are the two ideologically extreme 
networks (FNC being conservative and MSNBC being liberal), and they are equally represented 
in the LexisNexis database, I do not expect this to result in a bias that would systematically affect 
the coverage of one movement or the other.  
                                                 
23 See http://www.lexisnexis.com/en-us/products/lexisnexis-academic.page for more 
information. 
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 I used the following Boolean strings in my search: “tea w/1 party,” “tax AND protest,” 
“9/12 AND march,”  “occupy w/2 Wall AND Street,” “occupy AND protest,” “occupy w/2 
movement,” “occupy AND Zuccotti,” “occupy AND encampment OR camp.”  This search 
turned up tens of thousands of results, which I read through in order to find relevant transcripts. 
In order to be counted as relevant, the TPM or OWS had to be discussed in some substantial 
way.  Relevant transcripts include any mention of the social movement’s activities, 
characteristics, goals, motivations, successes, or failures.  Examples of irrelevant transcripts 
include the following, from CNN’s Newsroom at 2:30pm on December 4, 2011 in which two 
employees of CNN discuss how difficult it was to narrow down the top 100 stories of the year 
for promotion on the CNN website: “I mean, just looking at the economy, globally, looking at 
the economy in the U.S. and the unemployment, how that’s led to, you know, the ‘Occupy’ 
movement, which is another story we’re seeing huge traction with.”  There was no actual 
discussion of the Occupy movement; it was casually mentioned in passing as “another story” and 
there was no reference to an event or any feature characterizing the movement.  However, such 
brief mentions of a movement do sometimes qualify as relevant. For example, on a December 6 
2011 episode of CNN’s Newsroom at 10 am, the anchor states:  “The ‘Occupy’ movement 
members are taking their protests to Capitol Hill today. The group plans to march to the capitol 
with representatives and occupy congressional offices for the day.”  That is the only time in the 
entire program that OWS is mentioned.  Although this represents just two sentences from a 13-
page transcript, it is a report on actual activities, which is relevant. 
Another example of irrelevance is when a pundit, celebrity, or politician mentions the 
movement briefly and without substance just to criticize it, and the statement itself is treated as a 
standalone story by the news producers.  For example, just about every network covered (often 
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multiples times over the course of several days) a November 2011 speech in which Newt 
Gingrich, who was running in the Republican primary for president at the time, says OWS 
protesters ought to “get a job [and] take a bath.”  When this one sentence of the speech was 
covered without any other mention of OWS, I counted that transcript as irrelevant and removed it 
from the dataset.  Because news producers chose to present this as an off-the-cuff remark, with 
no discussion of the movement’s activities, goals, motivations, successes, or failures, it does not 
represent relevant OWS coverage.  Instead, journalists covered this statement as a Gingrich event 
and ignored the OWS part of it, thereby framing it as a Gingrich gaffe.  For example, in a 
November 21st 2011 episode of The Situation Room that I removed from the sample, the only 
mention of OWS comes when journalist Joe Johns says “Gingrich was in fine form this weekend 
after essentially telling ‘Occupy Wall Street’ protesters that they should go get a job after they 
take a bath. So after all these years, he still has a way with words.”  The journalist frames this in 
such a way that OWS is merely a prop to introduce the Gingrich coverage.  In other transcripts 
that I omitted from my sample, the quote was presented as one among a list of controversial 
statements Gingrich had recently made, and was used to introduce a story looking at Gingrich’s 
presidential run in depth.  However, some programs covered the Newt Gingrich statement and 
included the sentences he spoke before the “take a bath” comment (in which he described what 
he thought were the motivations of OWS), or they presented the “take a bath” comment and then 
went on to discuss OWS; those programs are relevant and I code Gingrich’s statement under the 
“ridicule” frame (see below for discussion of framing). 
The point of making this distinction between relevant and irrelevant transcripts is that I 
am primarily interested in how journalists cover social movements.  Unless one of these ad 
hominem attacks by a pundit or politician is followed or preceded by some context about the 
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social movement, it is not relevant to the questions posed in this project.  When journalists or 
news producers present these brief statements and then leave the conversation with no further 
comment or context, they are, by default, framing the report as something other than social 
movement coverage.  In the case of the transcripts I excluded from the sample, journalists 
framed those statements as reports of politicians’ activities.   
However, if the pundits or politicians make claims about the goals, motivations, or 
general merits of the arguments a movement is making, that transcript is relevant because there is 
actual substance to those comments—they are not just pure spite or ad hominem attacks lacking 
context.  For example, on a December 4, 2011 episode of State of the Union on CNN, 
Congresswoman Michelle Bachman discusses the merits of the Tea Party movement, and then 
states: “If you go to the essence of what occupy wall street [sic] stands for, it’s having other 
people pay for their stuff. That’s not where the American people are at.”  In contrast to the Newt 
Gingrich quote, which essentially tells us that he thinks OWS protesters are lazy and dirty, and is 
presented as an introduction to a news report on Gingrich, not OWS, this quote tells us that 
Michelle Bachman thinks that OWS has an actual goal—getting other people to pay for their 
stuff.  Although she is insulting OWS, and only mentions it briefly, she is discussing something 
substantive about the movement (regardless of whether or not it is true that OWS activists just 
want other people to pay for their stuff) and, because she discusses both OWS and the TPM, this 
transcript counts as relevant for both movements.   
After discarding irrelevant transcripts, I was left with a total of 10,106 transcripts for the 
Tea Party movement from February 2009 through December 2012, and 1,267 transcripts for the 
Occupy movement from September 2011 through December 2014.  Each transcript represents 
one full TV program, for a total of 11,373 programs in this analysis.  I used QSR NVivo 10 
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qualitative analysis software for this portion of the project; the organizational capabilities of the 
program made analysis of the extensive amount of data significantly less challenging than it 
would have been otherwise.  
Methods 
To analyze these transcripts, I use a combination of quantitative content analysis (see, for 
example, Johnston 2002; Neuendorf 2001) and a form of inductive analysis that Altheide (1987; 
1996) calls “ethnographic content analysis.”  Using the text search feature of NVivo, I was able 
to measure the frequencies of some specific phrases that appear in coverage of each movement 
over the course of the entire 11,373 transcripts.  This is useful for getting a general idea of how 
often certain words are used to describe activists, and in discovering some general themes in how 
coverage of each movement changed over time.  However, for in-depth analysis of specific 
frames and tone of coverage (e.g. positive or negative tone), I used a random number generator 
to select a sample of 200 transcripts from each movement.  I gathered these 400 transcripts and 
manually coded them using ethnographic content analysis, which involves a more reflective 
analysis of documents (Altheide 1987: 65, 67-68).  This was necessary in order to allow for the 
emergence of various frames and themes as I examined the transcripts for overall tone (positive, 
negative, and neutral).  While I developed some frames deductively based on prior research, 
inductive analysis was also necessary due to the large number of positive frames I found, which 
other researchers have not discussed in their analyses of media coverage of social movements.  
Limitations 
 There are some limitations to this research.  First, the text search feature of NVivo may 
turn up irrelevant information.  For example, searching for the word “arrest*” results in all forms 
of the word, including arrests, arrested, and arresting.  Therefore, if a news anchor mentions an 
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“arresting view” of the sunset, this would be included in the results.  To correct this, I went 
through the results of the text search for arrest and removed irrelevant phrases.  Some text 
searches turned up thousands of results, which were too cumbersome to sort through.  To correct 
these, I use a four-stage coding process that I describe in more detail below. 
  In addition, scholars have noted that there are certain limits that should be accounted for 
when using media to examine a social movement (e.g., Woolley 2000; Oliver and Myers 1999; 
Earl et al. 2004; McCarthy, McPhail, and Smith 1996).  McCarthy and colleagues (1996: 479) 
note that researcher bias – the reliability and validity of media archives gathered by researchers – 
is a potential problem.  To overcome researcher bias, I use the LexisNexis News database, which 
is regarded as the most complete archive of television, radio, and newspaper data.  All other 
limitations identified by these scholars, such as description bias, which is media bias in the 
descriptions of the events journalists select to report, are part of what I am investigating.   
Frame Analysis  
I used a four-stage process in analyzing the news transcripts.  First, I had to skim each of 
the over eleven thousand transcripts in order to gauge whether or not it was relevant (as I 
described above).  As I did this, I took notes on what I was seeing in terms of how journalists 
were talking about each of the movements, common or interesting phrases used to describe 
activists, and who was doing the talking about the movements: Just news anchors? Celebrities? 
Politicians?  I noted general themes that were apparent from quick skims of the transcripts.  
Second, I used the text search function in NVivo to find transcripts that mentioned protest events 
or rallies, political candidates affiliated with a movement, arrests, polling results, and other 
relevant information.  This is useful for getting an overall picture of how discourse of each 
movement might change over time.  Third, I did an in-depth reading of the sample of 400 
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transcripts, coding for common frames and overall tone (positive, negative, or neutral; see Dardis 
2006 for a different approach to coding for overall tone).  Finally, I took what I learned from the 
in-depth coding back to the text search and fine-tuned the search terms I used to find events, 
arrests, political candidates, etc.  This final stage resulted in more accurate coding of overall 
themes than I achieved with the original text search alone. 
Media Framing 
Frames are boundaries that focus on some elements while leaving other elements out of 
view.  Mass media frames can promote particular definitions, interpretations, and evaluations of 
movements (Entman 1993), and thus shape public opinion (Detenber et al. 2007; Iyengar 1991; 
Nelson et al. 1997).  Journalists use framing devices in the form of words, phrases, or sentences 
that serve to legitimize or delegitimize social movements and their issues of concern (Gamson 
and Lasch 1983; Gamson and Modigliani 1989).  I focus on these micro-level framing devices 
rather than thematic frames (Iyengar 1991) that categorize an entire news piece as having one 
overarching frame or another.  Focusing on micro-level framing draws attention to the nuances 
of media coverage rather than obscuring them by painting an entire news item with a broad 
brush.   
I examine positive, negative, and neutral frames used in coverage of OWS and the TPM. 
In order to draw comparisons to other studies of media coverage of social movements, I utilize 
some of the frames Boykoff (2006) developed in his study of media representations of the leftist 
World Trade Organization (WTO) protests of 1999, including what he calls the violence frame, 
the amalgam of grievances frame, the ignorance frame, and the freak frame.  Boykoff’s 
“violence” frame views protests in terms of the utilization of violent methods – regardless of 
whether such methods are used by protesters or not – and focuses on the presence or absence of 
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violence.  The violence frame includes all references to violence, including when activists use 
violent tactics, when police use violent tactics against activists, when journalists say there is a 
potential for a protest to turn violent, and even when journalists note the lack of violence at a 
protest event (Boykoff 2006: 211).   
The amalgam of grievances frame describes a movement as having no clear goals, no 
unified message, or as being concerned with too many disparate issues and thus lacking 
coherence.  The ignorance frame focuses on the lack of understanding that social movement 
participants have about the issues they are protesting and includes characterization of protesters 
as hypocrites, or as being wrong about the issues (see also McFarlane and Hay 2003). Boykoff’s 
“freak” frame places the focus on physical characteristics of protesters, such as costumes they 
wear or what their grooming habits are, but it also includes accounts of their “non-mainstream 
values, beliefs, and opinions” (Boykoff 2006: 216).  The protest paradigm literature uses an 
operationalization of the freak frame that only includes physical characteristics (e.g. Dardis 
2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999); I follow the protest paradigm’s construction of the freak frame 
and I add an insanity frame.  The insanity frame notes the non-mainstream, or “fringe,” values 
and beliefs of activists and includes characterization of protesters as “nut jobs,” “tea brain 
protesters,” “left wing lunatics,” and “crazies,” thus delegitimizing their concerns by making 
them out to be insane.   
Through the process of qualitative analysis, I developed two additional negative frames: 
the racism frame, and general ridicule.  The racism frame is used to portray a movement as being 
motivated by racism or as being composed of racist individuals.  General ridicule refers to 
instances of Tea Partiers being referred to as “tea-baggers,” a term that has sexual connotations 
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and was frequently followed by laughter in program transcripts24, or of Occupy protesters being 
referred to as dirty or smelling bad, also frequently followed by laughter.  These frames and 
others, such as accusations of being an “extremist” movement, of activists being criminals or 
anti-Semitic, or of believing conspiracy theories, can delegitimize a movement.  The presence of 
any of these frames in a program will show us the extent to which the movement was covered in 
a negative way. 
Boykoff only examined negative and neutral representations of the WTO protest 
movement; I expand on this typology by noting positive frames used by the media in their 
portrayal of both the TPM and OWS.  Like Boykoff, I include references to a lack of violence 
under the violence frame in my analysis, but I also add a “peaceful” frame, based on inductive 
analysis in which I found very few references to violence or potential for violence for the TPM, 
and rather found numerous instances of TPM events being described positively, as peaceful.  I 
found the same distinction in OWS coverage, where some journalists discussed a lack of 
violence and others never mentioned violence, opting to describe the protests simply as peaceful.  
The other positive frames I use were also derived from the qualitative process of ethnographic 
discourse analysis, and are as follows: legitimizing, normalizing, and patriotic.  The legitimizing 
frame notes validation of the movement as being inevitable or understandable considering 
political realities, of members as justifiably angry, and of the movement having a political impact 
                                                 
24 Although opponents of the movement have accused Tea Party members of being the first to 
refer to themselves as “tea-baggers,” I found no evidence to support this claim.  I did, however, 
find evidence that at least one protester used the phrase “tea bag” as a verb at the first national 
Tea Party event.  The man, protesting in Washington D.C., held a sign that read: “Tea Bag the 
Liberal Dems before they Tea Bag You!!”  Also, in April 2009, several Tea Party websites 
encouraged visitors to “Tea bag the fools in DC.”  See “The Evolution of the Word ‘Tea 
Bagger’” at http://theweek.com/article/index/202620/the-evolution-of-the-word-tea-bagger 
(retrieved May 7, 2010).   
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or being successful.  The normalizing frame focuses on movement members being “average 
Americans” or as being first-time activists, working people, or just “moms and dads.”  The 
patriotic frame focuses on movement members being motivated by their love for America, or 
wanting to “take back their country.” 
In addition to the positive and negative frames, I note neutral coverage and movement 
mobilization.  Neutral coverage includes descriptions of actual events without judgment, and 
other statements that have no discernible bias.  For example, on an April 15th episode of CNN’s 
Campbell Brown: No Bias, No Bull, the host stated: “All day, we have been watching thousands, 
some estimates say at least 10,000 people, gather at more than 300 organized anti-tax TEA 
Parties.  In this case, TEA stands for Taxed Enough Already.”  I code these kinds of value-free 
statements as neutral.  Mobilization is noted by the “encouraging” frame, which focuses on the 
hosts, anchors, and guests of programs encouraging viewers to get involved in the movement.  
On an episode of FNC’s Fox News Watch on April 12, for example, the anchor stated: “Can't get 
to a tea party? FOX Nation hosts a virtual tea party. You can check it out on the site for the tea 
party in your area. Again, that is Wednesday, the 15th of April.”  The encouraging frame goes 
beyond positive, to actually inciting viewers to take action and join a movement.   
I did not find a single instance of a comparable “discouraging” frame to match the 
encouraging frame in any of the transcripts; however, the negative delegitimizing frames are all 
forms of what Ferree (2004) calls “soft repression.”  This form of repression is deployed in the 
form of stigmatizing frames, which can be a force for discouraging participation in a social 
movement.  When the anchor of a news program ridicules participants in a social movement, or 
claims that they are crazy or stupid, the viewer may want to distance herself from the movement 
(Noelle-Neumann 1974, 1984; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  There may, therefore, be a 
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discouraging effect, but it operates in the same way that the patriotic, legitimizing, normalizing 
and peaceful frames operate; the positive frames I identified can serve to “softly encourage” in 
the same way that the negative frames discourage.  In contrast to both soft repression and the 
softly encouraging positive frames, the encouraging frame is blatant recruitment of viewers to 
participate in the movement.   
Using all of the frames described above, I code for overall tone per program.  Rather than 
relying purely on qualitative analysis (see Dardis 2006), I look quantitatively at the number of 
positive, negative, and neutral frames used in each program in order to determine the overall tone 
of coverage.  Overall tone includes phrases spoken by the host of a program, as well as program 
guests.  In order to derive overall tone for each program, I tallied the number of positive, 
negative, and neutral frames used in each program and chose the category with the highest score 
as the indicator of overall tone.  When the scores of the positive and negative categories were 
even, I coded the tone as neutral because the program gave equal voice to both sides of the issue.  
One would expect most programs to have a neutral tone due to professional journalism norms of 
objectivity and fairness (Bennett 1996).  However, in this era of niche marketing in cable news, 
fair and balanced reporting has become nothing more than an empty slogan for some news 
networks.  I found that FNC and MSNBC in particular were overwhelmingly not neutral in their 
coverage of either movement; they each leaned heavily positive for one movement and heavily 
negative for the other.  When the amounts of positive and negative framing devices within one 
program only differed by one or two, I gauged overall tone by an in-depth, qualitative reading of 
the transcript (Altheide 1987; Dardis 2006; Taylor 2011).  This method was necessary for about 
a dozen of the 400 transcripts in the sample.   
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As this chapter unfolds, I first examine the patterns of television coverage each 
movement received and how that changed over time.  Research on media and social movements 
has focused overwhelmingly on news coverage of protest events, and has found that news 
coverage increases when violence or disruption increases, but the TPM continued getting 
coverage after their protests events largely ceased.  Amenta and colleagues (2012) suggest that 
news coverage of social movements’ involvement in electoral politics could include more 
descriptions of the movement’s goals and motivations, but there is to my knowledge no study 
that actually examines media coverage of non-protest event related social movement activity.  I 
find that coverage of the TPM continues to increase even after protest activity all but ceases due 
to coverage of the TPM’s institutionalization in the form of professional PACs and involvement 
in electoral politics, while coverage of OWS all but ceases after large protest events peter out and 
they fail to institutionalize (Gitlin 2013).  I then turn to the framing devices journalists used to 
legitimize and delegitimize each movement, and examine how coverage of each movement 
aligns with the protest paradigm.  I find that, although the specific framing devices vary, both 
movements receive a similar share of legitimizing and delegitimizing TV news coverage.  My 
findings lead to a new formulation of the protest paradigm that accounts for an ideologically 
segmented mainstream media field.  
TV Coverage of the TPM and OWS Over Time  
On the October 14, 2011 episode of The O’Reilly Factor on FNC, host Bill O’Reilly 
interviews Tim Graham from the Media Research Center, a conservative group that studies 
media bias, about the difference in news coverage of the TPM versus OWS.  Graham claims that 
OWS is receiving far more media coverage than the TPM ever did.  He says:  
We have seen, in the first 11 days of these protests, 33 stories on the morning and 
evening shows on ABC, CBS, and NBC which auto [sic] would average out to basically 
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each network having a story every day. You look at the Tea Party back in 2009, we 
counted 13 stories in the entire year of 2009. So that would be about four stories per 
network all year long.  
 
But Graham’s synopsis of media coverage does not match up with reality; my data show 47 
broadcast network programs covering the TPM in 2009, not 13.  Even if I only count evening 
news programs, I have 15 – but he is counting morning and evening programs.  When I look at 
the first 11 days of OWS protests – September 17 through the 27th – I see exactly one story on 
network news, and that was Today on NBC, on September 27th.  That same program is also the 
only one (of those on the three broadcast networks) to cover the TPM in its first 11 days of 
protest (Feb. 27 - March 10).  But Graham’s presentation on The O’Reilly Factor is 
disingenuous, if not outright fallacious; the actual report shows Media Research Center is not 
looking at the first 11 days of OWS protest, but the first 11 days of October – nearly two full 
weeks after the protests began (http://www.mrc.org/media-reality-check/tale-two-protests-
media-cheer-wall-street-occupiers-jeered-tea-partiers). 
Aside from presenting the report in a less-than-truthful manner, what Graham and 
O’Reilly fail to acknowledge is that OWS is actively protesting each of those 11 days, where the 
TPM had one day of protest on February 27, followed by over six weeks of no action, followed 
by one day of protest on April 15, followed by eleven weeks of no action, followed by a July 4th 
protest.  This cycle continued throughout 2009 and 2010, and major protest events only 
decreased after that.  If we measure coverage by events, the TPM clearly received far more 
coverage than OWS.  In its first 55 days (February 19, the day of Santelli’s CNBC rant—which I 
discussed in chapter one—through April 17, 2009), the TPM had two major protest events and 
got covered on 153 TV news programs, or 76.5 TV programs for each day of activity.  In 
contrast, from September 16 (the first day “Occupy” appeared in the news, the day before its first 
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protest) through November 9, 2011, OWS held 54 protests and got covered on 617 programs, or 
11.4 for each day of activity.  If we ignore protest events and look at the entire first year for each 
movement: from February 27, 2009 to February 26, 2010, the TPM was covered on 1,253 
programs; from September 16, 2011 through September 15, 2012, OWS was covered on 1,160 
TV news programs.  Therefore, regardless of the number of protests, rallies, or demonstrations 
held, the TPM got more TV news coverage than OWS. 
In addition to the amount of TV news coverage, the patterns of coverage over time for 
each movement differ substantially.  Figures 2 and 3 show the frequency of coverage for each 
movement over time, measured in TV programs per network per week.  I gathered transcripts for 
OWS from 2011 through the end of 2014, but less than 5% of those transcripts were from 
programs that aired after 2012, and virtually all of the post-2012 programs were covering some 
other movement and comparing it to OWS.  In a graph showing the full, four-year dataset, half of 
the image looks like the last two months of 2012 – low and flat; therefore, I only show the 2011 
and 2012 programs in figure 3.  Figures 2 and 3 show a clear difference in the pattern of 
coverage each movement receives.  TPM coverage stays high through all four years, with spikes 
around protest events in 2009 and early 2010, and spikes around elections and legislative news 
from October 2010 through the end of 2012.  OWS coverage shoots up substantially after the 
first major arrests of activists occurred on October 1.  Large numbers of arrests in 2012 are 
immediately followed by (or co-occur with) increases in the number of TV news programs that 
cover OWS.  This suggests there may be a causal relationship between the number of arrests and 
an increase in TV news coverage, which is also suggested by Amenta and colleagues’ findings 
(2009). 
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Figure 2. TPM coverage over time (TV programs per network per week; 2009 – 
2012)
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. OWS coverage over time (TV programs per network per week; 2011 – 2012) 
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Research on media coverage of social movements would lead us to expect that OWS 
would get more coverage because they had more protest events, and many of those included 
violent incidences and mass arrests, which journalists tend to find newsworthy (Gamson and 
Wolfsfeld 1993; McLeod and Hertog 1992; Murdock 1981).  However, the TPM has much less 
frequent protest events with smaller crowds compared to OWS yet gets more TV news coverage.  
One possible reason the TPM gets so much more coverage is because their main movement 
organizations, such as Tea Party Express, begin using institutionalized tactics in the form of 
endorsing political candidates and lobbying for legislative goals.  Their success in getting 
candidates elected to Congress then leads to even more coverage because of organizational 
norms of relying on political elites for newsworthy information (Gans 1979; Schudson 2002; 
Shoemaker and Reese 1996; Walgrave and Van Aelst 2006).  When some political elites are 
directly affiliated with a social movement, that movement will automatically get more news 
coverage.  In addition, the TPM becomes a story in itself, which perpetuates coverage of 
anything movement-related (Seguin 2016). 
Changes in Types of Coverage Over Time 
 On a May 22, 2012 episode of FNC’s The Five, co-host Dana Perino says that the TPM
stopped getting media attention because the movement had been effective, and that OWS has 
received so much media attention because they have been “totally ineffective.”  While Perino is 
right in one way – the TPM protests stop getting media attention after 2010 – my data suggest 
she is mostly wrong.  The TPM continues to receive TV news coverage through 2012, mostly 
due to their influence on congressional politics.  However, once it became clear that OWS was 
not going to be politically “effective” – at least not in the way journalists in the mainstream 
media understand movements to be effective – OWS stopped getting media coverage.  
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Figure 4. Amount and type of coverage per network (full population of TV programs)
 
 
  Figure 4 shows the total amount of TV program coverage each movement received from 
each network in blue, and the orange and striped bars represent different types of coverage.  In 
the OWS graph, the orange bar represents coverage of events such as protests, marches, rallies, 
and demonstrations.  The striped bar represents coverage of protesters being arrested or of police 
threatening to arrest occupiers who refuse to leave their encampments.  In the TPM graph, 
orange represents coverage related to protest events, demonstrations, rallies, and any references 
to “the Tea Party movement,” “Tea Party groups,” or “Tea Party activists.”  The striped bar 
represents coverage of candidates for office who are affiliated with the TPM, coverage of the Tea 
Party Caucus in Congress, coverage of “Tea Party Republicans,” which typically reflects 
coverage of TPM-affiliated politicians, and coverage of the TPM’s effects on the legislative 
process in Congress.  This data was gathered using the text search feature of NVivo, so it is not 
as reliable as the sample of 400 that I coded manually.  I may be missing out on more nuanced 
political coverage, and some of the “movement” coverage may reflect the use of the phrase “Tea 
Party movement” when discussing politicians in Congress who are affiliated with the movement.  
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However, this does give us a general idea of how the TPM is talked about in the news over the 
course of nearly four years. 
 Compared to TPM coverage, a much higher proportion of OWS coverage focused on 
protest events, and, for most networks, more than half of that event coverage mentioned activists 
getting arrested or facing the potential of being arrested.  OWS coverage is more in line with 
other scholars’ claims that media coverage of social movements tends to focus on protesters’ 
violence or outrageous behavior (e.g. Gitlin 1981; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Sobieraj 2011).  
The political coverage of the TPM on each network is also more than double each network’s 
total coverage of OWS.  These differences between coverage of OWS and the TPM suggests 
what others have speculated (e.g. Taylor 2011) – that coverage of right-wing movements, which 
has not received a large amount of scholarly attention, is very different from coverage of left-
wing movements, which have been the overwhelming focus of research on media and social 
movements.  This points to the importance of studying right-wing movements in the same ways 
that left-wing movements have been studied.  However, the difference between the amounts of 
TPM and OWS coverage likely has more to do with the TPM’s entrenchment into party politics, 
and OWS’s lack of interest in doing the same.  Of course, this is all tied to the TPM’s status quo 
oriented goals and motivations. 
While the goals and motivations of the TPM focused on taxes at first, a shift occurs at the 
beginning of 2010 when the goal becomes electing like-minded candidates to office.  Figure 4 
shows that less than half of TPM coverage across all networks focused on the movement itself, 
and, for all networks other than CNN and FNC, political coverage of the TPM exceeds activist-
related coverage.  The shift in TPM coverage occurs when the primaries for the 2010 
congressional elections begin.  Looking at figure 5, we see TV news coverage of the TPM shift  
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abruptly in May 2010 from protest coverage to candidate coverage.  Tea Party candidate 
coverage remains high, and grows substantially, through the end of November 2010.  By the next 
election cycle, the novelty seems to have worn off and coverage of Tea Party candidates drops 
substantially, though not as much as TPM protest coverage drops.  By switching their tactics 
from public protest to electioneering, the TPM was able to stay in the news for a much longer 
period than OWS.  Research on media and social movements tends to privilege protest event 
coverage over all else, thus missing what could be important changes in coverage.  When tactics 
change but news coverage continues, that coverage also changes in ways that have not received 
much attention from social movement researchers. 
While TV news coverage of TPM protest events declines after 2010, journalists on TV 
news did not stop talking about the actual movement or its participants when they started talking 
about Tea Party candidates.  Figure 6 shows the number of news programs that mention the TPM 
as a movement compared to TPM-affiliated politicians or political candidates.  I used the text 
search feature of NVivo to find all instances of discussion of Tea Party politicians (some of the 
search terms include “tea party candidate,” tea party darling,” and “tea party favorite”) and the 
movement itself (search terms include “tea party movement” and “tea party activists”).  The 
amount of coverage of Tea Party-affiliated politicians only exceeds coverage of the movement or 
activists in 25 of the 202 weeks in my dataset, which shows that the TPM remains relevant even 
after becoming entrenched in the Republican Party—at least as far as mainstream TV news 
programs are concerned.  Thus, while TV news coverage shifts from focusing on protest tactics 
to institutionalized tactics, the goals and motivations of the grassroots movement are still getting 
national news attention.  
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 Whether the TPM infiltrated the Republican Party or the Republican Party infiltrated the 
TPM, the affiliation between the two solidified the status quo orientation of the movement.  As 
for OWS, their continued use of disruptive, non-institutionalized tactics solidified their anti-
status quo orientation.  While the civil disobedience that leads to mass arrests is good for getting 
a great deal of media attention, that attention ends up being short-lived.   
 Much of the protest paradigm literature suggests that all mainstream media will treat 
status quo oriented movements positively, and deviant movements negatively (McLeod and 
Hertog 1992, 1999; Shoemaker 1984; Shoemaker and Reese 1996).  However, the protest 
paradigm was designed to apply to protest coverage, not social movement coverage in general.  
It cannot be used to predict the type of coverage a movement will get when its tactics change 
from disruptive to institutionalized.  In the next section, I look at the sample of 400 transcripts in 
terms of overall positive, negative, or neutral tone to examine whether the characteristics of 
protest paradigm coverage (i.e. negative coverage) apply to non-protest related social movement 
coverage.  
Changes in Tone of Coverage Over Time 
Protest paradigm researchers have looked at media coverage of protest events at points in 
time, but have not looked at changes over time.  The protest paradigm literature does suggest, 
though, that if a movement’s tactics change then media coverage might also change (Boyle et al. 
2012; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  Based on these prior conjectures, we should expect OWS 
coverage to be more negative than neutral or positive, especially when tactics are more 
disruptive (e.g. blocking traffic rather than occupying public parks).  Since the TPM is a status 
quo oriented movement, we should expect TPM coverage to be more positive than neutral or 
negative in the first year and then to switch to mostly neutral as the movement changes tactics  
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from protesting, to running candidates for office, to working within Congress.  
The overwhelming majority of OWS television coverage is on protest events (166 of the 
200 sampled), while the overwhelming majority of TPM coverage focuses on electoral politics 
(only 35 of the 200 sampled mention protest events).  It makes sense to compare the full sample 
of 200 from each movement when we are examining coverage of each movement in general, in 
order to see the way coverage changes over the first 3 years of each movement’s life.  However, 
I will also compare OWS coverage to a sample of TPM coverage from its first year.  In my 
previous research (Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 2016), I examined three 5-week periods of 
news coverage of the TPM25 from 2009 and did qualitative content analysis of 319 television 
news transcripts from the 6 networks.  When we look at TPM coverage that focuses on events in 
the first year only, 196 of the 319 mention protests, demonstrations, or rallies.  One hundred 
ninety-two of the 200 programs in the OWS sample cover the first year of OWS activities, so in 
some ways it makes more sense to compare this sample to the 2009 TPM sample—at least when 
we are comparing the way TV news covered protest events.   
 Figure 7 presents a linear display of the tone of coverage of each of the 200 TPM news 
transcripts sampled from 2009 through 2012.  The largest spike in neutral TPM coverage occurs 
between September 6 and November 4, 2010.  This coverage focuses almost exclusively on TPM 
involvement in the Republican Party and in that year’s mid-term elections.  Only 4 of the 27 
programs from this time period in the sample mention protests or rallies, and all 4 of those also 
discuss electoral politics.  Few news programs from 2009 are in this sample, but we will get a 
better look at 2009 coverage in figure 9. 
                                                 
25 Each 5-week period focused on one of three major Tea Party protest events, from two weeks 
before through three weeks after: the first national protest on February 27, the first Tax Day 
protest on April 15, and the 9-12 Taxpayer March on September 12. 
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Figure 7. TPM tone of coverage over time, TV programs per month 
 
 
 
The largest spike in positive coverage – though it does not exceed neutral coverage – 
occurs during the month of August 2010, when Glenn Beck was promoting his “Restoring Honor 
Rally.”  Beck used his program on FNC to launch monologues against his detractors (many of 
whom had claimed Beck was racially insensitive (or worse) for holding his rally on the 
anniversary, and in the exact location, of Martin Luther King’s “I Have a Dream” speech) and to 
make claims that any criticism against Beck is equivalent to criticism of the TPM, in effect 
affiliating his rally with the TPM while he legitimizes the TPM’s goals and motivations.  The 
largest spike in negative coverage occurs during the last week of July 2011 – again, not 
exceeding neutral coverage – and focuses on the “extremist” economic views of the Tea Party 
Republicans in Congress, whom journalists and pundits alleged had caused a deep fracture 
within the Republican Party and were holding up the legislative process. 
For the most part, the tone of TPM coverage is consistent with expectations from both the 
protest paradigm and organizational model of news.  The organizational model of the news 
 85  
assumes that journalists pride themselves on being neutral observers of events (Gans 1979), 
which, in contrast to the protest paradigm, would lead us to expect coverage of social movements 
to be largely neutral.  There is some positive and some negative TPM coverage, but it is largely 
neutral across all three years.  This could be due to the fact that the TPM supports the status quo, 
that their tactics became institutionalized rather quickly, that TV news journalists value objective 
reporting, or a combination of all three. 
 Figure 8 shows the tone of OWS coverage over time.  Combining expectations from the 
protest paradigm and the organization model of newsmaking, we might expect OWS coverage to 
be neutral at first, and then switch to negative as events become more violent and activists are 
arrested.  However, when violence and arrests decrease, news coverage should also decrease – 
regardless of whether or not protest events decrease – since prior research has found that protests 
are over-reported when they are violent (McCarthy et al. 1996; Earl et al. 2004; Amenta et al. 
2012).  Contrary to what the protest paradigm literature suggests, and similar to TPM coverage, 
OWS coverage is more neutral than either positive or negative.  The largest spike in all three 
tones of OWS coverage occurs in mid-October 2011 at the height of their protests and arrests, 
and neutral coverage heavily outweighs both positive and negative coverage.  
Figure 8 shows that negative coverage of OWS does rise in May 2012 and then exceed 
neutral coverage in September 2012, but that may be explained more by the decrease in overall 
coverage than anything else.  The pattern in figure 8 is very different from the pattern of TPM 
coverage we see in figure 7; however, we are looking at different types of coverage for each 
movement.  It is more appropriate to compare figure 8 to figure 9, which displays the amount of 
coverage from a sample of TPM events in 2009—the majority of that coverage focused on 
protest events. 
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Figure 8. OWS tone of coverage over time, bimonthly TV programs 
 
 
 
Figure 9. TPM tone of coverage over time sampled from 2009, bimonthly TV programs 
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The first TPM tax day protest received overwhelmingly positive coverage, while the first 
few weeks of OWS protests got overwhelmingly neutral coverage.  Complaining about paying 
taxes is a common theme in American discourse and should be considered in line with the status 
quo.  The positive coverage around the tax day protest suggests that protest paradigm scholars 
are correct when they say that status quo movements are likely to get positive news coverage 
from mainstream press. 
In addition to each movement’s orientation toward the status quo, the differences in tone 
of coverage over multiple years between these two movements may be explained by changes in 
each movement’s tactics, as protest paradigm scholars suggest (Boyle et al. 2012; McLeod and 
Hertog 1999).  The last significant amount of news coverage OWS gets is at its one-year 
anniversary in September 2012, when nearly 200 activists are arrested.  A month later, at the end 
of October 2012, Hurricane Sandy hit the U.S. and caused major damage—especially in New 
Jersey and New York.  OWS activists formed “Occupy Sandy” and organized relief efforts for 
those whose homes were damaged or destroyed (Feuer 2012).  Because they organized non-
hierarchically, and outside of traditionally recognized relief programs such as the Red Cross, 
mainstream news may have seen their actions as neither newsworthy nor in line with the status 
quo.  Their efforts only received recognition on five nationally broadcast TV news programs, and 
all within the first two weeks of November 2012.  Meanwhile, the TPM was embedded in 
Republican electoral politics and was covered on 116 TV news programs during that same 2-
week time period.  
Summary 
 This analysis suggests that TV news coverage shifted along with the shift in activists’ 
tactics.  The TPM went from staging protest events and rallies to getting candidates elected to 
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office and then having a direct impact on the legislative process.  The protest paradigm would 
lead us to expect TPM coverage to start out positively, and then shift to neutral as their tactics 
become more institutionalized.  The tone of TPM coverage was mostly in line with those 
expectations, although there was more neutral coverage than negative or positive, and there were 
spikes of negative coverage even though the goals of the TPM support the status quo.   
 When OWS shifted their tactics from occupying public spaces and holding protests and 
demonstrations to using their funds to bail out people who had their homes foreclosed or 
donating their time and money to victims of Hurricane Sandy, mainstream TV news did not 
follow.  Why not?  Perhaps because these direct actions circumvent traditional institutional 
changes within the system, like lobbying for legislation or supporting political candidates, and 
media elites do not find those non-traditional actions newsworthy.  In addition – and as I will 
examine in depth in chapter 5 – the goals of OWS were never fully understood by mainstream 
news media, so journalists likely had a hard time connecting those tactics with OWS’s overall 
goals or message. 
 Media elites seem to find disruptive protests more newsworthy than other tactics when a 
movement’s message does not support the status quo, and institutionalized tactics newsworthy 
when a movement’s message supports the status quo.  However, my analysis so far has examined 
TV news as if all networks operate within the same paradigm, yet TV news today is segmented 
in such a way that different networks have different journalistic norms.  In the next section I 
present evidence that contemporary TV news media in the U.S. are more complex than the 
protest paradigm literature acknowledges, and I make the case for an improved framework for 
understanding the protest paradigm in the contemporary U.S. context. 
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Reframing the Protest Paradigm  
 The protest paradigm that McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1999; also see Hertog and McLeod 
1995) describe is a framework to which mainstream news outlets adhere, but that “alternative” 
news outlets do not.  In the previous section I showed that the TPM received a much greater 
amount of TV news coverage than OWS, but both movements received more neutral coverage 
than positive or negative overall, contrary to what the protest paradigm framework would lead us 
to expect.  According to protest paradigm scholars, mainstream news should use mostly 
marginalizing frames and alternative media should use mostly supportive or sympathetic frames 
to describe anti-status quo movements (Boyle et al. 2012; McFarlane and Hay 2003; McLeod 
and Hertog 1999; Reul et al. 2016).  However, I was looking at aggregate TV news coverage 
rather than examining each individual network.  Examining the amount and tone of coverage on 
each network will make it clear that the protest paradigm’s definitions of mainstream and 
alternative need to be reconceptualized to account for the contemporary U.S. media field. 
Returning to Tim Graham’s presentation on the October 2011 episode of The O’Reilly 
Factor on FNC, he claims that OWS gets overwhelmingly positive coverage on TV news and the 
TPM gets mostly negative coverage.  Again, the data contradict his statement.  Of the 200 
sampled OWS transcripts, 23 were overall positive in tone, 28 were negative, and 149 were 
neutral.  For the TPM, 17 were positive, 26 were negative, and 157 were neutral.  Figures 10 and 
11 show that both movements were overwhelmingly covered in a neutral way  (χ²=1.18, p=0.554 
suggests no significant difference between the two).  However, the Media Research Center report 
only examines broadcast network news, not cable news.  When I look only at the three broadcast 
networks, I have 33 episodes in my OWS sample – 2 were positive in tone, 31 were neutral, and 
none were negative.  I have 34 episodes in my TPM sample – one was negative, one was 
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Figure 10. Tone of OWS Sampled Coverage by Network, 2011 – 2014 (N=200) 
 
Figure 11. Tone of TPM Sampled Coverage by Network, 2009 – 2012 (N=200) 
 
Figure 12. Tone of TPM Sampled Coverage by Network, 2009 (N=319) 
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positive, and 32 were neutral.  Again, there is no significant difference between the two 
(Freeman-Halton extension of the Fisher exact probability test Pa=0.807; Pb=0.614). 
Comparing figure 10 to figure 11, however, we see that there are differences in the ways 
that some networks covered these two movements.  Each figure displays the amount of negative, 
positive, and neutral coverage each network devoted to the TPM or OWS.  The three broadcast 
networks covered each movement with the same relative frequency, and covered each in largely 
neutral language, yet the cable networks covered these movements very differently.  FNC and 
MSNBC are about inverse—which should be expected since FNC is a right-leaning network and 
MSNBC is a left-leaning network.  However, FNC devoted a lot of airtime to the TPM and 
MSNBC did not reciprocate proportionately with their OWS coverage.  CNN devoted the most 
airtime to both movements, but the proportion of negative, positive, and neutral coverage on 
CNN resembles the 3 broadcast networks, not either of the other 2 cable networks. 
Figure 12, which displays the tone of coverage for the sample of 319 programs from 2009 
TPM protest events, presents an even starker contrast between FNC and MSNBC.  While CNN 
and the broadcast networks present mostly neutral coverage, with sparse but equal amounts of 
negative and positive coverage for both the TPM and OWS, over 80% of FNC programs covered 
the TPM positively and over 80% of MSNBC programs covered the TPM negatively in 2009.  
This suggests that protest paradigm conceptions of mainstream and alternative media do not 
adequately explain TV news in the 21st century U.S.  Because looking only at the overall tone 
per network may lead us to miss fine-grained details in the coverage each movement receives 
from each network, we must first examine the framing devices used by these six networks in 
order to better explain the protest paradigm’s relevance – or lack thereof – to the contemporary 
field of TV news. 
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Framing Devices in OWS and TPM Coverage 
The protest paradigm is a routinized pattern for mainstream media coverage of social 
protests (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 310) that uses frames that marginalize or demonize 
protesters (McFarlane and Hay 2003: 217).  Research on framing and news gathering suggests 
that journalists select frames from a limited repertoire (Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999); 
this would lead us to think that the framing devices journalists use in their coverage of social 
movements would be largely the same, regardless of the kind of social movement being covered 
or the network doing the covering.  However, the fact that the TPM and OWS used different 
tactics and represent opposite poles of the left-right ideological spectrum might lead us to suspect 
that the framing devices used in TV news would be just as different.   
Despite the differences in tactics, ideology, and the amount and types of coverage that 
each movement gets, table 1 shows that many of the same negative and positive framing devices 
are used in coverage of both movements.  Because so many of the 200 OWS transcripts focus on 
events, and so few of the 200 TPM transcripts do, I include a column for the sample of 319 TPM 
transcripts from 2009 events (see Taylor 2011) in table 1.  Frames used in event-related coverage 
tend to be quite different from frames used in other types of coverage, such as that related to 
electoral politics, so it is more appropriate to compare OWS frames to the frames found in 2009 
coverage of the TPM. 
The first two items listed in table 1 are not frames, but represent the focus of each 
transcript—event-related coverage, or coverage of the movement’s involvement (or lack thereof) 
in electoral politics.  Some transcripts do not fall into either category, such as those in which 
program hosts or their guests discuss one or both of the movements or their issues of concern in 
general terms, without referencing actual events or electoral politics.  Electoral politics refers to  
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Table 1. Number of programs in which each frame appeared at least once (Percentage of all 
programs in parentheses) 
 OWS  
(N=200) 
TPM  
(N=200) 
TPM 2009  
(N=319) 
Type of Coverage    
Event 166  (83%) 35    (17.5%) 121  (37.9%) 
Electoral Politics 37    (18.5%) 103  (51.5%) 25    (7.8%) 
    
Disruption    
Disruptive tactics 44   (22%) 0     (--) 0      (--) 
Arrests 97   (48.5%) 0     (--) 0      (--) 
Violence 98   (49%) 9     (4.5%) 20    (6.3%) 
     Activist Violence 45   (22.5%) 2     (1%) 15    (4.7%) 
     Police Violence 44   (22%) 0     (--) 0      (--) 
     Potential Violence 11   (5.5%) 5     (2.5%) 10    (3.1%) 
    
Negative     
Any negative frame 100 (50%) 63   (31.5%) 150  (47%) 
     Delegitimizing 35   (17.5%) 6     (3%) 119  (37.3%) 
     Amalgam of Grievances 41   (20.5%) 0     (--) 10    (3.1%) 
     Freak 18   (9%) 2     (1%) 38    (11.9%) 
     Insanity 11   (5.5%) 17   (8.5%) 29    (9.1%) 
     Ignorance 37   (18.5%) 10   (5%) 30    (9.4%) 
     Lazy  16   (8%) 0     (--) 0      (--) 
     Racism 0     (--) 19   (9.5%) 35    (10.9%) 
     Ridicule 19   (9.5%) 19   (9.5%) 43    (13.5%) 
     Radical  22   (11%) 31   (15.5%) 9      (2.8%) 
    
Positive    
Any positive frame 95   (47.5%) 30   (15%) 199  (62.4%) 
     Legitimizing 47   (23.5%) 17   (8.5%) 183  (57.4%) 
     Patriotic  4     (2%) 8     (4%) 51    (15.9%) 
     Normal 28   (8.8%) 10   (5%) 90    (28.2%) 
     Peaceful 56   (28%) 0     (--) 25    (7.8%) 
Note: Frames are not mutually exclusive, thus percentages do not add to 100. 
 
 
the movement being mentioned in conjunction with politicians or with candidates running for 
office.  For the TPM this most often means that a politician is described as some sort of Tea 
Party candidate, or is endorsed by the Tea Party, or that some politician either supports or 
condemns the Tea Party.  For OWS, this almost exclusively means that discussion touched on 
OWS’s failure to do what the TPM did in terms of campaigning for political candidates.  In early 
coverage, it was discussed as a question like “Will OWS run candidates for office like the TPM 
did?” or “Is this the Democrats’ answer to the TPM?”  That soon changed to coverage of 
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Republican politicians and candidates condemning OWS.  It then appeared in later coverage 
when people drew comparisons between OWS and the TPM, and was used as a way of 
explaining how different the two movements are.  Some OWS transcripts fall into both event and 
electoral categories; this usually occurs when event-related coverage also includes conservative 
politicians condemning the movement, or speculation on whether OWS would follow the tactics 
of the TPM.   
The “disruption” category lists frames related to arrests and violent or disruptive tactics.  
Disruptive tactics include blocking traffic and other forms of civil disobedience, while violence 
and arrests are extreme outcomes of disruptive tactics.  Arrests refer to coverage of anyone being 
arrested at a movement-related event.  Violence includes any reference to violent actions at 
movement-related events, or potential for violence, and it includes violence by activists and 
violence committed by police.  References to activist and police violence often occur within the 
same program.  Table 1 shows that all frames related to disruption occur far more frequently in 
OWS coverage than in TPM coverage, which is not surprising since nearly all OWS events were 
disruptive in some way and virtually no TPM events were disruptive (as discussed in the 
introductory chapter). 
 The negative and positive categories list frames that I described in detail in the framing 
section above.  The “negative” frames depict a movement in a marginalizing or unflattering way, 
and constitute soft repression (Ferree 2004).  The “positive” category lists frames that depict a 
movement in a sympathetic or flattering way, or – in the case of the legitimizing frame – depict a 
movement’s grievances, motivations, or tactics in a positive way, as necessary, worthwhile, 
justified, or successful.  Looking at each sample of 200 transcripts from multiple years of 
coverage, 50% (100) of OWS programs included at least one of the negative frames listed in 
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table 1, and 31.5% (63) of TPM programs included at least one negative frame.  Meanwhile, 
47.5% (95) of OWS programs included at least one of the positive frames listed in table 1, and 
just 15% (30) of TPM programs included at least one positive frame.   
This would seem to suggest that the TPM was covered more neutrally overall, and that 
OWS was covered more positively than the TPM.  However, we are mostly comparing coverage 
of OWS protest events to coverage of the TPM’s involvement in electoral politics.  Comparing 
this OWS coverage to TPM coverage that largely focuses on events from before its entrenchment 
in institutional politics yields very different results.  Looking only at the 2009 sample of TPM 
coverage, 47% (150) of programs included at least one negative frame and 62.4% (199) included 
at least one positive frame.  This suggests that when coverage is event-related or coverage is on a 
new movement, coverage is less neutral overall.  Whether the movement is from the political left 
or right might matter, considering TPM coverage included fewer negative frames and more 
positive frames than OWS, but what seems to matter more is the movement’s relationship to the 
status quo, and its entrenchment in institutionalized politics or structures.  Because so much of 
the post-2009 coverage of the TPM focused on either elections or on Congress as opposed to 
protest events, there was less room to bring in frames that focus on the positive or negative 
characteristics of activists. 
 TV news outlets covered the TPM and OWS in some disparate ways, but they also 
covered each movement similarly, as table 1 indicates.  Nearly all of the negative and positive 
frames were used in coverage of both movements.  The only exceptions are the racism frame, 
which is only used in TPM coverage and describes activists as motivated by racism, and the lazy 
frame, which occurs only in OWS coverage and describes activists as generally lazy or not 
wanting to get a “real” job.  However, when we look at the framing devices used by each 
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individual network we are likely to see bigger differences, which will illuminate the problematic 
way mainstream and alternative media are conceptualized in the protest paradigm literature. 
Mainstream vs. Alternative Media 
According to the protest paradigm literature, mainstream media use mostly marginalizing 
frames and alternative media use mostly legitimizing frames (Hertog and McLeod 1995; 
McFarlane and Hay 2003; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  Protest paradigm scholars do not give 
clear definitions of either “mainstream” or “alternative” news outlets, but based on their brief 
descriptions of the alternative newspapers they examine, one could infer that alternative media is 
that which is made by and for a narrow subset of the population while mainstream media is that 
which is made to appeal to the widest audience possible.  For example, much protest paradigm 
research (e.g. Hertog and McLeod 1995; McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999) uses the case of 
anarchist protests and the alternative media they examine are anarchist newspapers.  Anarchist 
newspapers, produced by anarchists and read almost exclusively by other anarchists, present 
anarchist protests in a positive light.  Mainstream media is distributed widely, appeals to a broad 
audience, and is produced by journalists who follow traditional newsmaking norms in terms of 
the types of stories they cover and the kinds of sources they rely upon (Gans 1979; Shoemaker 
and Reese 1996).  The broadcast networks ABC, CBS, and NBC, along with cable network CNN 
fall into the mainstream category, as evidenced by the neutral coverage of both the TPM and 
OWS that indicates traditional journalistic norms of objectivity (see figures 10, 11, and 12). 
Although both FNC and MSNBC are mainstream in the sense that they reach a large 
audience, rely on traditional sources such as political elites, and cover many of the same stories 
that CNN and the broadcast networks cover, their coverage of the TPM and OWS did not adhere 
to the protest paradigm in ways that one would expect.  FNC offered positive coverage of the 
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TPM and MSNBC offered positive coverage of OWS in the same way that anarchist newspapers 
offered positive coverage of anarchist protests.  However, FNC and MSNBC do not just present 
supportive and sympathetic frames of movements that align with their respective political 
ideologies; they are also far more negative than other mainstream outlets toward movements that 
oppose their ideologies.  Pointing to evidence that MSNBC is a left-leaning network that covered 
the TPM more negatively than any other network, Weaver and Scacco (2013) argue that 
marginalization of protesters now falls along party lines and that this contradicts the protest 
paradigm.  While they do not go so far as to develop a new framework, they suggest that there 
may be multiple protest paradigms based on the ideological stances of media outlets.   
Although Weaver and Scacco are correct that FNC and MSNBC present news in an 
ideologically driven way, I disagree that this contradicts the protest paradigm framework.  
Instead, FNC and MSNBC each operate within their own spheres of political discourse (Hallin 
1986; Taylor 2011) and do not neatly fit into either mainstream or alternative categories of 
media.  The protest paradigm framework sees alternative media as that which is supportive of 
protests, and does not address extreme partisan media that would be overly negative, as FNC is 
toward OWS and MSNBC is toward the TPM.  In this section I use the sample of 200 OWS 
programs and the 2009 sample of 319 TPM programs – both which contain a majority of protest 
coverage rather than electoral politics coverage – to make the case for a reconfiguration of the 
protest paradigm that incorporates Hallin’s (1986) spheres and is closer to Chan and Lee’s 
(1984) original conception of journalistic paradigms. 
Table 2 displays framing devices used by mainstream networks ABC, CBS, NBC, and 
CNN in one column, MSNBC in the next, and FNC in the final column.  It is clear that the 
mainstream networks differ substantially from MSNBC and FNC.  While the mainstream 
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Table 2. Number of OWS programs in which each frame 
appeared at least once, by media type (Percentage of all programs 
per media type in parentheses) 
 Mainstream 
(N=143) 
MSNBC 
(N=24) 
FNC 
(N=33) 
Disruption    
Disruptive tactics 35 (24.5) 3   (12.5) 6   (18.2) 
Arrests 77 (53.8) 9   (37.5) 11 (33.3) 
Violence 70 (49.0) 10 (41.7) 18 (54.5) 
     Activist Violence 27 (18.9) 3   (12.5) 15 (45.5) 
     Police Violence 34 (23.8) 6   (25.0) 4   (12.1) 
     Potential Violence 7     (4.9) 1     (4.2) 3     (9.1) 
    
Negative     
Delegitimizing 15 (10.5) 1     (4.2) 19 (57.6) 
Amalgam of Grievances 32 (22.4) 5   (20.8) 4   (12.1) 
Freak 5     (3.5) 0       (--) 2     (6.1) 
Insanity 3     (2.1) 2     (8.3) 5   (15.2) 
Ignorance 20 (14.0) 4   (16.7) 15 (45.5) 
Lazy  9     (9.8) 2     (8.3) 5   (15.2) 
Ridicule 3     (2.1) 0       (--) 16 (48.5) 
Radical 4     (2.8) 6   (25.0) 12 (36.4) 
    
Positive    
Legitimizing 27 (18.9) 13 (54.2) 7   (21.2) 
Patriotic  2     (1.4) 2     (8.3) 0       (--) 
Normal 18 (12.6) 8   (33.3) 2     (6.1) 
Peaceful 42 (29.4) 11 (45.8) 3     (9.1) 
Note: Frames are not mutually exclusive, thus percentages do not  
add to 100. 
 
 
networks used negative and positive frames at similar rates, MSNBC used far more positive than 
negative frames and FNC used far more negative than positive frames.  All three types of 
networks covered OWS disruptive tactics and arrests, but mainstream networks did so at a higher 
rate—which is consistent with the protest paradigm.  All three types of TV outlets covered OWS 
violence, but MSNBC focused on police violence, FNC focused on activist violence, and the 
traditionally mainstream networks covered both about equally. 
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Table 3. Number of TPM 2009 programs in which each frame appeared 
at least once, by media type (Percentage of all programs in parentheses) 
 Mainstream 
(N=111) 
MSNBC 
(N=71) 
FNC 
(N=137) 
Disruption    
Disruptive tactics 0        (--) 0        (--) 0         (--) 
Arrests 0        (--) 0        (--) 0         (--) 
Violence 16  (14.4) 9    (12.7) 20   (14.6) 
     Activist Violent Speech 3      (2.7) 2      (2.8) 0         (--) 
     Activist Physical Violence 5      (4.5) 0        (--) 0         (--) 
     Counter-Protester Violence 4      (3.6) 0        (--) 2       (1.5) 
     Potential Violence 3      (2.7) 5      (7.0) 1       (0.7) 
     No Violence 2      (1.8) 2      (2.8) 17   (12.4) 
    
Negative     
Delegitimizing 55  (49.5) 52  (73.2) 12     (8.8) 
Amalgam of Grievances 6      (5.4) 3      (4.2) 1       (0.7) 
Freak 4      (3.6) 4      (5.6) 1       (0.7) 
Insanity 7      (2.1) 19  (26.8) 2       (1.5) 
Ignorance 11    (9.9) 17  (23.9) 2       (1.5) 
Racism  25  (22.5) 10  (14.1) 9       (6.6) 
Ridicule 9      (8.1) 34  (47.9) 0         (--) 
Radical 2      (1.8) 7      (9.9) 0         (--) 
    
Positive    
Legitimizing 56  (50.5) 21  (29.6) 106 (77.4) 
Patriotic  14  (12.6) 2      (2.8) 35   (25.5) 
Normal 27  (24.3) 5      (7.0) 58   (42.3) 
Peaceful 6      (5.4) 1      (1.4) 18   (13.1) 
Encouraging 2      (1.8) 1      (1.4) 37   (27.0) 
Note: Frames are not mutually exclusive, thus percentages do not add to 100. 
 
 
Because coverage of the TPM after 2010 focused so heavily on electoral politics and did 
not include many of the framing devices used in pre-2010 TPM coverage (as well as OWS 
coverage), I use the sample of coverage from 2009, which included far more protest events than 
the sample from 2009 through 2012 (see table 1).  Table 3 displays framing devices used by the 
three types of networks in 2009 coverage of the TPM.  Tea Party protesters did not use disruptive 
tactics and were not arrested, so those frames did not appear in any coverage.  As in their 
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coverage of OWS, mainstream outlets used equivalent amounts of negative and positive framing 
devices for the TPM.  For example, about half of mainstream programs used the delegitimizing 
frame and half used the legitimizing frame.  MSNBC used far more negative than positive 
frames, and FNC used far more positive than negative frames.   
Similar to OWS coverage, and consistent with the protest paradigm, all three types of 
networks used the violence frame in their TPM coverage.  While the mainstream networks 
covered the 5 types of violence frames that I identified about equally, MSNBC focused mostly 
on the potential for TPM protests to turn violent and FNC focused on the lack of violence.   
MSNBC and the mainstream networks framed some of the things TPM activists said as “violent 
speech” while FNC did not.  The mainstream networks covered a shoving match that occurred 
between TPM activists and some counter-protesters (people protesting the TPM’s protests) and 
used frames that blamed the TPM and their counter-protesters about equally.  FNC only framed 
the counter-protesters as being physically violent and MSNBC ignored the incident entirely 
(perhaps because it would have depicted their preferred group, the counter-protesters, in a 
negative light).   
The data presented in tables 2 and 3 demonstrate that mainstream TV networks still 
adhere to the protest paradigm: they use frames that marginalize protesters, and they use the 
violence frame even when there is no actual violence to report.  It also shows that they use as 
many positive frames as negative, which literature on journalistic norms would lead us to expect 
(Gans 1979) but which the protest paradigm literature does not address.  The data also 
demonstrate that FNC and MSNBC cannot be considered mainstream in the sense that 
communications scholars have used the term, but that Hertog and McLeod’s (1995) conception 
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of “alternative press” is also inadequate to capture the nuances of the contemporary U.S. 
television news field. 
 In previous work (Taylor 2011), I used Hallin’s spheres (1986) to explain the differences 
between FNC, MSNBC, and the mainstream networks in their TPM coverage.  I argued that the 
TPM falls into the sphere of legitimate controversy for the broadcast networks and CNN, as 
journalists on those networks “are obliged to remain disinterested reporters because it is assumed 
that rational and informed people will hold differing views” (Taylor 2011: 46) on the TPM—or 
any given social movement.  In contrast, the TPM falls into the sphere of consensus for FNC and 
the sphere of deviance for MSNBC. 
In his work on UK media coverage of the 2003 Iraq War protests, Ian Taylor (2014) 
adapts Hallin’s model into four spheres of opinion: full legitimacy, partial legitimacy, implicit 
deviance, and explicit deviance.  While his point that mainstream news reports of protests tend to 
fall within the sphere of legitimate controversy (specifically occupying the spheres that he calls 
“partial legitimacy” and “implicit deviance”) is well made, Ian Taylor goes so far as to say that 
there is no sphere of consensus in contemporary media (p. 41).  I rebut that, and argue there are 
some things that any corporate-owned news medium will always consider to be within the sphere 
of consensus.  The capitalist economic model is one such thing.  Because all for-profit media rely 
on capitalism in order to survive, they take for granted that capitalism is a good system and 
assume that a strong majority of Americans agree.  Journalists on MSNBC criticize the extreme 
right components of the TPM such as their interpretation of the 2nd amendment and their racism, 
but they never criticize the movement’s celebration of capitalism.  The idea that racism is 
unacceptable and should not be tolerated falls within the sphere of consensus as well (although 
what actually constitutes racism is contested in often partisan ways).  Indeed, FNC does not 
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celebrate the clear racism present in the rhetoric at some TPM protests; instead, journalists on 
FNC argue that the TPM is not racist and that any TPM discourse or action that can be 
interpreted as racist should be blamed on fringe agitators rather than genuine Tea Party activists.  
The problem with Hallin’s original concept is not that there is no sphere of consensus, as 
Ian Taylor (2014) argues, but that the three-spheres concept is only relevant to mainstream media 
outlets that try to appeal to the widest audience possible.  My reinterpretation of the three spheres 
(M. Taylor 2011) sees each as applying only to an individual media outlet’s intended audience, 
and recognizes that some media outlets market their news products toward narrow niches.  Even 
if Ian Taylor is correct that there is no sphere of consensus that remains constant across all media 
outlets, my understanding of the three spheres is that they vary by media outlet anyway—what 
falls in the sphere of consensus is that with which the majority of an outlet’s audience agrees.  
The audience that FNC attracts is more politically conservative than the general population, and 
the audience that MSNBC attracts is more politically progressive.  Knowing this, each network 
can place a given news item in its own sphere of legitimate controversy, deviance, or consensus 
even if other networks would place that same news item in a different sphere.  
In contrast to protest paradigm scholars who contend that media outlets adhere to the 
protest paradigm based on the tactics of a movement (Boyle et al. 2012) or how deviant, 
extremist, or militant a movement is (Hertog and McLeod 1995; McLeod and Hertog 1999; 
Shoemaker 1984), I find that whether a media outlet will follow the protest paradigm depends on 
where a social movement falls in terms of the three spheres.  A media outlet will only adhere to 
the protest paradigm if the protest movement falls into that outlet’s sphere of legitimate 
controversy.  If the movement falls into an outlet’s sphere of deviance, the protest paradigm will 
be taken to the next level, and marginalizing (negative) frames will be used far more than 
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legitimizing (positive) frames.  Finally, if a social movement falls into an outlet’s sphere of 
consensus then that outlet’s journalists will go out of their way to portray the movement in a 
positive way and will be far less likely to adhere to the protest paradigm.  Tables 2 and 3 
demonstrate this quantitatively, but the protest paradigm’s relation to spheres of political 
discourse can be explained qualitatively with the case of arrests of OWS activists.  
Coverage of OWS Arrests in Three Spheres  
Arrests, especially mass arrests, are among the most newsworthy things that can happen 
during a protest (McCarthey et al. 2008; Myers and Caniglia 2004; Wouters 2013).  TV news 
coverage of OWS surged after the first mass arrests of activists in New York City.  From the day 
protests started until two weeks later, on October 1st when 724 OWS activists were arrested, 
OWS was covered in a total of 19 programs.  In the first four days after the arrests, 32 programs 
covered OWS—an increase of nearly 160 percent.  For the next two weeks after that, OWS 
coverage averaged twenty programs per day.  Another 718 activists were arrested during those 
two weeks (Oct. 5 through 18).  Protest paradigm literature suggests that mainstream media will 
cover arrests using negative or marginalizing frames toward activists, while alternative media 
will cover arrests in ways that focus on the activists’ “higher moral purpose” (McLeod and 
Hertog 1992: 267) and criticize police tactics.  However, the ideological segmentation of 
contemporary U.S. television networks cannot be adequately described in this dichotomous way.  
It is more useful to think of media outlets as operating within spheres of political discourse rather 
than as either mainstream or alternative with no variation or gradations. 
As I explained in chapter 2, Hallin (1986) described news stories and sources as falling 
into one of three spheres of political discourse in U.S. media.  In this section I describe how 
journalists on each TV network portrayed OWS arrests, and how that case demonstrates the  
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Figure 13. Adaptation of Hallin’s Spheres (1986: 117) in relation to the protest paradigm 
 
link between the three spheres and the protest paradigm.  Figure 13 depicts Hallin’s three spheres 
as they align with three forms of protest coverage: protest paradigm coverage that is overly 
negative, protest paradigm coverage that is balanced and objective, and supportive coverage that 
protest paradigm scholars have traditionally attributed to alternative media.  OWS coverage falls 
in the sphere of deviance on FNC, the sphere of legitimate controversy on CNN and the three 
broadcast networks, and in the sphere of consensus on MSNBC. 
I coded all mentions of arrests at OWS protest events in all 1267 transcripts using the text 
search feature in NVivo, which allows me to analyze the entire population of transcripts rather 
than just a sample.  My text search for arrests captured 25 words on either side of the word  
“arrests” (or arrest, arresting, or arrested); I read this material and coded all relevant text, 
removing anything not related to OWS activists being arrested.  Figure 14 shows the words most 
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frequently used by each network in their coverage of OWS arrests, in the form of word clouds (I 
separate CNN from the three broadcast networks here in order to more clearly show the 
similarities and differences between them).  Each word cloud displays the 40 words found most 
frequently within those coded selections; words in larger font appeared more frequently than 
those in smaller font. 
Reading through the text coded at “arrest*,” I noticed that TV news covered arrests in 3 
different ways: FNC did so in a mocking way, usually comparing OWS arrests to the lack of 
TPM arrests and suggesting that OWS activists deserved to be arrested; MSNBC did so in a way 
that criticizes the police for overuse of force; and CNN and the Broadcast networks did so in a 
mostly neutral way, using value-free language to describe events as they were happening.  Figure 
14 shows that FNC is the only network with “violence,” “injured,” and “property” in its word 
cloud.  Describing OWS events as violent, focusing on activists and police who were injured, 
and discussing property damage caused by the activists allowed the conservative news network 
to justify state suppression of OWS; activists were behaving badly and deserved to be arrested.  
FNC is also the only network with “party” in its word cloud.  I found that all instances of the 
word “party” refer to the Tea Party—the word cloud only captured words consisting of 4 letters 
or more, so “tea” was left out.  Programs on FNC mentioned the Tea Party when reporting OWS 
arrests as a way to set up OWS as the opposite of the TPM, which had no arrests and which FNC 
portrayed positively, as a patriotic social movement.  FNC used the TPM as a foil to enhance 
their portrayal of OWS activists as criminals.  
Protest paradigm scholars describe mainstream and alternative media as having “different 
moral interpretations of the same events” (McLeod and Hertog 1992: 269).  While FNC reported 
on OWS arrests in ways that made OWS activists seem immoral and deserving of punishment,  
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Figure 14. Word cloud for programs coded at “Arrests,” by network  
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MSNBC covered these arrests in a sympathetic way.  It is the only network with “pepper” in its 
word cloud, which comes from all the mentions of police using pepper spray on protesters.26  
MSNBC news anchors and program hosts focused on police brutality in their coverage of OWS 
arrests, where FNC focused on what they framed as the “bad behavior” of activists.  McLeod and 
Hertog (1992: 270) described a dichotomous media environment: while the mainstream media 
“criticiz[ed] law violations, the alternative media questioned law enforcement. Police brutality 
was framed as being symbolic of state oppression.”  Because OWS falls into MSNBC’s sphere 
of consensus, they focus their coverage of mass arrests on the bad behavior of police, rather than 
the bad behavior of the protesters.  But if MSNBC is the alternative media outlet in this scenario, 
then FNC would fall into what protest paradigm scholars refer to as the mainstream outlet; 
where, then, do the broadcast networks and CNN fit? 
Because McLeod and Hertog (1992, 1995, 1999) used the case of the anarchist 
movement to build their protest paradigm theory, and the anarchist movement is one that is so 
radical that it would fall into the sphere of deviance for any of the TV networks I use in this 
research, I argue that McLeod and Hertog’s conceptions of mainstream and alternative media are 
too specific to anarchism to apply to all social movements.  By incorporating Hallin’s spheres, 
the protest paradigm can be generalized to all social movements.  Ironically, this brings us closer 
to Shoemaker’s (1984) idea that the more radical journalists perceive a movement to be, the 
more negative coverage that movement will receive, an idea that McLeod and Hertog (1999: 
311) used to build their case that “the more radical a group is perceived to be, the more closely 
journalists will conform to the protest paradigm” (emphasis added).  Applying the protest 
                                                 
26 Unlike the initial word search, which captured variations of the word “arrest,” the word cloud 
feature of NVivo does not capture those variations. “Spray” did not show up in the word cloud 
because of the variations in “spray, sprayed, and spraying.” 
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paradigm to Hallin’s spheres clarifies that the protest paradigm can be adhered to without using 
more negative than positive framing devices and that the mainstream vs. alternative media 
dichotomy is too simplistic.  Different media outlets can each see the same news item as falling 
into any of the three spheres, depending on the audience they each attract.   Thus, middle-of-the-
road networks ABC, CBS, NBC, and CNN should find OWS to fall into the sphere of legitimate 
controversy, and to adhere to the protest paradigm—but in a balanced and objective way rather 
than an overly negative way. 
As figure 14 shows, the broadcast networks and CNN covered OWS arrests in very 
similar ways, which are quite distinct from both FNC and MSNBC.  Instead of spinning arrests 
as a result of activist misbehavior or police misbehavior, they cover arrests very succinctly as 
events occur.  The broadcast networks and CNN are the only ones with “riot” and “camp” in 
their word clouds.  These refer to the OWS “camps” that were cleared out by police in “riot” 
gear; protesters who refused to leave the camps were arrested.  The word cloud for the broadcast 
networks is the only one that includes “banks.”  This is not due to in-depth coverage of some sort 
of anti-bank motivations behind OWS protests, however; it is simply reports of activists getting 
arrested while demonstrating inside of bank buildings, with no context or explanation as to why 
they are protesting at banks.  Consistent with the protest paradigm, this lack of context is typical 
of mainstream media coverage of social movements (see also Sobieraj 2011).  Because they have 
much less space to report news compared to CNN’s 24 hours, the broadcast networks have to 
provide tight sound bites that reduce the day’s biggest news stories efficiently enough to fit them 
all into one hour.  The words “protests,” “arrests,” and “police” are all the same size in the 
broadcast word cloud, indicative of short and to-the-point stories that describe what is happening 
without taking the time to explain why it is happening. 
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The spheres explain why so many networks that adhere to the protest paradigm do so 
using a balanced set of framing devices.  They also explicate the idea that news outlets cannot be 
described simply as mainstream or alternative, but that there are three possible orientations a 
news outlet can take toward any news story.  Thus, the protest paradigm applies to contemporary 
U.S. television media in much the same way that Chan and Lee (1984) described the three 
journalistic paradigms of the Hong Kong press. 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I examined how the amount and type of TV coverage each movement 
received changed over time and what factors explain those changes.  I found that news coverage 
of each movement differed based on the tactics each movement used and on their respective 
alignments with the status quo as well as their respective alignments with the spheres of 
discourse that correspond to each type of TV news outlet.  In line with the protest paradigm, 
coverage of OWS is driven by violence and arrests and then all but ceases when OWS switches 
to focusing on non-public protest tactics such as direct assistance to needy populations.  In the 
meantime, coverage of the TPM switches from mostly adhering to the protest paradigm to 
ignoring TPM protest events and focusing on the TPM’s direct effects on electoral politics.  
OWS’s anti-status quo and the TPM’s pro-status quo orientations likely explain these 
differences.  
I also showed how TV news coverage of each movement varied in terms of frequency, 
type, and tone across different networks.  OWS received far more protest event coverage while 
the TPM receive far more coverage that had nothing to do with their public protests, but both 
movements received more neutral coverage than positive or negative.  This varied by network, 
with CNN and the broadcast networks giving overwhelmingly neutral coverage of both 
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movements, FNC mostly positive coverage of the TPM and negative coverage of OWS, and 
MSNBC mostly negative coverage of the TPM and positive coverage of OWS.  While many of 
the same frames were used in coverage of both movements, the frequency of framing devices 
also varied by network.   
Finally, I explained that these variations by network do not necessarily contradict the 
protest paradigm, as some have suggested (e.g. Weaver and Scacco 2013).  Rather, they are 
evidence of a more nuanced process taking place in our segmented television news landscape.  
By incorporating a version of Hallin’s spheres that recognizes the importance of a news outlet’s 
intended audience, the protest paradigm can be generalized to all social movements.  Where a 
social movement falls in terms of a news outlet’s sphere of consensus, deviance, or legitimate 
controversy will determine whether the news outlet adheres to the protest paradigm, a more 
negative version of the protest paradigm, or uses positive and supportive frames to describe the 
movement.  Therefore, a media outlet’s adherence to the protest paradigm is determined in part 
by the perceived political ideology of the outlet’s target audience.  In addition, this relationship 
between negative and positive frames and spheres of discourse should apply to any news item or 
news source, not just social movements. 
This chapter covered the first component of the partisan media paradigm: media outlets 
that try to appeal to the widest audience will cover social movements in neutral or balanced 
ways, regardless of the political ideology of the social movement.  Most research on media and 
social movements argues or assumes that mainstream media will use negative frames to describe 
activists and will not cover the substantive issues that activists raise (e.g. Amenta et al. 2009; 
Boyle et al. 2012; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011).  In 
the next chapter, I cover the second component of the partisan media paradigm: that substantive 
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coverage of social movements occurs when negative frames are used in news reports, and 
regardless of whether or not the coverage is focused on protest activity.  I test whether prior 
research that found negative frames actually predict in-depth reporting on the issues for the first 
year of TPM coverage (Taylor 2011), and for both right and left-wing movements (Taylor and 
Gunby 2016) holds for OWS and the TPM over multiple years of coverage.  I also build on this 
research by testing whether positive frames have a similar predictive effect.   
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CHAPTER 4. 
FRAMING DEVICES AND SUBSTANTIVE COVERAGE 
OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
In the previous chapter, I showed how TV news programs used many of the same framing 
devices in coverage of the TPM and OWS.   In this chapter, I examine whether the framing 
devices used in coverage of each movement occur alongside substantive coverage in the form of 
standing (allowing activists to speak in their own words, see Ferree et al. 2002) and descriptions 
of activists’ messages.  Using a random sample of 400 TV news transcripts – 200 of TPM 
coverage from 2009 through 2012, and 200 of OWS coverage from 2011 through 2014 – I test 
whether this data supports or contradicts prior research on framing and in-depth coverage of 
social movements.  While prior research found that the “freak” (negative descriptions of 
activists’ appearances or behaviors) and ignorant (descriptions of activists as stupid, or not 
understanding the issues they are protesting) framing devices predicted different forms of in-
depth coverage of the TPM and Global Justice Movement (Taylor and Gunby 2016), I find that 
other negative frames and also some positive frames are even stronger predictors of some forms 
of in-depth coverage for the TPM and OWS. 
Prior Work on Framing and Substantive Coverage  
Most research on media and social movements indicates that news coverage will be 
negative or will not bring up a movement’s issues of concern (e.g. Amenta et al. 2009; Boyle et 
al. 2012; Gitlin 1980; McLeod and Hertog 1999; Smith et al. 2001; Sobieraj 2011).  However, 
some recent scholarship suggests that favorable coverage does occur in some circumstances, 
such as when a movement supports the status quo or when coverage does not focus on protest 
activity (Amenta et al. 2012; Boykoff and Laschever 2011; Weaver and Scacco 2013), even 
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when negative framing devices are used in that coverage (Taylor and Gunby 2016).  In this 
section I give a brief overview of the literature on substantive coverage of social movements, and 
identify gaps in the literature that I attempt to fill in this chapter. 
Amenta and colleagues (2012) rightly point out that the literature on social movements 
and media has found that media coverage of protests is rarely favorable toward protesters, but 
that this literature does not address the fact that movements are often covered for other reasons—
not just for protests (p. 86).  They take a “story-centered” approach to evaluating the quality of 
media coverage a social movement gets.  They find that when a story is initiated by disruptive 
social movement action (which the authors define as any protest, march, or demonstration, 
whether or not it includes civil disobedience), the movement’s message is less likely to be 
covered.  In contrast, they find that when a story is initiated by institutional action such as 
running candidates for office or fighting to pass legislation, the movement’s message is more 
likely to be covered (p. 89).  Their study is limited in two important ways: 1) they are looking 
solely at the case of the Townsend Plan, which was a social movement that was active in the first 
half of the 20th century; and 2) the only form of media they examine is newspaper coverage.  I 
bring this into contemporary times by looking at two 21st century movements and their TV 
coverage.  Does this story-centered argument apply to TV news coverage of contemporary 
movements? 
Recent scholarship on TV news coverage of the TPM suggests there could be support for 
Amenta and colleagues’ (2012) findings.  Boykoff and Laschever (2011) found that 2009 and 
2010 coverage depicted the TPM supportively more than twice as often as it depicted the 
movement negatively.  In their investigation of the protest paradigm’s (see chapter 2 for an 
overview of this line of research) applicability to right-wing movements, Weaver and Scacco 
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(2013) found that protest paradigm coverage of the TPM varied by news source, and that CNN 
and FNC were more likely to use legitimizing frames than MSNBC.  However, neither of these 
studies examine TPM coverage after 2010.  By including coverage from 2011 and 2012 in my 
sample, I capture media framing of the TPM during a period in which its tactics are almost 
entirely institutionalized. 
The protest paradigm suggests that when media cover violence and/or arrests, they fail to 
cover the issues or to give activists standing (Boyle et al. 2012; Dardis 2006; McLeod and 
Hertog 1999).  Other scholars have argued that coverage of the violence at the 1999 WTO 
protests in Seattle actually led to more in-depth coverage of the issues being protested (DeLuca 
and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002).  However, this argument was challenged by Boykoff (2006), 
who examined whether coverage of violence at protests affiliated with the Global Justice 
Movement – including the 1999 WTO protests – led to an increase in substantive coverage of the 
protester’s issues.  He operationalizes substantive coverage as that which includes 5 or more 
sentences explaining the goals or motivations of the protesters.  Boykoff (2006) uses a broad 
definition of the violence frame, including when reporters describe an event as having the 
potential for violence and even when they describe an event as nonviolent (p. 211).  He found no 
correlation between the violence frame and substantive coverage.  I improve upon Boykoff’s 
work by testing whether four distinct forms of the violence frame – activist violence, police 
violence, potential for violence, and no violence – predict each of three components of 
substantive coverage. 
Amenta and colleagues conceptualize substantive coverage as that which includes both a 
description of the movement’s messages and gives activist standing.  Standing refers to activists 
being given a voice by media in the form of direct quotes or paraphrasing (Amenta et al. 2012: 
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87; see also Ferree et al. 2002).  Following my prior research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), I 
separate standing into these two components since direct quotes are more legitimizing than 
paraphrasing (McLeod and Hertog 1999: 319), and paraphrasing can misconstrue activists’ 
meanings.  I ask whether a series of negative and positive framing devices predict quoting, 
paraphrasing, or covering the movement’s message, and then I combine the three components 
and test whether negative and positive framing devices predict substantive coverage. 
While Amenta and colleagues (2012) have shown that substantive coverage of social 
movements does not occur when coverage is initiated by disruptive social movement actions, 
they do so using newspaper coverage of a movement from the 1930s.  I move this research 
forward by examining a more relevant source of news and contemporary social movements.  In 
addition to building on Amenta’s work, I also build on my prior research (Taylor and Gunby 
2016) by examining positive frames as well as negative frames.   
 In prior research (Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 2016), I tested whether negative 
framing devices and substantive coverage were mutually exclusive.  I examined TV news 
coverage around protest events specifically and found that negative frames such as ‘freak’ and 
‘ignorant’ correlate strongly with substantive coverage of social movements.  The original 
research examined TV news coverage of the TPM and the Global Justice Movement (GJM); 
coverage of OWS is similar to the GJM in many ways, and different in others.  The GJM and 
OWS share many overlapping actors, frames, targets, and tactics, which has led scholars to claim 
that the GJM has symbiotically coalesced into the OWS (de Vries-Jordan 2014).  Key 
differences include the fact that OWS got more news coverage than the GJM, and that MSNBC 
was not nearly as partisan as it is now back when the GJM was getting a lot of media attention 
(from 1999-2004).  The TPM coverage I used in the original research was 2009 coverage only, 
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and was sampled around three major protest events; the sample I use in this chapter covers 2009 
through 2012 and is overwhelmingly related to electoral politics rather than protest events.   
In my prior research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), I found that negative frames are 
significant predictors of all three components of substantive coverage.  While those results were 
also consistent with Amenta and colleagues’ (2012) finding that event-related coverage leads to 
more coverage of activist “standing,” my research only included analysis of two negative 
framing devices.  In this chapter, I test whether the results from that original research hold for 
TV news coverage across multiple years of movement activity, including additional negative 
frames and positive frames, and including much more news coverage that is not focused on 
protest events.  I am also testing the theory that news coverage initiated by protest is more likely 
to include standing, and coverage initiated by institutionalized action is more likely to include 
more thematic framing—the message behind the movement (Amenta et al. 2012: 85; see also 
Iyengar 1991, 2005).  While event-related TPM coverage made up over half of the data used in 
my 2016 article, only 35 of the 200 TPM transcripts in this chapter are event-related.  Inversely, 
just 34 of the 200 OWS transcripts are not event-related.  Therefore, I am not just comparing a 
progressive movement with a right-wing movement; I am comparing coverage of protest events 
to coverage of a movement that has moved on from protests to institutionalized tactics.  
Therefore, the sample of TPM coverage should be more comparable to the Townsend Plan 
coverage used by Amenta and colleagues (2012).  
Data and Methods 
Dependent and Independent Variables 
My dependent variables explore whether news programs provided substantive coverage 
of the movements, which I gauge by coding each sentence that quoted activists, paraphrased 
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activists, or explained their message in the form of activists’ motivations, grievances, and 
demands.  The quote variable measures the number of sentences spoken by an activist in an 
episode.  The paraphrase variable measures the number of sentences that paraphrased an activist 
in the news episode.  Following Ferree and colleagues (2002), I consider quoting and 
paraphrasing in tandem as examples of “standing.”  Standing is an indicator of in-depth coverage 
that benefits social movements (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993) because it represents journalists 
giving a social movement the opportunity to speak for itself (Ferree et al. 2002).  Amenta and 
colleagues (2012) also conceptualize both quoting and paraphrasing as standing (see also Ferree 
et al. 2002).  However, rather than look at both paraphrasing and quotes together as examples of 
standing, I also analyze them separately to acknowledge that quotes, coming directly from the 
activists, are often a stronger form of standing than paraphrasing (see Detenber et al. 2007 for an 
example of the different effects on public perception produced by quoting and paraphrasing).  
The variable message refers to the presence of a description of the substantive issues behind the 
movement’s actions.  I count the number of sentences in each episode that discuss the protesters’ 
grievances, demands, goals, and/or motivations as well as journalists’ or pundits’ critiques of the 
protest targets (Rojecki 2002).  None of these variables are mutually exclusive; any or all of the 
frames and measures of substantive reporting can occur within a single sentence and certainly 
within one TV news episode.  
Substantive coverage includes both standing and the movement’s message.  However, 
rather than operationalizing substantive coverage as a dichotomous variable, as Amenta and 
colleagues (2012) do, where substantive = 1 when both the message and either quoting or 
paraphrasing of activists takes place in one news transcript and 0 otherwise, I use a count 
variable.  The count variable has a score of 1 for each sentence that either quotes or paraphrases 
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an activist, and for each sentence that describes the movement’s message.  This broader range 
allows the analysis to capture multiple instances of standing and reporting on the message. 
 In order to test whether substantive coverage occurs alongside specific framing devices, 
my independent variables are many of the negative and positive frames that I described in 
chapter 3.  I include the following negative frames: freak, ignorance, insanity, ridicule, amalgam 
of grievances, and racism.  I then run analysis on the violence frame as conceptualized by 
communications scholars (e.g. Boykoff 2006; but see also Dardis 2006 and McFarlane and Hay 
2003, who broke the violence frame into two distinct forms), and compare results of that model 
to one that parses out different forms of the violence frame: activist violence, police violence, 
potential for violence, and no violence.  Finally, I examine the following positive frames: 
normal, patriotic, and peaceful (see chapter 3 for descriptions of each).  The peaceful frame is 
distinct from the “no violence” frame because the peaceful frame is overtly positive, focusing on 
the calm and peaceful atmosphere at the protest or the peaceful nature of the activists.  The “no 
violence” frame places the focus on violence, with journalists or pundits often going out of their 
way to express surprise at the lack of violence at an event.  I do not include the “legitimizing” 
frame (see chapters 3 and 5) because it is often indistinguishable from the movement’s message, 
which is a dependent variable. 
Control Variables 
Following Taylor and Gunby (2016), my analysis includes three control variables.  I 
control for event-related coverage with a dichotomous variable.  A value of 1 indicates that the 
program was focused on a specific upcoming, current, or past protest event; otherwise, the value 
is 0.  I control for whether or not the episode focuses on an event to distinguish protest event 
coverage from coverage of the movement as a whole, or of institutionalized tactics such as  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for variables used in chapter 4 analyses 
 Occupy Wall Street 
N=200 
 Tea Party Movement 
N=200 
 Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max  Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Logit DVs          
Standing 0.575 0.496 0 1  0.160 0.368 0 1 
Message 0.650 0.478 0 1  0.580 0.495 0 1 
          
ZINB DVs          
Quote 1.520 3.014 0 17  0.490 1.878 0 16 
Paraphrase 0.775 1.136 0 5  0.085 0.329 0 2 
Message 2.920 4.060 0 15  1.715 3.086 0 25 
Substantive   5.215 6.474 0 33  2.219 4.407 0 33 
          
Negative          
Freak 0.050 0.329 0 4  0.010 0.100 0 1 
Ignorance 0.505 1.341 0 9  0.100 0.521 0 5 
Insanity 0.070 0.309 0 2  0.115 0.415 0 3 
Ridicule 0.215 0.856 0 7  0.155 0.650 0 7 
Amalgam 0.370 0.915 0 6    - -   - - 
Racism - - - -  0.155 0.585 0 4 
          
Disruptive          
Arrests 1.090 1.617 0 8    - -   - - 
Violence 1.490 2.860 0 21    - -   - - 
Activist Violence 0.495 1.272 0 9    - -   - - 
Police Violence 0.615 1.756 0 15    - -   - - 
Potential for     
Violence 
0.090 0.472 0 5    - -   - - 
No Violence 0.005 0.071 0 1    - -   - - 
          
Positive          
Normal 0.310 1.072 0 10  0.125 0.814 0 10 
Patriotic 0.025 0.211 0 2  0.065 0.389 0 4 
Peaceful  0.505 1.130 0 9    - - - - 
          
Controls          
Word Count 955.12 775.458 87 4015  609.21 817.553 91 6574 
Event coverage 0.830 0.377 0 1  0.175 0.381 0 1 
FNC 0.165 0.372 0 1    0.220 0.415 0 1 
MSNBC 0.120 0.326 0 1  0.215 0.412 0 1 
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electioneering.  I also control for which network produced the episode.  I include the two 
ideologically biased cable news networks (FNC and MSNBC) as dummy variables, with the 
traditionally mainstream CNN and broadcast networks as the reference category.  This allows me 
to control for different organizational norms in reporting.  See table 4 for descriptive statistics of 
all variables used in the analyses presented in this chapter. 
Methods 
In my first analysis, I use logistic regression; in the rest, I use zero-inflated negative  
binomial regression (ZINB).  This form of regression analysis is particularly suited to modeling 
count variables with excessive zeroes and where outcome variables’ variances are larger than 
their means (Long and Freese 2014).  My data meet both of these criteria, as table 4 indicates.  
Statisticians and other researchers propose that zero inflated distributions provide better 
statistical fit to data where the dependent variables are count variables with excessive zeroes, 
since failing to account for the extra zeroes can result in biased parameter estimates (Greene 
1994; Hall 2000; Lambert 1992; Xie et al. 2009).  After comparing the predicted and actual 
probabilities from four different regression models that can be used to analyze count data, I 
confirmed that ZINB is the best fit to my data using likelihood ratio and Vuong tests27 
(Perumean-Chaney et al. 2013) and HPC tests (Silva et al. 2015).  See Appendix B for results of 
those tests.   
 ZINB regression assumes that the excessive zeroes in the outcome variables are the result 
of two different processes happening in the data.  It uses a logit model to explain the outcome of 
zero in the dependent variable, and a negative binomial model to explain the counts for the non-
zero outcomes (Long and Freese 2014).  Each of several framing devices, whether the episode 
                                                 
27 Using Vuong to test for zero-inflation in non-nested models has recently come under scrutiny 
(see Wilson 2015). I conduct HPC tests as an added measure. 
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was event-based, and the news networks comprise the negative binomial model that explains the 
number of sentences that quote, paraphrase, or describe the movements’ message.   
Due to the nature of TV news production, the time devoted to a story is decided by 
executive producers prior to broadcast.  The amount of time allotted to a story then affects the 
amount of substantive coverage a journalist is able to fit into a story, though longer time 
allotment does not guarantee any substantive coverage.  I operationalize the time devoted to a 
story with word count, which is measured by the number of all movement-related words in an 
episode’s transcript.  I include word count to ensure that my analysis of the association between 
the frames and substantive coverage “does not simply reflect how much the journalists could fit 
into each episode” (Taylor and Gunby 2016: 586).  In my analyses, a low word count explains 
the excessive zero outcomes, since shorter news segments are less likely to include substantive 
coverage.  Each of the three control variables could also explain the excessive zeroes, so I 
include them in both the logit model and the negative binomial model.  When comparing models, 
I use Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) to assess model fit.  Decreases of more than 10 from 
model to model are considered to be significant improvements in model fit (Burnham and 
Anderson 2004). 
Results and Discussion  
First, I test whether my data support the theory that news coverage initiated by protest 
action will be more likely to include standing, and news coverage initiated by institutionalized 
action such as electioneering will be more likely than protest coverage to include the message 
behind the movement (Amenta et al. 2012: 85).  In order to directly compare my results to 
Amenta and colleagues’, I combined quoting and paraphrasing into one variable and made that 
variable dichotomous (any transcript that includes either a quote or paraphrase is counted as 1,  
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Table 5. Log Odds Coefficients from Logistic Regression of Event-
Related Coverage on a Movement’s Standing and Message  
 Occupy Wall Street  
(N=200) 
Tea Party Movement 
(N=200) 
  
Standing 
 
Message 
 
Standing 
 
Message 
Event 1.509** -0.669 1.091* 1.370** 
 (0.497) (0.501) (0.446) (0.488) 
     
FNC -0.376 -0.361 -0.506 0.334 
 (0.463) (0.473) (0.545) (0.393) 
     
MSNBC -0.918 0.777 -0.590 0.319 
 (0.586) (0.712) (0.555) (0.393) 
     
Word Count 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001* 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
     
Constant -2.169*** -0.534 -2.069*** -0.816** 
 (0.553) (0.513) (0.307) (0.315) 
     
LR χ2 
(df=5) 
51.53*** 55.21*** 13.89** 29.65*** 
Pseudo R2 0.189 0.213 0.079 0.109 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
otherwise it is 0), which is consistent with the way they measured standing.  Likewise, I code 
message as ‘1’ for any transcript that includes at least one sentence describing the movement’s 
message, otherwise it is zero.   
Because the dependent variable in each analysis is dichotomous, I use logistic regression 
for this first set of tests.  Table 5 displays coefficients from logistic regression for both standing 
and the message of each movement.  Looking first at the columns labeled “Standing,” it is clear 
that my results support Amenta and colleague’s assertion that protest event coverage is more 
likely to include standing than non-protest coverage.  When coverage is event-related, the odds 
that a TV news program will include OWS standing are 4.522 to 1 (log odds = 1.509) and the 
odds of TPM standing are 2.977 to 1 (log odds = 1.091), holding all other variables constant. 
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Results presented in table 5 also suggest that protest events are not as detrimental to 
communicating a movement’s message as Amenta and colleagues suggested.  Although the 
coefficient is negative, event coverage has no significant effect on coverage of OWS’s message.  
Contrary to what we would expect, when news coverage is initiated by a TPM protest event, the 
odds of that coverage containing the message behind the protesters’ actions are 3.935 times 
higher than when coverage is not initiated by a protest event (log odds = 1.370), holding all other 
variables constant.  Thus, the odds that event-related TPM coverage will include the TPM’s 
message are about 4 to 1, higher than the odds that it will give standing to TPM activists (about 3 
to 1).   
This could be due to either the TPM or the Townsend Plan being a special case.  One or 
the other of these two movements could be significantly different from most other social 
movements, and our respective results could be evidence of that.  The fact that the TPM is a 
status quo oriented movement may be enough to differentiate it from most other U.S. social 
movements, at least the ones that get a lot of media attention.  As supporters of the status quo, 
journalists are more likely to discuss the TPM’s message regardless of whether the story is 
event-related.  Alternatively, my results could be due to the medium itself; perhaps TPM 
newspaper data will show a result more in line with Amenta and colleagues’ expectations.  
Still, predicting substantive coverage based on whether that coverage is focused on a 
protest event is a simplistic way of examining very complex data.  I turn next to specific framing 
devices and their relationships with different components of substantive coverage.  I start by 
looking at negative framing devices used in both OWS and TPM coverage, then disruptive 
framing devices (which, arguably, are also negative) used in OWS coverage (none appeared in 
the sample of TPM coverage), and then positive framing devices in both OWS and TPM 
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coverage.  Finally, I develop models that incorporate all framing devices and their effects on a 
count variable that measures the extent of substantive coverage overall. 
Negative Frames and In-Depth Coverage 
 Results of ZINB regression of various negative frames on three components of 
substantive coverage of OWS and the TPM are listed side by side in table 6.  Each of the six sets 
of results presented in table 6 test the same independent variables’ effects on a different 
dependent variable.  Thus, the models in table 6 should not be compared against each other (see 
Appendix C for incremental models for each of the three dependent variables on OWS and TPM 
transcripts).   
The results show that many negative frames used in TV news occur simultaneously with 
descriptions of the messages of both movements.  However, results for quoting and paraphrasing 
activists from both movements over the full 3-year time periods are not entirely consistent with 
prior research.  The freak frame is almost exclusively used in live event coverage, and only 
appears in 2 programs in this TPM sample (compared to 38 programs in the sample from 2009 
coverage, see Taylor and Gunby 2016).  Because of this, as well as the fact that activists are 
more likely to be directly quoted in protest event coverage rather than be paraphrased, it is not 
surprising that the freak frame has a very strong and negative relationship with paraphrasing 
TPM activists.  None of the 200 TPM transcripts included both paraphrasing and the freak frame.  
However, the freak frame is a significant predictor of both movements’ messages.  
I use a different coding scheme for the freak frame here than I did in prior research.  In 
the original paper (Taylor and Gunby 2016), we followed Boykoff’s (2006) lead and combined 
the insanity frame with the freak frame; we found it to be a significant predictor of standing for 
both movements, and a marginally significant predictor of conveying the message of the TPM  
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Table 6. Coefficients from ZINB Regression – Negative Frames 
      Occupy Wall Street (N=200) Tea Party Movement (N=200) 
DV: Quote Paraphrase Message Quote Paraphrase Message 
 
Negative Frames 
Freak  0.450 
(0.330) 
-0.371 
(0.282) 
0.398+ 
(0.224) 
 0.210 
(0.428) 
-14.913*** 
(1.021) 
1.099** 
(0.384)  
Ignorance  0.033 
(0.092) 
-0.002 
(0.097) 
0.214** 
(0.073) 
 0.215 
(0.938) 
-0.121 
(0.284) 
0.557** 
(0.210)  
Insanity 0.092 
(0.357) 
0.174 
(0.376) 
0.180 
(0.155) 
 0.041 
(0.761) 
0.590 
(0.570) 
0.458 
(0.292) 
Ridicule 0.091 
(0.148) 
0.270+ 
(0.152) 
-0.206** 
(0.077) 
 -0.310 
(0.348) 
-0.500* 
(0.230) 
0.114 
(0.164) 
Amalgam 0.159+ 
(0.094) 
0.022 
(0.102) 
0.385*** 
(0.091) 
 - - - 
Racism  - - -  0.719 (0.760) 
0.105 
(0.278) 
-0.038 
(0.170) 
Controls        
Event  0.207 
(0.553) 
-0.474+ 
(0.285) 
-0.297 
(0.220) 
 1.771* 
(0.747) 
0.323 
(1.115) 
0.757* 
(0.308) 
FNC -1.710*** 
(0.467) 
-1.015** 
(0.375) 
0.124 
(0.294) 
 -0.841 
(0.651) 
-2.587+ 
(1.476) 
0.086 
(0.348) 
MSNBC -0.206 -0.254 0.962***  2.544 -1.259 -0.121 
 (0.484) (0.315) (0.274)  (3.619) (0.998) (0.239) 
Constant 0.555 
(0.507) 
0.758* 
(0.297) 
0.864*** 
(0.205) 
 -0.190 
(0.796) 
-1.171 
(0.728) 
0.299+ 
(0.175) 
Inflated Controls       
Word Count -0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
-0.015+ 
(0.008) 
 -0.007+ 
(0.004) 
-0.006 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
Event -0.978 
(1.998) 
-4.967** 
(1.790) 
1.839 
(1.300) 
 0.066 
(1.361) 
-1.032 
(3.757) 
-1.654 
(2.079)   
FNC -2.212* 
(1.030) 
-0.448 
(1.662) 
2.691 
(1.915) 
 -0.798 
(1.720) 
-3.618+ 
(2.055) 
-1.953 
(2.574)   
MSNBC -0.752 
(3.079) 
2.384+ 
(1.370) 
1.837 
(1.532) 
 10.281 
(7.030) 
-18.743*** 
(2.258) 
-1.081 
(1.197)   
Constant 5.248+ 
(2.994) 
7.636*** 
(2.267) 
1.979 
(1.724) 
 4.466** 
(1.710) 
4.158* 
(1.942) 
3.087** 
(1.197)   
lnalpha        
Constant 0.669** 
(0.219) 
-3.040 
(2.653) 
-0.397* 
(0.163) 
 0.621 
(0.572) 
-2.614 
(19.770) 
-0.420 
(0.265)   
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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but not the message of the GJM.  Here, I follow the protest paradigm’s operationalization of the 
freak frame as focusing on protesters’ manner of dress, use of props, and other physical 
characteristics (Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  I separate coverage of “non-
mainstream values, beliefs, and opinions” (Boykoff 2006: 216) into the “insanity” frame.  As 
table 6 shows, the insanity frame has no predictive value on any of the components of 
substantive coverage for either movement.  Therefore, these results show that a focus on 
protesters’ non-mainstream physical characteristics is more likely than a focus on non- 
mainstream values and beliefs to include components of substantive coverage. 
The first three sets of results in table 6 display models for each of the three components 
of substantive coverage (quoting activists, paraphrasing activists, and communicating activists’ 
messages) in OWS coverage; the second set of results display the same for TPM coverage. 
Appendix C contains incremental model building for each of the 6 fully loaded models presented 
in table 6.  Predicted probabilities for each of the negative framing devices (holding all other 
variables at their means) in OWS coverage are depicted in figure 15, and predicted probabilities 
for TPM coverage are depicted in figure 16. 
Table 6 shows that the ignorance frame is a significant predictor of the message for both 
movements.  For each sentence that includes the ignorance frame, the odds of that transcript 
including OWS’s message are 1.239 times higher (log odds increase by a factor of 0.214), 
holding all other variables constant, and the odds of a transcript including the TPM’s message 
are 1.745 times higher (log odds increase by a factor of 0.557), holding all other variables 
constant.  This is consistent with the original research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), although we 
found the ignorance frame to be a significant predictor of paraphrasing for both the TPM and 
GJM as well, while it has no significant effects on paraphrasing here.  
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For both movements, negative frames have the most substantial positive effects on 
coverage of the grievances, demands, goals, and/or motivations (i.e., the message) of each 
movement.  The bottom row of graphs in figure 15 show predicted probabilities for each of the 
negative framing devices and coverage of OWS’s message.  The ridicule frame is the only frame 
that has a negative relationship with coverage of OWS’s message.  The presence of all other 
negative frames increase the likelihood that OWS’s message will be included in a news 
transcript, and all but the insanity frame are statistically significant.  Nearly all of the ridicule 
frames were found in FNC coverage of OWS; since FNC is the most hostile network toward the 
left in general, it should not be surprising that use of the ridicule frame is a predictor of less 
coverage of the actual issues with which this left-leaning movement was concerned.  The bottom 
row of graphs in figure 16 show predicted probabilities for each of the negative framing devices 
and coverage of the TPM’s message.  Effects of the freak and ignorance frames on coverage of 
the TPM message are positive and statistically significant, and relatively strong.  
 Table 6 and figure 15 show that the freak and ridicule frames have the strongest effect on 
paraphrasing OWS activists, and the amalgam of grievances frame has the strongest effect on 
quoting OWS activists and on coverage of their message.  The amalgam of grievances frame is 
only used in OWS coverage.  Since the amalgam frame often presents a list of the movement’s 
grievances, it should not be surprising that it is a significant predictor of coverage of the OWS 
message. 
 The racism frame, only used in TPM coverage, is not a significant predictor of any 
component of substantive coverage.  The racism frame tends to cut off conversations about the 
TPM and about racism itself, leading instead to discussions centering on the act of accusing 
someone of being racist and ignoring the causes and effects of racism, or even a discussion about 
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what racism actually is.  I will delve more into the racism frame in the next chapter when I 
examine the process by which some frames lead to more or less substantive coverage.  
 Many of the control variables have strong and significant effects on substantive coverage 
of both movements.  Table 6 shows that low word count significantly predicts the excessive 
number of zero outcomes for both movements in all models except OWS message and TPM 
paraphrasing, which indicates that programs with a lower word count do not have enough room 
to offer in-depth coverage.  The coefficients for OWS event coverage contradict research by 
Amenta and colleagues (2012), who found that standing occurs more when the news coverage is 
event-related.  However, results for the TPM partially support their findings in that event-related 
coverage predicts standing, but contradict their findings in that Amenta and colleagues argued 
electoral coverage would include more in-depth discussion of the issues the movement stands 
for.  Table 6 shows that TPM event-related coverage also included more in-depth coverage of 
their message.  When a news transcript discusses a TPM event, the odds of that transcript 
including the TPM’s message are twice as high (2.132 to 1; log odds increase by a factor of 
0.757), holding all other variables constant. 
I argued in chapter 3 that FNC and MSNBC operate as neither mainstream nor alternative 
media outlets.  The protest paradigm literature demonstrates that alternative media – a phrase 
they would not have used to describe FNC or MSNBC, which are both mainstream in terms of 
audience access and viewership – are overly positive in their coverage of movements with which 
they are ideologically aligned.  Results in table 6 offer further support for my argument, since 
FNC is significantly less likely in general to give OWS activists standing, and MSNBC is 
significantly more likely in general to report the OWS message.  However, FNC is no more 
likely than any other network to do the same for the TPM.  This further supports another 
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contention I made in chapter 3, that the TPM’s orientation as a status quo movement means that 
it gets more media coverage overall, and more balanced coverage in general.  
Disruptive Frames and Substantive Coverage 
The protest paradigm literature suggests that journalists covering protest events will use 
disruptive frames, such as the violence frame, even when there is no actual violence to report 
(Hall et al. 1978; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  If a protest movement that has had violent 
incidents in the past engages in a peaceful protest, journalists will discuss the potential for the 
event to turn violent or go out of their way to say that no violence has occurred.  Scholars have 
theorized that this use of disruptive frames delegitimizes movements and causes the messages 
they are trying to convey to be ignored (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 
1999).  In this section I test whether those scholars are correct, or whether various disruptive 
framing devices are likely to co-occur with the three components of substantive coverage.  
Because TPM protests rarely turned violent (a shoving match at a 2009 rally between a Tea 
Partier and a counter-protester is as violent as it got, but transcripts covering that event did not 
end up in my sample) and no TPM protesters were ever arrested, and because the majority of the 
TPM sample did not cover protest events at all, no disruption frames occur often enough in TPM 
coverage to justify an examination; I focus only on the OWS sample here.   
Table 7 displays ZINB regression results for disruptive frames used in OWS coverage; 
there are two models for each of the three dependent variables (quoting, paraphrasing, and the 
OWS message).  Figure 17 displays predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for 
each of the disruptive framing devices on each of the three components of substantive coverage.  
In the first model in each of the three sets of models, I use the same construction of the violence 
frame that Boykoff (2006) uses in his analysis of GJM news coverage.  These models support  
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Table 7. Coefficients from ZINB Regression – Disruptive Frames in OWS Coverage (N=200) 
 
DV: Quote         Paraphrase Message 
Disruptive Frames 
Arrests  -0.132* 
(0.067) 
-0.155* 
(0.069) 
-0.013 
(0.058) 
-0.007 
(0.065) 
-0.015 
(0.061) 
-0.034 
(0.062) 
 
Violence 0.073* 
(0.029) 
- 0.003 
(0.027) 
- 0.017 
(0.023) 
- 
 
Activist Violence - 0.014 
(0.107) 
- 0.032 
(0.057) 
- 0.051 
(0.060) 
Police Violence - 0.099 
(0.078) 
- -0.084 
(0.115) 
- -0.000 
(0.041) 
Potential for Violence - 0.370+ 
(0.202) 
- 0.142 
(0.096) 
- 0.178 
(0.179) 
No Violence - 1.163*** 
(0.226) 
- -14.933*** 
(1.020) 
- 1.575*** 
(0.208) 
Controls        
Event  0.606 
(0.542) 
 
0.672 
(0.619) 
-0.477+ 
(0.267) 
-0.260 -0.097 
(0.276) 
-0.068 
(0.287) (0.259) 
FNC 
 
-1.751*** 
(0.398) 
-1.627*** 
(0.424) 
-0.566 
(0.466) 
-0.628 
(0.457) 
0.095 
(0.254) 
0.096 
(0.250) 
MSNBC -0.565 
(0.460) 
-0.546 
(0.478) 
-0.265 
(0.309) 
-0.124 
(0.323) 
0.640* 
(0.255) 
0.709** 
(0.265) 
  
Constant 0.506 
(0.528) 
 
0.422 
(0.591) 
0.781** 
(0.243) 
0.620** 
(0.240) 
1.217*** 
(0.242) 
1.160*** 
(0.255) 
  
Inflated Control  
-0.009+ 
 (0.005) 
 
-0.009* 
(0.004) 
 
-0.006*** 
 (0.002) 
  
-0.010 
(0.011) 
 
-0.010 
(0.011) 
Word Count 
 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Event -0.580 
(2.697) 
-0.637 
(2.227) 
-5.182** 
(1.921) 
-4.784** 
(1.799) 
1.779 
(1.293) 
1.784 
(1.302) 
  
FNC -2.312* 
(1.075) 
-2.256* 
(1.080) 
-0.595 
(1.838) 
-0.505 
(1.863) 
1.789 
(2.573) 
1.804 
(2.445) 
MSNBC -0.613 
(4.962) 
-0.752 
(3.883) 
2.422+ 
(1.406) 
2.506+ 
(1.379) 
1.413 
(2.012) 
1.422 
(1.997) 
Constant 4.804 
(3.839) 
4.909 
(3.201) 
7.902** 
(2.493) 
7.469** 
(2.359) 
1.173 
(1.758) 
1.157 
(1.637) 
lnalpha       
Constant 0.635** 
(0.237) 
0.572* 
(0.241) 
-2.359 
(1.491) 
-4.626 
(14.440) 
-0.010 
(0.265) 
-0.062 
(0.261) 
AIC 572.338 572.642 443.295 442.695 848.124 846.946 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Boykoff’s claim that the violence frame does not lead to in-depth coverage of a movement’s 
issues.  However, this form of the violence frame is broad and comprises various framing 
devices; some place the blame for violent behavior on the protesters, others blame the police.  
Each of these devices could have a different relationship with substantive coverage. 
The second model in each of the three sets of models in table 7 lists all components of the 
violence frame separately.  Here, Boykoff’s (2006) claim is only partially supported; while 
activist violence and police violence have no significant effect on substantive coverage, the “no 
violence” framing device actually predicts increased coverage of the message and quoting 
activists.  The odds are nearly 5 to 1 that a program that includes the “no violence” frame will 
also discuss the movement’s message (log odds increase by a factor of 1.575).  However, the “no 
violence” frame appeared so infrequently that it did not co-occur with paraphrasing at all, hence 
the strong negative coefficient.   
In addition, coverage of arrests has a negative relationship with all three components of 
substantive coverage.  This relationship is only statistically significant for quoting activists.  For 
each mention of activists getting arrested, the odds of an activist being quoted are 0.856 to 1 (log 
odds decrease by a factor of 0.155), holding all other variables constant.  Many activists, 
especially anarchists and those on the left of the political spectrum, get arrested on purpose in 
order to gain news coverage and bring awareness to the issues they are protesting.  The results 
presented in table 7 and the first column of figure 17 show that this tactic does not accomplish 
what activists intend for it to accomplish—at least not immediately.  News coverage of OWS did 
increase substantially after the first mass arrests, and much of that coverage did include in-depth 
explanations of the protesters’ messages (see chapter 3).  The tactic of getting arrested may not 
bring immediate attention to a movement’s message, but sustained activity following arrests 
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might get more media attention than it would have otherwise, and this coverage has the potential 
to include deeper explanations of the movement’s message. 
Amenta and colleagues (2012) hypothesized that coverage of disruptive events would not 
lead to coverage of the issues but might lead to standing (p. 97).  Results in table 7 show that this 
is true only when the disruptive event does not include any violence.  When journalists focus on 
the potential for violence or the fact that the event was not violent, they are more likely to quote 
activists.  The coefficients for activist violence and police violence are close to zero, which 
indicates that explicit descriptions of violence do not preclude substantive coverage. 
These results highlight the importance of paying close attention to nuances when 
analyzing social movement media framing.  Amenta and colleagues’ definition of ‘disruptive 
events’ as any form of public demonstration, and Boykoff’s broad definition of the violence 
frame each fail to capture a wider range of possibilities for predicting substantive coverage.  
However, my results are largely consistent with scholars who have argued that the use of 
disruptive frames delegitimizes movements and causes the messages they are trying to convey to 
be ignored (Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; McLeod and Hertog 1999).  Thus far in this chapter, 
and in prior research (Taylor and Gunby 2016), only negative framing devices have been 
examined as predictors of substantive coverage.  In the next section, I look at positive framing 
devices used in coverage of both OWS and the TPM. 
Positive Frames and Substantive Coverage 
The three most common positive framing devices used in coverage of both movements 
were the normalizing frame, the patriotic frame, and the peaceful frame (see chapter 3 for 
thorough discussion of each).  The “peaceful” frame was used frequently in early coverage of 
TPM rallies, but it did not appear at all in this sample of 200 and so I did not include it in the 
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TPM models.  I also removed the “normal” frame from the regression on TPM paraphrasing 
because there was no transcript in which both the normal frame and the paraphrase frame 
occurred—because of this, the model would not converge. 
Table 8 displays the results of ZINB regression for the positive frames, with results from 
each dependent variable listed side by side.  The first three models test the effects of positive 
frames on each of the three components of substantive coverage for OWS, and the last three 
models test the same for TPM coverage.  Each of the six sets of results presented in table 8 test 
the same independent variables’ effects on a different dependent variable.  Thus, the models in 
table 8 should not be compared against each other (see Appendix D for results of incremental 
model building).  Figure 18 displays predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for 
each of the positive framing devices (holding all other variables at their means) in OWS 
coverage, and predicted probabilities for TPM coverage are depicted in figure 19. 
For OWS, none of the positive framing devices are significant predictors of activist 
quoting or paraphrasing.  However, the peaceful and patriotic frames are significant predictors of 
reporting OWS messages.  The patriotic frame has the strongest positive relationship with 
descriptions of the OWS message.  For each sentence that includes the patriotic frame, the odds 
of that transcript including OWS’s message increase by 1.88 (log odds increase by a factor of 
0.631), holding all other variables constant.  For the TPM, the patriotic frame has a strong and 
significant positive relationship with paraphrasing activists and with describing their message.   
All three of these positive frames connect a social movement with the status quo.  In the 
U.S., hard-working people, moms and dads, first-time activists (each read as “normal people”), 
and America-loving patriots represent the apex of the status quo.  Peaceful protests are more 
socially acceptable than civil disobedience, and far more acceptable than property damage or 
 137  
 
 
Table 8. Coefficients from ZINB Regression – Positive Frames 
 Occupy Wall Street (N=200) Tea Party Movement (N=200) 
DV: Quote Paraphrase Message      Quote Paraphrase Message 
Positive Frames 
Normal 0.150+  
(0.082) 
0.035 
(0.047) 
0.099 
(0.076) 
 -0.125  
(0.216) 
- 0.136+  
(0.078) 
Patriotic 0.183  
(0.138) 
-0.414  
(0.330) 
0.631***  
(0.088) 
 0.738  
(0.566) 
1.214***  
(0.180) 
0.442**  
(0.135) 
Peaceful 0.106  
(0.072) 
0.016  
(0.050) 
0.143*  
(0.060) 
 - - - 
Controls        
Event  0.279 
(0.506) 
-0.461+  
(0.267) 
-0.219  
(0.237) 
 1.453*  
(0.665) 
 
2.170***  
(0.535) 
0.293  
(0.237)  
FNC -
1.410***  
(0.376) 
-0.537  
(0.479) 
0.287  
(0.242) 
 -0.738  
(0.528) 
-0.487  
(1.123) 
-0.118  
(0.341) 
MSNBC -0.482  
(0.527) 
-0.251  
(0.328) 
0.548*  
(0.246) 
 2.141* 
(1.049) 
0.734  
(0.711) 
0.476  
(0.323) 
Constant 0.512 
(0.492) 
0.726** 
(0.250) 
1.111*** 
(0.225) 
 -0.067  
(0.901) 
-2.958***  
(0.531) 
0.498**  
(0.170) 
Inflated Controls       
Word Count -0.010*  
(0.004) 
-0.006**  
(0.002) 
-0.013  
(0.010) 
 -0.007  
(0.005) 
-0.004 
(0.003) 
-0.008**  
(0.003) 
Event -1.164 
(1.291) 
-5.148** 
(1.972) 
1.866 
(1.296) 
 0.054 
(1.622) 
39.971* 
(17.681) 
-2.982 
(2.851) 
FNC -2.028* 
(0.990) 
-0.571 
(1.866) 
2.477 
(2.457) 
 -0.684 
(1.406) 
37.791* 
(17.037) 
-2.635 
(2.548) 
MSNBC -1.157 
(1.828) 
2.427+ 
(1.421) 
1.594 
(1.659) 
 10.553 
(9.037) 
21.025* 
(8.532) 
-0.310 
(1.046) 
Constant 5.504**  
(2.108) 
7.838**  
(2.556) 
1.655  
(1.701) 
 4.541**  
(1.657) 
-37.579*  
(15.096) 
2.466*  
(1.013) 
lnalpha        
Constant 0.688**  
(0.212) 
-2.487  
(1.726) 
-0.060  
(0.183) 
 0.559  
(0.710) 
19.916***  
(0.103) 
-0.361  
(0.289) 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Figure 19. Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for positive frames in TPM 
coverage. 
 
 
violent altercations with police.  Peaceful protests do not challenge the status quo, while civil 
disobedience and/or violence do.  Prior research has shown that when a movement is framed as 
being against the status quo, the movement’s underlying issues and ultimate goals are paid little 
attention by journalists (McLeod and Hertog 1992, 1999).  My results show that when a social 
movement is framed in a way that supports the status quo, substantive coverage is likely to 
follow. 
However, negative framing devices might actually be better predictors of substantive 
coverage than positive framing devices.  In the next section, I use an additive operationalization 
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of substantive coverage that combines both forms of standing (quoting and paraphrasing) with 
coverage of the movements’ messages; each sentence in which any of these three components of 
substantive coverage occurs counts as 1, thus substantive coverage is a count variable that ranges 
from 0 to 33 (meaning there were 33 sentences that included quotes, paraphrasing, and/or a 
description of the movement’s message in at least one transcript).  I then test whether negative or 
positive framing devices are stronger predictors of substantive coverage. 
Comparing Predictors of Substantive Coverage: Positive vs. Negative Frames 
While some scholars have found that news coverage of social movements is likely to be 
delegitimizing and fail to offer in-depth coverage of the issues (Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; 
Sobieraj 2011), or that protest coverage is less likely to offer in-depth descriptions of the issues 
than coverage of social movements using institutionalized tactics (Amenta et al. 2012), others 
have argued that certain negative frames lead to some forms of in-depth coverage (Taylor and 
Gunby 2016) or that coverage of violent protests could lead to more in-depth coverage of the 
issues (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002).  No study, to my knowledge, has looked at the 
relationship between specific positive and negative framing devices and substantive coverage.   
Rather than operationalizing substantive coverage as that which includes both standing 
and the protesters’ message, each operationalized as a dichotomous variable (Amenta et al. 
2012), I operationalize substantive coverage as a count variable that has a score of 1 for each 
sentence that either quotes or paraphrases an activist, and for each sentence that describes the 
movement’s message.28  This provides a better measure of substantive coverage because it 
                                                 
28 I also constructed a weighted count variable for substantive coverage.  Direct quotes are more 
powerful for social movements than paraphrasing, since paraphrasing can misconstrue activists’ 
meanings (Detenber et al. 2007; McLeod and Hertog 1999), and descriptions of the issues 
motivating a movement are most powerful since this brings public awareness to an issue and 
increases movement mobilization  (Gitlin 1980; Vliegenthart, Oegema, and Klandermans 2005).  
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captures multiple instances of in-depth coverage.  For example, using the dichotomous 
operationalization, a news transcript in which a reporter discusses 2 distinct goals and one 
critical motivating factor of a movement and quotes an activist would score the same as a news 
transcript in which an activist is paraphrased and one goal of the movement is mentioned.  Using 
the count operationalization that I described above, those two transcripts would score 4 and 2, 
respectively.  Thus the count operationalization captures a greater range of substantive coverage.  
Descriptive statistics for “substantive” coverage, along with all variables used in the following 
analyses, are listed in table 4. 
Table 9 displays results of ZINB regression of positive and negative framing devices on 
substantive OWS coverage.  Model 1 includes negative frames, model 2 includes disruptive 
frames, model 3 includes positive frames, and model 4 includes all framing devices together.   
Figure 20 displays predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for each of the framing 
devices and the network control variables used in model 4 (holding all other variables at their 
means).  For the sake of parsimony, I use the broad operationalization of the violence frame 
(Boykoff 2006) rather than separating it out into its four components.  AIC scores presented in 
table 7 show that the models that include the four components separately were not improvements 
over the models that kept the broad operationalization. 
The results in model 1 are about what we would expect based on the results presented in 
table 6.  All negative framing devices with the exception of the ridicule frame are at least 
marginally significant predictors of an increase in substantive coverage of OWS.  Similarly, the 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
For the weighted version of substantive coverage, each sentence paraphrasing an activist counts 
as 1, each direct quotation of an activist counts as 2, and each sentence that mentions a goal or 
motivation of the movement counts as 3.  I do not present results of these analyses because they 
were incredibly similar to the unweighted analyses presented in tables 10 and 11. 
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Table 9. Coefficients from ZINB Regression of Framing Devices on 
Substantive Coverage of OWS (N=200) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Negative Frames     
Freak 0.428 
(0.282) 
- - 0.469 
(0.327) 
Ignorance 0.172** 
(0.055) 
- - 0.176** 
(0.054) 
Insane 0.260+ 
(0.134) 
- - 0.247+ 
(0.140) 
Ridicule -0.071 
(0.078) 
- - -0.070 
(0.089) 
Amalgam 0.292*** 
(0.085) 
- - 0.297*** 
(0.080) 
Disruptive Frames     
Arrests - -0.012 
(0.045) 
- 0.006 
(0.041) 
Violence - 0.042* 
(0.017) 
- -0.015 
(0.033) 
Positive Frames     
Normal - - 0.144* 
(0.068) 
0.166** 
(0.064) 
Patriotic - - 0.451*** 
(0.076) 
0.183 
(0.321) 
Peaceful - - 0.170** 
(0.057) 
0.180*** 
(0.052) 
Controls     
Event -0.049 
(0.281) 
0.112 
(0.263) 
0.010 
(0.242) 
-0.136 
(0.267) 
FNC -0.576* 
(0.271) 
-0.429+ 
(0.219) 
-0.198 
(0.217) 
-0.356 
(0.255) 
MSNBC 0.552* 
(0.281) 
0.324 
(0.256) 
0.244 
(0.282) 
0.464 
(0.324) 
Constant 1.474*** 
(0.269) 
1.649*** 
(0.247) 
1.558*** 
(0.241) 
1.316*** 
(0.268) 
Inflated Controls     
Word Count -0.013 
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.011) 
-0.014 
(0.010) 
-0.015* 
(0.008) 
Event 0.483 
(1.306) 
0.513 
(1.132) 
0.348 
(0.964) 
0.291 
(1.027) 
FNC 0.511 
(1.814) 
0.435 
(1.481) 
0.723 
(1.394) 
0.861 
(1.287) 
MSNBC 0.803 
(1.359) 
0.700 
(1.366) 
0.627 
(1.208) 
0.786 
(1.216) 
Constant 2.406 
(3.609) 
2.201 
(2.738) 
2.739 
(2.255) 
3.068+ 
(1.844) 
lnalpha     
Constant -0.307+ 
(0.185) 
-0.068 
(0.171) 
-0.133 
(0.143) 
-0.419** 
(0.144) 
AIC 1026.922 1057.353 1046.662 1018.337 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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results in model 2 are about what we would expect based on the results from table 7.  The results 
in model 3 are also expected, based on the results presented in table 8; all of the positive frames 
are significant predictors of an increase in substantive coverage.  In addition, news coverage on 
FNC is less likely to include substantive coverage of OWS, while coverage on MSNBC is more 
likely to include substantive coverage, though neither of the coefficients for those variables are 
statistically significant.  
In the full model, the coefficients for the violence and patriotic frames lose significance 
while the ignorant, insane, amalgam of grievances, normal, and peaceful coefficients remain 
positive and significant.  These results add support to Boykoff’s (2006) finding that the violence 
frame did not result in more coverage of protesters’ messages.  A mix of negative and positive 
framing devices, but not disruptive frames, are the best indicator that a movement will receive 
substantive coverage on TV news.  My findings also challenge Amenta and colleagues’ (2012) 
assertion that coverage of protest events is less likely to include substantive coverage; the event 
coefficient is neither strong nor significant.  AIC scores presented in table 10 indicate that model 
4 is the best fit to the data, and that model 1 is a better fit than either model 2 or 3.  This suggests 
that the negative framing devices have stronger explanatory power for substantive coverage of 
OWS than the positive or disruptive framing devices. 
Table 10 displays results of ZINB regression of negative and positive frames on 
substantive TPM coverage.  The negative freak and ignorance frames are the strongest predictors 
of substantive coverage of the TPM, though the patriotic frame is significant and relatively 
strong as well.  Predicted probabilities with 95% confidence intervals for the variables in model 
3 are presented in figure 21.  These findings indicate support for prior research that found the 
freak and ignorant framing devices predict substantive coverage of the TPM (Taylor and Gunby  
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Table 10. Coefficients from ZINB Regression of Framing Devices on 
Substantive Coverage of the TPM (N=200) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Negative Frames    
Freak 1.184*** 
(0.283) 
- 1.196*** 
(0.204) 
Ignorance 0.639** 
(0.235) 
- 0.661** 
(0.224) 
Insane 0.412 
(0.323) 
- 0.267 
(0.358) 
Ridicule 0.126 
(0.218) 
- 0.149 
(0.209) 
Racism 0.138 
(0.199) 
- 0.057 
(0.148) 
Positive Frames    
Normal - 0.080 
(0.119) 
0.119 
(0.129) 
Patriotic - 0.686*** 
(0.154) 
0.610** 
(0.228) 
Controls    
Event 0.960*** 
(0.279) 
0.554* 
(0.263) 
0.640** 
(0.242) 
FNC -0.077 
(0.304) 
-0.225 
(0.321) 
-0.366 
(0.244) 
MSNBC -0.319 
(0.253) 
0.405 
(0.422) 
-0.248 
(0.251) 
Constant 0.545** 
(0.180) 
0.709*** 
(0.206) 
0.569*** 
(0.171) 
Inflated Controls    
Word Count -0.012** 
(0.004) 
-0.010* 
(0.004) 
-0.011** 
(0.004) 
Event -1.523 
(1.793) 
-2.317 
(1.682) 
-1.970 
(1.256) 
FNC -2.164 
(2.588) 
-3.196 
(3.749) 
-3.065 
(2.967) 
MSNBC -1.224 
(1.235) 
-0.456 
(1.245) 
-1.008 
(1.109) 
Constant 3.360** 
(1.183) 
2.898* 
(1.193) 
3.268** 
(1.113) 
lnalpha    
Constant -0.108 
(0.180) 
0.016 
(0.215) 
-0.421+ 
(0.229) 
AIC 733.464 743.270 713.551 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; +p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
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2016).  AIC scores presented in table 10 indicate that the fully loaded model is a better fit to the 
data than either of the two models that only include either negative or positive frames.  In 
addition, model 1 is a better fit to the data than model 2.  Like the results from OWS coverage, 
this suggests that negative framing devices have stronger explanatory power than positive 
framing devices for substantive coverage of the TPM. 
Across all three models in table 10, coverage of TPM events is significantly more likely 
to include substantive coverage.  When a news transcript discusses a TPM event, the odds of that 
transcript including substantive coverage increase by 1.9 times (log odds increase by a factor of 
0.640), holding all other variables constant.  Again, this challenges research that contends 
electioneering and other institutionalized tactics will garner more substantive news coverage than 
protest events (Amenta et al. 2012).   
None of the TV networks have a significant effect on substantive coverage in the full 
models for either OWS or TPM coverage.  This complicates prior research that found significant 
differences between cable news networks in their coverage of TPM issues (Boykoff and 
Laschever 2011; Taylor 2011; Taylor and Gunby 2016; Weaver and Scacco 2013).  While some 
networks are more likely to use negative frames and others more likely to use positive frames, 
the quality of coverage between networks may not vary as much.  In the next chapter, I take a 
closer look at the framing process and examine how framing devices used in different ways and 
with varying frequency by each network can end up producing similar coverage in terms of 
substance.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I tested whether TV news transcripts covering multiple years of social 
movement activity support or contradict prior research on framing and substantive coverage of 
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social movements.  While some researchers have argued that coverage of violent protests opens 
the door to more coverage of the underlying issues (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002), 
others found that the violence frame does not lead to more in-depth coverage of protesters’ issues 
(Boykoff 2006).  Still other research has found that coverage of protest events does lead to 
increased activist standing, but that coverage of social movements engaged in institutionalized 
tactics leads to more coverage of the movement’s overall message (Amenta et al. 2012).   
While my results support some prior findings, they contradict others.  The violence 
frame, even when broken into four components, does not predict substantive coverage.  This 
supports Boykoff’s (2006) research and challenges DeLuca and Peeples’s (2002) and Rojecki’s 
(2002) claims that violence or civil disobedience can lead to in-depth coverage of the issues.  
While event-related coverage does predict activist standing, a finding that supports Amenta and 
colleagues’ work (2012), it also predicts more substantive coverage of a movement’s issues, at 
least for the TPM, which contradicts their findings.   
My results also add to existing research by expanding on the negative frames used in 
prior research (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Taylor and Gunby 2012), and adding positive 
frames.  Taken together, these results provide a more nuanced picture of the relationship between 
various framing devices and substantive reporting than prior research has been able to offer.  It 
seems that the most substantive coverage includes a mix of negative and positive frames, though 
it could be that some networks are more likely to use either negative or positive frames and yet 
still offer substantive coverage, even if the slant is overly negative or positive. 
What processes explain the relationship between negative and positive frames and in-
depth coverage of social movements?  In the next chapter, I move the under-theorized framing 
literature forward by unpacking the process by which these frames lead to more substantive 
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coverage.  I also examine the various forms of the racism frame that appear in TV news 
coverage, and outline the process by which some forms of this frame have the effect of shutting 
down the potential for meaningful conversations about issues that matter.   
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CHAPTER 5. 
THE PROCESS OF TV NEWS FRAMING OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
 
 
 
Introduction 
In the last chapter, I showed that negative frames can be strong predictors of different 
components of substantive coverage for social movements.  In this chapter, I move the under-
theorized framing literature forward and uncover the processes through which this happens.  We 
know a lot about the process of prognostic, diagnostic, and motivational framing social 
movements use to create collective action frames (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and Benford 
1988); however, to my knowledge no sociological research has examined how media frames – 
which are often not the collective action frames preferred by activists – affect communication 
patterns in news coverage of social movements.  Untangling the process by which frames can act 
as gateways to various types of discourse is important not only to our sociological understanding 
of social movements, but to our understanding of political discourses in the mass media field in 
general.  
In this chapter, I unpack the processes by which specific frames lead to more substantive 
coverage.  I also examine the various delegitimizing and legitimizing forms of the racism frame 
that appear in TV news coverage of the TPM, and explain how some forms of this frame have 
the effect of shutting down the potential for meaningful conversations about complex issues.  I 
then outline a similar process that occurs in OWS coverage when journalists and pundits use the 
amalgam of grievances frame.  I conclude by discussing the reasons for the differences in 
coverage of the TPM and OWS, and the further implications of media framing processes in 
coverage of other social movements as well as other items in the news. 
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Data and Method 
In this chapter, I rely mostly on the sample of 200 OWS transcripts from 2011 through 
2014 and 200 TPM transcripts from 2009 through 2012 that I use in chapter 4, though I also use 
excerpts from the full set of 11,373 transcripts from both movements (2009 – 2012 for TPM and 
2011 – 2014 for OWS) as well as the 2009 sample of 319 TPM transcripts from prior research 
(Taylor 2011).  In chapter 3, I described the coding process for all of the frames I use in this 
chapter.  With all of the frames coded, I set out to examine how some of the most common 
frames are used and to theorize the process of TV news framing.  In this section, I describe the 
method I used to analyze these transcripts. 
Discourse and Frame Analysis  
My approach to analyzing TV news frames is informed by discourse analysis.  Discourse 
analysis is commonly used by those interested in the relationship between power and knowledge, 
and is thus informed by Michel Foucault’s (1972) approach, which describes how power 
relationships shape institutional practices and construct subjects.  Foucault’s conception of 
“conditions of possibility” suggests “that we need to describe the various bits and pieces that had 
been in place to allow something else to be possible” (Kendall and Wickham 1999: 37).  I apply 
this concept, intended for historical analysis of systems of thought and knowledge, to my 
analysis of TV news discourse on social movements.  Throughout my analysis I keep in mind the 
conditions of possibility that exist in American culture, which allow the media elite to present the 
news in the ways that they do. 
In their explanation of Foucaultian discourse analysis, Kendall and Wickham (1999: 42) 
argue that analysts must identify “rules of the production of statements… rules that delimit the 
sayable” and “rules that create the spaces in which new statements can be made.”  In this 
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chapter, I examine frames used by journalists and pundits (the media elite) and activists in TV 
news coverage of social movements, keeping in mind that: 1) journalists adhere to organizational 
and institutionalized norms in presenting news coverage; 2) the for-profit nature of corporate 
media requires mainstream news coverage to support the political and economic status quo; and 
3) different networks cover social movements from the spheres of deviance, legitimate 
controversy, or consensus based on their target audience (see chapter 3).   Mass media constitute 
a particular arena or “master forum” in which groups and individuals can enter into public 
discourse (Ferree et. al 2002: 10).  I focus on TV news, which is just one portion of this master 
forum and which has its own rules of discourse that are quite different from other media such as 
newspapers or the Internet. 
Following Naples’ (2003) materialist feminist perspective, I acknowledge that frames are 
“constituted in discourses that organize and are structured by ruling relations” (p. 91).  These 
relations of ruling (Smith 1987, 1999) affect the ways frames are developed, interpreted, and 
reinterpreted or coopted by both movement and media actors.  I pay special attention to which 
actors (e.g. journalists, pundits, activists) use specific framing devices as I analyze how discourse 
develops within a TV news program.  In addition, I follow the advice of Wood and Kroger 
(2000), who urge discourse analysts to look for meanings deeper than the literal (e.g. possibilities 
of irony or sarcasm), to be aware of possible multiple functions of discourse, and to consider 
what is not said (pp. 92-93).   
While discourse analysis informs my approach in an overarching way as I read the 
sample of TV news transcripts with power relations in mind, I use frame analysis, originally 
developed by Erving Goffman (1974), to systematically analyze TV news frames.  Frame 
analysis typically examines frames as either dependent variables (e.g. how journalists build 
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frames) or independent variables (e.g. how frames influence an audience) (Scheufele 1999: 107).  
However, my analysis is not concerned with how frames are developed by journalists or 
activists, nor specifically with how frames influence audiences, but with the framing process as a 
communication pattern.  I examine how frames open and/or close paths to other frames by first 
identifying and categorizing frames, then analyzing the pattern of discourse that develops as 
various types of frames are utilized by journalists, pundits, and activists. 
In this chapter I argue that the TV news framing process privileges the status quo, and 
that a single frame can be used in various ways to legitimize or delegitimize a social movement.  
I articulate the gateways model of news framing, which shows how the use of one frame opens 
up space for the use of other frames, how some frames can be used to shut down discourse, and – 
based on the partisan media paradigm that I developed in the preceding chapters – how 
substantive coverage of activists’ goals, motivations, and message depends on which frames are 
used by power holders and on which network those frames are used by particular speakers.   
Frame Trajectories 
In chapter 4, I showed that both negative and positive frames commonly used in TV news 
coverage of social movements are strong predictors of substantive coverage in the form of 
quoting or paraphrasing activists, and covering their goals, motivations, or overall message.  In 
this section, I provide a descriptive analysis of how those specific frames lead to or stem from 
substantive coverage.  I identify 3 ways positive frames are used, and 6 ways that negative 
frames occur with substantive coverage. 
Positive Frames and Substantive Coverage 
In chapter 4, I showed that three positive frames significantly predict substantive 
coverage of social movements.  The “patriotic” and “normal” frames describe activists’ 
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characteristics: the patriotic frame describes activists as people who love freedom, liberty, and/or 
America, and the normal frame describes activists as moms, dads, workers, or simply “normal 
people” as opposed to professional activists.  The peaceful frame is used to describe protesters’ 
tactics or characteristics, and is often used to counter the violence frame.  All three of these 
positive frames place activists within the boundaries of the status quo: to love one’s country, to 
be a worker contributing to a healthy economy and/or a parent contributing to the next 
generation of patriotic Americans, and to respect state authority by remaining peaceful are all 
qualities that are valued because they perpetuate the status quo.  Each of these positive frames 
operate as discourses of power that legitimize the capitalist state, American exceptionalism, 
“traditional” family values, and American military strength (good citizens demonstrate 
peacefully, bad citizens disobey the law and therefore deserve military/police oppression).  
News anchors, reporters, pundits, and other guests – including activists themselves – use 
these positive frames in three ways that correspond with substantive coverage: 
1) The normal and patriotic frames are used to justify the goals, motivations, or messages of 
activists. 
2) The peaceful frame is used to create a boundary between violent protesters and peaceful 
protesters, and then describe the message of the peaceful ones. 
3) The peaceful frame is used, often along with other legitimizing frames, to describe the 
goals and/or message of activists.  
In this section I provide examples of these three forms of positive framing in TV news coverage 
of both OWS and the TPM. 
1. The normal and patriotic frames are used to justify the goals, motivations, or messages 
of activists. 
The patriotic frame was used often in TPM coverage.  While it was typically used by 
program hosts and pundits on FNC, it was also used by activists themselves.  For example, on a 
March 31, 2009 episode of FNC’s The Glenn Beck Program, Richard Behney, a plumber-turned-
Tea-Party-organizer, is a guest.  He describes the motivations and message of the TPM: “This is 
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not a Republican thing or a Democrat [sic] thing.  This is a freedom-loving American thing, and 
we’re having no politicians.  We’re upset at all of them… They’re all part of the problem and it’s 
time to stand up for freedom.”  Behney frames the motivations of the TPM as “freedom-loving” 
and “American” (i.e. patriotic) while explaining that one of the goals of the movement is to vote 
politicians, no matter their party affiliation, out of office.  This goal became solidified in 2010, 
when dozens of congressional candidates affiliated themselves with the TPM and challenged 
mostly Republican incumbents.  Effecting change through the ballot box rather than through civil 
disobedience is in line with the status quo because it legitimizes the American electoral politics 
process. 
The patriotic frame was also used in descriptions of OWS.  On a November 17, 2011 
episode of Politics Nation on MSNBC, after host Al Sharpton criticizes those on the political 
right for accusing OWS activists of being disruptive troublemakers, liberal political pundit Van 
Jones speaks on behalf of OWS: 
The other thing they’re trying to say is that this is some kind of movement that is against 
everything American. No, it’s a patriotic movement…we are supposed to be a place 
where equal opportunity means something. It shouldn’t just be just [sic] a cruel joke. And 
we’re standing up for that. That’s what patriots do. You stand up and defend your country 
against the people who want to rig the game. 
 
Jones equates patriotism with standing up for equal opportunity, which the political right sees as 
socialist (and hence, un-American).  The political right and left have different interpretations of 
what patriotism can mean, but both definitions still support the status quo.  It is not how love of 
one’s country manifests that matters here; it is the assumption that one should love one’s country 
that is in line with the status quo. 
The way the normal frame was used was very similar to the patriotic frame.  On this 
March 31, 2010 episode of American Morning on CNN, news anchor John Roberts moderates a  
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discussion with female TPM activists: 
ROBERTS: … What is it about the TEA Party that is so attractive to women? 
JENNY BETH MARTIN, NATIONAL COORDINATOR, TEA PARTY PATRIOTS: 
Well, the main -- our main values in TEA [sic] Party Patriots are fiscal responsibility, 
constitutionally limited government and free markets. And women, they are at home. 
They’re making the tough decisions and having to cut the budget, figure out how to cut 
spending in their own homes and they understand that translates to businesses and to 
government. 
ROBERTS: Do you agree with that, Rebecca? Is that one of the reasons why the TEA 
Party is attractive to you? That you handle a lot of the responsibilities at home, and so, 
that just -- immediately becomes a part of your politics? 
REBECCA WALES, COMMUNICATIONS DIRECTOR, SMART GIRL POLITICS: I 
think most certainly. You have women who are not just mothers, they are small business 
owners. They are also daughters. And both the stimulus package and moving onto the 
health care reform package, these are things that affect women so directly on so many 
different levels. 
 
Jenny Beth Martin uses traditional gender stereotypes of women’s place in the private sphere to 
justify their place in the public sphere.  To Martin, it is normal and natural for a woman to take 
care of her household and so it is normal and natural for her to extend this to support “fiscal 
responsibility” in government.  Wales reaffirms this and further normalizes female TPM 
activists: they are also mothers, daughters, and small business owners.  Because these women are 
so “normal,” they care about TPM values such as “constitutionally limited government and free 
markets” and fighting against health care legislation. 
The normal frame was also used to justify the motivations of OWS protesters.  On an 
October 6, 2011 episode of The Rachel Maddow Show on MSNBC, guest host Ezra Klein 
engages in a monologue to justify the OWS movement.  MSNBC is the only network on which 
program hosts do these kinds of monologues in favor of OWS, just as FNC is the only network 
to do the same for the TPM.  Klein begins by asking a question he likely thinks the audience is 
asking themselves:  
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So what’s bringing them out in the streets? What do the Occupy Wall Streeters, the 99 
percent, want? They’re not protesting because they want a revolution or communism or 
anarchy. 
Listen to them. You should take a look at their stories, which they’re telling online on a 
Tumblr blog. 
Here’s one. “I moved home in August after six months in my friend’s basement. Between 
my low wage, no benefits job and $70,000 in private loans, I could not afford to rent. I’m 
unemployed and uninsured but I am in good company. I am the 99 percent.” 
Another. “I am 36 years old. I have my master’s degree, and I work two jobs. My 
husband has his PhD and works four. We have one child and health care coverage. We 
are luckier than most. My parents can’t afford to retire. They live week by week deciding 
to purchase their medications or pay their bills. What happened to the American Dream?” 
These folks are protesting because they feel like they made a deal. You might be familiar 
with this deal. You worked hard, you get a good education, you probably pick up loans in 
order to get that education, but you do it because that is what you’re supposed to do to get 
ahead, to reach for that brass ring you call the American Dream. But these folks, they 
didn’t end up with the American Dream. They ended up with debt, a lot of it. 
And perhaps if everyone was suffering, that wouldn’t be so hard to take. But for the top 1 
percent, the deal seems to have actually changed a little bit. You work hard, you actually 
make a lot of your own rules, and you end up with more than you ever dreamed possible. 
Thirty-five years ago, the top 1 percent of income earners made 9 percent of all the 
income in this country. Now that top 1 percent makes almost a quarter of the income in 
the country. That is 1 percent of Americans making nearly 24 percent of every dollar in 
income paid out anywhere in the country. 
So you have to ask yourself, how is it that the 1 percent is doing so great? They haven’t 
been playing more by the rules or getting more educated. 
 
Klein sets up his monologue by presenting some negative frames that have been used by other 
media outlets to describe OWS protesters: communists, anarchists, people who want a revolution 
(read: anti-status quo).  He then quotes two activists, which gives them standing, and frames 
them as hard-working people who just want to achieve the American Dream (read: normal).  
Klein goes on to describe the context of the OWS protests in depth, explaining the economic 
situation that has led these protesters to be (in his opinion, legitimately) angry.  Klein’s entire 
justification relies on characteristics that perpetuate the status quo.  “Playing by the rules” and 
investing in higher education are upheld as virtuous, and the 1 percent becoming more profitable 
despite members of the 99% having the same education levels and playing by the rules is 
presented as unjust and a logical motivation to take part in OWS protests.  
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2. The peaceful frame is used to create a boundary between violent protesters and 
peaceful protesters, and then describe the message of the peaceful ones. 
 
A common way reporters, pundits, and activists themselves used the peaceful frame was 
to create a boundary between two segments of OWS protesters.  On an October 15, 2011 episode 
of Newsroom on CNN, correspondent Barbie Nadeau describes an OWS protest in Italy: 
I had several people come up to me and say, you know, this is embarrassing, [sic] this 
isn’t what we’re here for. We’re actually here to protest peacefully, to demonstrate 
against, you know, legitimate complaints we have against our government, about taxes 
and joblessness and education cuts and a variety of issues. Right now they're planning to 
have another demonstration either Thursday or Friday if they can get city approval, which 
I think they’ll probably get next week because their voices were hijacked by this violent 
movement. 
 
Here, OWS activists are described as peaceful through a paraphrase of an activist’s comments.  
Part of the paraphrase includes OWS complaints about government, taxes, unemployment, and 
cuts to social welfare—all socially acceptable (i.e. in line with the status quo) issues to be 
concerned about.  The reporter frames violent protesters as having “hijacked” the movement, and 
does not address their complaints (which are likely similar, but more revolutionary, and hence 
opposed to the status quo).   
 This process was slightly different for TPM coverage.  Rather than creating boundaries 
between activists within the TPM, the peaceful frame was used to solidify boundaries between 
the TPM and leftist activists.  For example, in FNC’s The Glenn Beck Program on April 16, 
2009, host Glenn Beck discusses the recent Tea Party tax day protests and mainstream media 
coverage of them.  He says: “I haven’t heard about a single report of violence. Have you? 
Imagine…that peace happening with the clowns at the G-20 summit. Remember, we’re anti-
government, which the G-20 people are [also] anti-government.”  Beck compares the TPM to the 
G-20 protesters because one of their motivations, being against big government, is the same—
but he contrasts them because he sees G-20 protesters as leftists and so associates the left with 
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violence and the right with peaceful protest.  Strikingly, he uses the word “we” when talking 
about the TPM.  Beck spent several weeks promoting a TPM protest that he would be attending 
in Texas, and then broadcast his program live from the protest on April 15.  His affiliation with 
the TPM has been cited by many in the mainstream media as a major mobilizing factor for the 
conservative movement. 
3. The peaceful frame is used, often along with other legitimizing frames, to describe the 
goals and/or message of activists. 
 
Sometimes the peaceful frame was used to describe protesters without comparing them to 
a violent group.  On a May 1, 2009 episode of The Glenn Beck Program on FNC, host Glenn 
Beck explains that the Tea Party “began to grow because that’s what people do. That’s called 
capitalism. It’s called freedom. People find their own voice and go, ‘Yes, I want some more of 
that.’ Thousands of people held peaceful protests all across the country.” He then goes on to 
explain how the “mainstream media” do not understand what the TPM is all about, but he does 
understand, and “pretty much all of it boils on down to [government] spending.”  Beck associates 
the TPM with capitalism, freedom, and peace, which legitimizes their main frustration: 
government spending.  By casting himself as an insider who understands the movement better 
than the “mainstream media,” from which he strategically disassociates himself and his program, 
Beck endears himself to his conservative viewers.  Beck and his program went on to become 
unofficial mascots of the TPM, and Beck was the main organizer of the movement’s 9/12 march 
on Washington. 
While not as charismatically mobilizing as Glenn Beck was for the TPM, programs hosts 
on MSNBC used the peaceful frame for OWS in much the same way.  Other pundits on news 
programs did as well.  For example, on an October 17, 2011 episode of The Ed Show on 
MSNBC, guest pundit Van Jones says: 
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You have this big peaceful nonviolent movement, that’s challenging Wall Street, saying 
‘hey, would you get your boot off the neck of the American people?’ Wall Street was 
responsible for the recession, their recklessness…Wall Street is the main culprit. You got 
a mass movement in the streets trying to deal with that. 
 
Jones describes the movement as peaceful, paraphrases them, and then explains the context that 
justifies OWS activists’ motivations and message.  This level of OWS context rarely occurred on 
any networks other than MSNBC and CNN. 
 It is easy to see how positive frames can lead to substantive coverage of a social 
movement.  It happens in a fairly simple way, with both the positive frame and the substantive 
coverage often coming from the same speaker.  Negative frames occur with substantive coverage 
in some similar ways, but also take more complex paths.   
Negative Frames and Substantive Coverage 
The relationships between positive frames and substantive coverage are rather 
straightforward.  However, negative frames often take complex paths to substantive coverage.  I 
discovered 6 paths that negative frames can take that lead to or stem from paraphrasing or 
quoting activists, or explaining the goals, motivations, or context behind the issues a movement 
is protesting.  Some of these paths are only possible in TV or radio news coverage – as opposed 
to newspaper or other print news – due to the open, conversational space that these forms of 
unscripted news provide.  Speakers on TV news programs: 
1) use frames to create boundaries between activists 
2) use frames to discredit activists, which leads to someone else challenging that frame 
3) present a frame in order to create an opportunity to discredit that frame and provide 
more information 
4) use frames to create a discussion between several people   
5) ask a direct question of an activist with the sole intent of making the activist look 
ignorant 
6) present the message in order to counter or ridicule the message (message first, then 
negative frame) 
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While journalists most often initiate these, other elites (politicians, celebrities, and political 
pundits) and activists are also involved.  I found that all of the negative frames I identified in 
chapter 3 take one or more of these 6 paths.  In this section I explain the 6 paths and give 
examples of each in order to illustrate how negative frames co-occur with substantive coverage, 
as a process. 
1. Negative frames create boundaries between activists. 
 
In many programs, negative frames and substantive coverage are coupled because 
reporters do not present all protesters as homogenous, but instead present a dichotomous view of 
the different activists at a protest event.  By creating distinctions between the “good” protesters 
and “bad” protesters, reporters can play up absurd elements of the protest as a way to gain or 
maintain viewership while still legitimizing the event, or at least keeping it in the sphere of 
legitimate controversy (Hallin 1986).   
An early example of negative frames being used to create a boundary between subsets of 
TPM activists occurs on an April 17, 2009 episode of The Rachel Maddow Show on MSNBC.  
Maddow mentions that there were a lot of “normal” attendees at the tax day tea party, but 
focuses on the more “deviant” messages: 
The TEA parties featured a lot of mainstream Republican figures alongside the “abolish 
the Federal Reserve” folks, and people with messages like this.  Yes, the “Obama was not 
born in the United States, and thus is not actually even really the president” conspiracy 
theorists are tea-baggers, too. 
 
The host brings in delegitimizing frames – “conspiracy theorists” makes activists out to be fringe 
or radical, and “tea-baggers” is the phrase commonly used on MSNBC and sometimes on CNN 
to belittle activists by associating their name with a sex act – while tempering her remarks with a 
mention of the mainstream majority who participate in the same protest events.  At the same 
time, she mentions two issues with which the TPM was genuinely concerned: many Tea Partiers 
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had a goal of abolishing the Federal Reserve Bank, which they saw as a private corporation that 
dictates U.S. financial policies29, and many genuinely believed Barack Obama was born in 
Kenya and therefore an illegitimate president.  Because those two issues fall into the sphere of 
deviance for the program’s target audience, the issues themselves are framed in a way that makes 
the TPM look crazy or irrational.  Nevertheless, the issues get airtime. 
Coverage of both movements included activists themselves drawing these boundaries.   
On a May 21, 2012 episode of CNN’s Newsroom, anchor Carol Costello speaks with OWS 
spokesperson Mark Bray about a few potentially violent activists that some media outlets have 
linked to OWS: 
COSTELLO: … So let’s talk about these people who are arrested in Chicago. Police 
called them anarchists who wanted to firebomb Obama headquarters in Chicago. They 
had Molotov cocktails ready to go. So are these people part of the “Occupy Movement”? 
BRAY: Well, you know, we’ve been very clear from the first day that “Occupy” is a 
nonviolent movement that our protest tactics have direct action and nonviolence 
(INAUDIBLE) are premised upon the values of nonviolence, right? So that needs to be 
made clear from the start and these people are not acting in the spirit of what “Occupy” is 
about. 
Whether they’ve been a part of certain groups or not, I can’t say. And also it’s important 
to keep in mind that authorities have been known for using tactics of entrapment, that 
there have been times and they’ve sort of provided the materials for people and led them 
down this direction. So that’s important to be kept in mind before we know all the details. 
 
Bray is given standing by appearing as a guest on the program and getting the chance to 
denounce the alleged violent actions of a few protesters who may have affiliated themselves with 
OWS.  Bray clarifies that OWS is devoted to nonviolent tactics, and he gets the chance to move 
some of the blame from OWS to the police.  By bringing up entrapment, Bray is able to cast 
some doubt on the legitimacy of the police and their arrest of the Chicago activists. 
                                                 
29 For more on TPM views about the Federal Reserve Bank, see: Roland, Allen L. “The 
Rothschild’s Federal Reserve Must Be Abolished.” Published online July 6, 2009 at Infowars.  
Retrieved July 13, 2017 at: https://illuminutti.files.wordpress.com/2014/03/20120415-
infowars.pdf  
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2. Negative frames discredit activists, which leads to someone else challenging that 
frame. 
 
Sometimes, a reporter or pundit will use a negative frame to describe a social movement 
with no intention of offering substantive coverage of the movement.  Due to the spontaneous 
nature of TV news compared to print media, the negative frame still opens up the possibility for 
substantive coverage when other people are included in the conversation.  For example, on an 
October 9, 2011 episode of This Week on ABC, regular conservative commentator George Will 
frames OWS as ignorant for having what he believes is a hypocritical message, and an OWS 
activist challenges the ignorant frame and clarifies the message:  
GEORGE WILL (ABC NEWS) 
(Off-camera) Mr. Lagreca, I hear a certain dissonance in your message. Your message is, 
Washington is corrupt, Washington is the handmaiden of the powerful. A lot of 
conservatives agree with that. But then you say this corrupt Washington that’s the 
handmaiden of the powerful should be much more powerful in regulating our lives. Why 
do you want a corrupt government bigger in our lives? 
JESSE LAGRECA (OCCUPY WALL STREET PROTESTOR) 
You know, I find that a lot of these conversations about the government tend to deflect 
away from Wall Street, because let’s be honest. The lobbyists have enormous power, and 
they’ve shut out the voice of American people. So I think we should demand a 
government that is listening to people. And I find it ironic that when people demand 
action from their government, so many people tend to overreact and say, “Well, that’s 
out-of-control government.” Our government is a function of our democracy. By 
attacking the government, we are attacking democracy. So to me, I think, yes, we should 
ask our government to represent the will of the people. And if the will of the people are 
demanding action, then they should follow suit. 
 
Will repeats a criticism of OWS that was frequently presented on FNC programs, where it either 
went unchallenged or was challenged by liberal pundits who were unfamiliar with the messages 
of rank-and-file activists, and thus could not challenge the ignorant frame as effectively as 
LaGreca does here.  LaGreca is able to clearly articulate an OWS demand: that government 
should function as a democracy, and listen to the people.  LaGreca turns Will’s criticism on its 
head when he says that lobbyists have shut the voice of the American people out, and thus 
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corporate lobbying, not government, is the corrupt power that is at the root of the problem OWS 
is protesting. 
It is not always activists themselves who are able to challenge negative frames and offer 
information on a movement’s grievances or demands.  For example, on an April 15, 2009 
episode of CNN’s Situation Room, liberal pundit Paul Begala and conservative guest John 
Feehery talk with news anchor Wolf Blitzer about the TPM: 
BEGALA: …But what they're protesting is, I mean, come on, they don't want to pay their 
taxes. Wolf, they ought to go to Walter Reed. They ought to see guys there who have 
given a lot more than money to their country and don’t complain a bit. They’re ready to 
go back and serve again. 
… 
FEEHERY: … This is not just about paying taxes. Actually, they’re talking about the 
bailout and how their tax money is going to bail out Washington -- bail out Wall Street. 
And that's the outrage that a lot of these people feel. 
 
Begala frames the TPM as people who lazily complain about having to pay their taxes, and 
compares them to wounded military veterans in such a way that makes the TPM seem 
unpatriotic.  Feehery responds not by directly challenging Begala’s negative frame, but by 
explaining the grievances of the TPM in more detail.  Tea Partiers’ grievances are not just about 
paying taxes, but also where that tax money is going: to bail out Wall Street.  Ironically, this 
message is one of the very same that OWS would use two years later. 
3. Negative frames are presented in order to discredit the frame(s) and provide more 
information. 
 
Often times a reporter, pundit, or activist will present a negative frame with the intent of 
challenging that frame him or herself.  On a September 26, 2010 episode of Face the Nation on 
CBS, TPM activist Sal Russo is a guest, and says: 
As you know, first it was we were all AstroTurf. That somebody was paying everybody 
to turn out. Then we’re a bunch of crackpots and nuts. Then we’re a bunch of racists. And 
this movement keeps growing because it grows on the fundamental principle that unites 
all the tea party movements, and that is a belief that the federal government has become 
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too big, too intrusive, with the accompanying higher taxes, onerous regulations, higher 
deficits, and a skyrocketing national debt. 
 
Russo presents several negative frames in order to discredit the frames and provide more 
information about the beliefs of TPM activists.  He presents the “astroturf” frame, which 
delegitimizes activists by alleging that they are not grassroots, but puppets of the rich and 
powerful; he presents the insanity frame, in which activists are labeled “crackpots and nuts” for 
their political views; and he presents the racism frame, which alleges that TPM activists were 
motivated by their racism against the first black President of the United States.  He challenges 
the astroturf frame by claiming the movement “keeps growing,” which suggests a grassroots 
element to mobilization.  He then challenges the racism frame by explaining that TPM activists 
are not motivated by racism but by their “belief that the federal government has become too big.”  
He challenges the insanity frame by going on to explain that “big government” has led to 
oppressive regulations and high deficits and national debt.  Russo is able to effectively challenge 
the frames that have been used to delegitimize the TPM and re-frame the TPM as a movement 
that supports the status quo in terms of a free market, capitalist economy. 
One of the most common ways this re-framing happens is exemplified in the following 
October 27, 2011 clip from The Ed Show on MSNBC.  The host, Ed Schultz, plays a video of 
someone else using negative frames to describe OWS, and then challenges those negative 
frames. 
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP) 
PAT ROBERTSON, HOST, THE 700 CLUB: Why are they there? Well, they’re just 
mad. Well, is it right for a Christian just to get involved in a protest of anger? If you’re 
going to demonstrate, demonstrate for righteousness. Demonstrate to lift the yoke of 
oppression. Demonstrate to help those that are poverty-stricken. But don’t just go out and 
mess up a park and just scream and tear up things. 
(END VIDEO CLIP) 
SCHULTZ: I think Pat Robertson has been watching too much FOX [sic] News. The 99 
percenters are not just screaming and tearing things up. In fact, they’re doing exactly 
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what Robertson just advocated. They’re demonstrating for righteousness. They’re 
demonstrating to lift the yoke of oppression. And they’re demonstrating to help those 
who are poverty stricken. 
 
Here, the host of the program plays a clip from another program – always a program from a 
different network – and then criticizes that clip.  Christian conservative Pat Robertson frames 
OWS as angry and violent, and Schultz reframes by directly challenging the violence frame.  He 
then legitimizes OWS by explaining their motivations and goals in the same Christian-centric 
terms Robertson used.  This type of reframing also happened frequently with FNC coverage of 
the TPM.  A program host on FNC would show a clip from MSNBC or CNN and then discuss 
how wrong it was and defend the TPM by explaining their grievances and goals. 
It is also notable that Schultz, one of the most outspoken supporters of OWS on MSNBC, 
referred to activists as “the 99 percenters.”  By using the OWS frame “We are the 99%” when 
covering the movement, which is a collective action frame that activists developed, Schultz 
avoids the militaristic connotations of “occupation” (other reporters sometimes referred to OWS 
activists as “occupiers”) and accentuates the broad appeal of the movement, normalizing the 
protesters by suggesting that OWS represents 99% of Americans.  Only five episodes of The Ed 
Show ended up in my sample of 200, but Schultz refers to OWS as “the 99 percent movement” 
or to activists as “the 99 percenters” in four of the five episodes. 
4. Negative frames are used to create a discussion between several people. 
 
Some segments of news programs include panels that feature multiple guests discussing 
hot topics.  On these types of programs, negative frames can be used by a news anchor or pundit 
in order to spark a discussion.  For example, a reporter on an April 19, 2009 episode of ABC’s 
This Week frames the TPM activists as ignorant for protesting high taxes when the “real” issue, 
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according to the reporter, is hatred for the President.  A commentator then defends the activists 
against the reporter’s claim, and provides more information about the protesters’ grievances. 
DONALDSON: …What they were saying is we don’t like Obama and this is a proxy 
way to say that because it’s true.  He’s going to lower taxes on 95% of the American 
public and the rest are going to have higher taxes.  So, … It’s not about the level of taxes. 
Those rallies were mainly, it seems to me, organized to say we don’t like Obama across 
the board… 
… 
NOONAN: …I didn’t think that the TEA party phenomenon was as much anti-Obama as 
it was anti-ruling class in a way.  They were tough on the Republicans.  They were mad 
at George Bush.  They were mad at his spending and his deficits.  There was a certain 
libertarian tilt that was a little bit new.  It wasn’t maybe standard old-time conservative 
right wing gathering [sic].  It was something else that was going on. 
 
Reporter Sam Donaldson frames the TPM as ignorant on tax policy, which sparks a back and 
forth between news anchor George Stephanopolous and reporter Cokie Roberts (not shown), 
which leads to the statement by conservative pundit Peggy Noonan.  Donaldson’s attempt to 
delegitimize TPM motives is thwarted by Noonan, who provides more information about the 
protesters and their grievances.  This discussion between commentators includes both negative 
and positive framing of protesters, and ends up giving the viewers a better sense of the activists’ 
grievances and demands. 
A similar pattern occurs on an October 28, 2011 episode of CNN’s American Morning.  
News anchor Carol Costello presents the violence frame, police sergeant Ed Mullins confirms 
the frame, and OWS activist/spokesperson Dan Cantor challenges the frame and offers more 
information. 
COSTELLO: And you say officers have been injured in Lower Manhattan, 20 officers. 
Tell us about that? 
… MULLINS: What happens in a demonstration, when - when there is a need to take 
action, to correct a violation, a law, or correct an obstruction of, you know, pedestrian 
traffic, two things can happen. Either the protesters comply or they resist. And we’ve 
seen peaceful demonstrations in the past. We’ve seen sit-ins where people just get 
arrested, and that’s the end of it. 
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In cases where conflict comes about and violence comes about as a result of it, we now 
have a situation that escalates to a whole different level, and - and that expands into other 
people or people that want to - 
COSTELLO: So you’re saying that protesters in the Occupy Movement have injured 
police officers in the course of arrests? 
MULLINS: Yes. That’s how it generally happens. 
CANTOR: Well, in general, these have been overwhelmingly peaceful protests all over 
the country. Unfortunately, New York, the most prominent example of unfortunate action 
was the pepper spraying by a police captain of one of the protesters. 
Listen, that - that happens and there are outliers we count on the police to exercise 
restraint and we count on the protesters to be non-violent. There’s an irony here, of 
course. It becomes the decision about this, as opposed to what protesters are really about, 
which is why the Oakland thing was so upsetting. 
It’s even ironic. My favorite sign down at Occupy Wall Street, one of my favorite is, 
“Police join us. They’re destroying your pensions, too.” And I know this is, you know, on 
the minds of Sergeant Mullins and his members. Their pensions were undone by some of 
the gambling that happened on Wall Street. 
So it’s important to keep in mind what this is really all about, and not turn it into a 
battleground. 
 
Mullins justifies the cops’ use of force by claiming that OWS protesters “resisted” instead of 
“complying.”  He then blames police injuries directly on OWS activists’ violence.  Cantor turns 
the violence frame back on police by citing the example of the New York cop who instigated 
violence by pepper spraying peaceful protesters and claims that OWS protests have been 
“overwhelmingly peaceful.”  Cantor then quotes an OWS protest sign that conveys a central 
grievance of the movement and suggests that police should stop trying to control the protesters 
and join them instead, since OWS shares some of the same interests of the police and all of them 
were harmed by corrupt Wall Street practices. 
5. Reporters or pundits ask a direct question of an activist with the sole intent of making 
the activist look stupid 
 
On cable news programs, negative frames are sometimes presented by reporters 
attempting to get some controversial footage by catching protesters looking stupid.  In the 
following example from an April 15, 2009 episode of Newsroom on CNN, correspondent Susan 
Roesgen stands amongst a crowd of TPM protesters in Chicago.  She approaches a man holding 
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a photoshopped sign depicting President Obama with a Hitler mustache and a Gestapo uniform, 
and asks the man what the sign is supposed to mean.  When the man says Obama is “a fascist,” 
Roesgen spars with the protester, telling him how offensive she thinks he is while he just keeps 
repeating that Obama is a fascist.  Roesgen walks away from the man and approaches another 
man, who is holding a toddler, and the following exchange takes place:30 
SUSAN ROESGEN, CNN CORRESPONDENT: … 
You’re here with your 2-year-old and you’re already in debt. Why are you here today, 
sir? 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Because I hear a president say that he believed in what Lincoln 
stood for. Lincoln’s primary thing was he believed that people had the right to liberty and 
they had the right... 
ROESGEN: Sir, what does this have to do with taxes? What does this have to do with 
your taxes? 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Let me finish speaking. 
ROESGEN: Do you realize that you’re eligible for a $400 credit? 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Let me finish my point. Lincoln believed that people had the 
right to share in the fruits of their own labor and that government should not take it. And 
we have clearly gotten to that point. 
ROESGEN: Wait. Did you know that the state of Lincoln gets $50 billion out of these 
stimulus [sic]? That’s $50 billion for this state, sir. 
…[at this point a man waving a Gadsden flag physically interjects himself, making it 
impossible for Roesgen to continue speaking to the man with the toddler]… 
ROESGEN: OK. Well, Kyra, we’ll move on over here. I think you get the general tenor 
of this. It’s anti-government, anti-CNN, since this is highly promoted by the right wing 
conservative network, Fox. And since I can’t really hear much more and I think this is not 
really family viewing, I’ll toss it back to you -- Kyra. 
 
Roesgen interrupts the protester before he can answer her first question by asking him what his 
concern has to do with taxes.  The TPM held their first major protest on tax day, which led the 
news media to assume the movement’s primary grievance was high taxes.  Roesgen is so focused 
on getting her “$400 tax credit” talking point into the conversation, which is a direct challenge to 
the protesters’ presumed central concern, that she ignores the man’s actual grievances.  Roesgen 
                                                 
30 Due to the chaotic nature of this transcript, I watched a video of this entire exchange in order 
to capture the full context of the moment.  The video, retrieved July 10, 2017, can be see here: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2baxw_YScxc  
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removes herself from the tense conversation by going back to CNN desk anchor Kyra Phillips.  
Despite Roesgen’s attempts to focus the discussion on taxes and frame the protesters as ignorant, 
we do get to hear some actual grievances.  One man’s issue of concern is what he perceives to be 
Obama’s fascism, and the other man’s grievance is government overreach.   
This form of negative framing does not always provide in-depth information about 
activists’ goals and grievances.  Often we only get the quote (standing) portion of substantive 
coverage, without the added depth of the activists’ actual grievances or goals.  And CNN 
reporters do not just target right-wing protesters with these confrontational tactics.  On an 
October 3, 2011 episode of Out Front on CNN, host Erin Burnett ventures into Zucotti Park to 
speak with OWS activists.  After spending some time framing the activists as hypocrites for 
owning laptop computers and cell phones, and using the freak frame to describe their behavior 
and appearance, Burnett delves into one of OWS’s most salient motivations for their protest: the 
government’s bailout of Wall Street bankers.  
BURNETT: So do you know that taxpayers actually made money on the Wall Street 
bailout? 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: I was unaware of that. 
BURNETT: They did. They made -- not on GM, but they did on the Wall Street part of 
the bailout. 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: OK. 
BURNETT: Does that make you feel any differently? 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, (INAUDIBLE) -- 
BURNETT: If I were right it might?  
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Oh, sure. 
(END VIDEO CLIP) 
BURNETT: “Seriously?!” That’s all it would take to put an end to the unrest?  
 
Back behind the safety of her news desk, Burnett’s facetiously delivered “seriously?” lets 
viewers know that she is incredulous at how ignorant the protesters are.  While the clip is 
focused on one of OWS’s most salient grievances – the Wall Street bailout – the justification for 
that grievance is not presented.  Instead, the grievance is undermined: if these ignorant OWS 
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activists only knew that taxpayers profited off the Wall Street bailout, they would stop their 
ridiculous protests.31  Burnett gives the protesters standing by showing them speaking on air, but 
denies them full legitimacy by not airing their explanations of the movement’s grievances, 
demands, or goals.  
6. Reporters or pundits present the movement’s message in order to counter or ridicule 
the message  
 
While the other 5 categories of negative frames feature a frame presented first, followed 
by some form of substantive coverage, this final category features the grievances, demands, or 
goals of a social movement, followed by a negative frame.  Frequently in both OWS and TPM 
coverage, the ignorance frame was used when explaining the protesters’ grievances and 
demands.  For example, in an October 16, 2011 episode of Your Money on CNN, guest pundit 
Stephen Moore, who is an editorial writer at The Wall Street Journal, discusses OWS: “On the 
one hand they say, you know, down with Wall Street, down with businesses, down with profit, 
down with corporations, and then they say we want jobs. Well, where do they think jobs come 
from?”  Moore paraphrases OWS activists and mentions their grievances and a demand, but 
frames them as ignorant for having what he believes is a goal that contradicts their message. 
Similarly, in the following example from an April 10, 2009 episode of MSNBC’s 
Countdown with Keith Olbermann, the host of the show lists some of the TPM activists’ 
grievances and rebukes each of them in turn. 
                                                 
31 I feel obliged to note here that Burnett’s claim that taxpayers made money off the bailouts is 
false.  The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) included taxpayer-funded bailouts of the auto 
industry and banking industry, was signed into law by President George W. Bush in 2008, and 
was revised by the Obama administration in early 2009.  The 2009 revision reduced the relief 
amount from $700 billion to $475 billion.  TARP was a major motivation for both the TPM and 
OWS movements.  In March 2015, the Congressional Budget Office issued a final report on 
TARP.  This report concluded that taxpayers lost a total of 28 billion dollars on the program.  
The report, retrieved July 15, 2017, is available here: 
https://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/114th-congress-2015-2016/reports/50034-TARP.pdf  
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 They seem to be against the stimulus package, which includes several hundred 
 billion  dollars in tax cuts for people like themselves.  And they seem to be against 
 large deficits, they don’t like these massive deficits.  Who does?  By the same 
 token, when there are measures proposed to do something about those huge 
 deficits, i.e., letting taxes to [sic] back to where they were in 2001, they’re against 
 it too.  
 
The way in which Olbermann challenges each of the movement’s grievances comes across as an 
argument that the activists are ignorant for making such claims.  Olbermann asserts that TPM 
activists benefitted from the stimulus package that they are protesting, and that the deficit 
problem could be addressed by returning tax rates to pre-2001 levels, which the TPM also 
opposes.  Despite the negative and delegitimizing portrayal of movements’ messages, this form 
of negative framing still presents a form of substantive coverage in that it does necessarily 
include the movement’s grievances, demands, and/or goals. 
Summary 
In TV news coverage of social movements, whether left-wing or right-wing, positive 
frames are used to uphold the status quo or to emphasize aspects of a social movement that 
adhere to the status quo.  Negative frames can represent a movement as anti-status quo but are 
often used to divide activists into an anti-status quo minority and a contrasting majority of 
“genuine” activists who are actually normal, patriotic, and peaceful.  Negative frames are also 
sometimes used to set up a discussion that challenges the frame and ends up offering more 
substantive coverage of the movement’s message.   
The possible trajectories of all six forms of negative framing and three forms of positive 
framing that I identified are captured in figure 22.  Frames can act as gateways to various types 
of coverage.  A negative frame opens a pathway for a positive frame to be used, either to directly 
contradict the negative frame or by the mediating mechanism of the boundary.  Inversely, a 
positive frame can open a pathway for a negative frame to be used in the same way.  This 
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process opens a pathway to substantive coverage.  Alternatively, substantive coverage can lead 
directly to either a positive or negative frame, or vice versa.  When two or more speakers are 
involved, this process can continue looping through various paths, leading to more substantive 
coverage and more negative and/or positive frames.  I did not find any examples of substantive 
coverage leading directly to a boundary without a negative or positive frame as a mediating 
mechanism, nor did I find an example of a positive frame leading directly to a negative frame 
without a boundary or substantive coverage mediating that path.  However, those paths are 
certainly within the realm of possibility. 
 
Figure 22. The gateways model of media framing 
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While frame trajectories are similar across TV networks, the TPM and OWS had 
different manifestations of patriotism, peacefulness, and normalcy.  What remains constant 
across TV networks is that the fundamental ideas of patriotism, peacefulness, and normalcy are 
positive characteristics.  FNC and MSNBC may disagree on what constitutes patriotism, but they 
both agree that patriotism is a positive quality for any activist to have. They both adhere to the 
same general status quo. 
In the next two sections, I focus on frames that were used almost exclusively for one 
movement or the other in order to further illustrate how the TV news framing process 
perpetuates hegemonic norms, thereby upholding the status quo.  The racism frame was used 
exclusively in coverage of the TPM32, and is not correlated with substantive coverage of TPM 
issues according to my analysis in chapter 4.  It was used in six distinct ways that I examine in 
depth.  The “amalgam of grievances” frame (Boykoff 2006) was used almost exclusively in 
coverage of OWS, and appears in programs in ways that reveal how the mainstream media are 
deeply entrenched in a wider political institutional structure. 
The Tea Party and the Racism Frame 
The racism frame was not significantly correlated with any form of substantive coverage 
of the TPM in my analysis in chapter 4.  This is likely because the frame is often presented 
without discussing the TPM, and is instead used to discuss controversial statements elites have 
made that accuse the TPM of racism.  In this section, I analyze the ways in which the racism 
frame was used in TPM coverage.  The racism frame was not always presented in a negative 
way, or in a way that would delegitimize the TPM.  So, how was this frame used if not always 
                                                 
32 Two FNC programs did accuse OWS protesters of being anti-Semitic, but that was the closest 
they came to the racism frame.  The racism frame did not explicitly appear in OWS coverage in 
my sample. 
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negatively?  How could a seemingly negative framing device be used to actually legitimize the 
movement?  In this section I unpack six different ways the racism frame was presented, and 
examine how and on which networks each utilization of the frame appears.  I use both the sample 
of 200 transcripts from 2009 through 2012 (used in chapter 4), and the sample of 319 transcripts 
from 2009 only (from Taylor 2011; also used in chapter 3). 
In TPM coverage, journalists used the racism frame in six different ways: 1) to ask 
whether TPM activists are racist; 2) to accuse TPM activists of being motivated by racism; 3) to 
distinguish between the majority of “normal” TPM protesters and the “fringe” groups of racists 
and extremists in the movement; 4) to ask conservatives whether they condemn the racism that is 
evident in the movement; 5) to discuss controversies in which elites (such as Jimmy Carter, the 
NAACP, and NPR executives) accused the TPM of being motivated by racism; and 6) to counter 
the racism frame by expressing outrage that anyone would dare accuse the TPM of being racist.  
Some of these versions of the racism frame are meant to delegitimize, while others are meant to 
legitimize the movement.   
Table 11 displays each of the six uses of the racism frame.  The left side of the table 
shows frequencies for the sample of 200 TPM transcripts from 2009 – 2012, and the right side 
shows frequencies for the 319 TPM transcripts sampled around TPM events.  Each side displays 
the number of programs per network in which each type of the racism frame was used, 
categorized by speaker (journalist, activist, or other program guest—including political pundits, 
politicians, and celebrities).  For example, the accusatory version of the racism frame (“Racist!”) 
is used by a journalist on one MSNBC program and by other guests on two CNN programs and 
one FNC program, for a total of four programs or 2% of the sample of 200 programs from 2009 
– 2012.
  Ta
bl
e 1
1.
 F
re
qu
en
ci
es
 fo
r e
ac
h 
of
 th
e 
6 
us
es
 o
f t
he
 R
ac
ism
 fr
am
e,
 T
V
 p
ro
gr
am
s b
y 
ne
tw
or
k 
an
d 
sp
ea
ke
r  
 
Sa
m
pl
e o
f 2
00
 fr
om
 2
00
9 
- 2
01
2 
Sa
m
pl
e o
f 3
19
 fr
om
 2
00
9 
ev
en
ts
 (T
ay
lo
r 2
01
1)
 
 
Jo
ur
na
lis
t 
A
ct
iv
ist
 
O
th
er
 G
ue
st
 
(to
ta
l 
pr
og
ra
m
s)
 
%
 o
f 
sa
m
pl
ed
 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
Jo
ur
na
lis
t 
A
ct
iv
ist
 
O
th
er
 G
ue
st
 
(to
ta
l 
pr
og
ra
m
s)
  
%
 o
f 
sa
m
pl
ed
 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
1 Ra
ci
st?
 
2 
- C
N
N
 
0 
0 
(2
)  1%
 
2 
- C
BS
 
2 
- C
N
N
 
1 
- F
N
C
  
1 
- M
SN
BC
  
0 
2 
- C
BS
  
3 
- C
N
N
 
 
(1
1)
 
 
3.
5%
 
2 Ra
ci
st!
 
1 
- M
SN
BC
 
0 
2 
- C
N
N
 
1 
- F
N
C
 
(4
)  2%
 
5 
- C
N
N
 
2 
- M
SN
BC
 
0 
  1
 - 
CB
S 
 
13
 - 
C
N
N
 
  5
 - 
M
SN
BC
 
  2
 - 
N
BC
 
(2
8)
 
 
8.
8%
 
3 So
m
e 
ra
ci
st,
 
m
os
t n
ot
 
1 
- C
N
N
 
1 
- M
SN
BC
  
0 
2 
- C
N
N
  
2 
- M
SN
BC
  
 (6
)  3%
 
1 
- C
BS
  
5 
- C
N
N
 
1 
- M
SN
BC
 
 
2 
- C
N
N
 
2 
- C
N
N
 
1 
- N
BC
 
(1
2)
 
 
3.
8%
 
4 
 
Co
nd
em
n 
ra
ci
sm
? 
2 
- C
N
N
 
0 
0 
(2
) 
1%
 
3 
- C
N
N
 
0 
1 
- C
N
N
 
(4
) 
1.
3%
 
5 El
ite
s s
ay
 T
PM
 
is 
ra
ci
st 
3 
- C
N
N
 
0 
0 
(3
)  
1.
5%
 
1 
- C
BS
 
1 
- M
SN
BC
 
2 
- N
BC
 
0 
6 
- C
N
N
 
3 
- N
BC
 
(1
3)
 
 
4.
1%
 
6 N
ot
 R
ac
ist
! 
6 
- F
N
C
 
1 
- C
BS
 
1 
- F
N
C
 
(8
) 
4%
 
7 
- F
N
C
 
2 
- F
N
C
 
3 
- F
N
C
 
(1
2)
 
3.
8%
 
(to
ta
l p
ro
gr
am
s)
 
%
 o
f s
am
pl
ed
 
pr
og
ra
m
s 
(1
6)
 
8%
 
(1
) 
0.
5%
 
(8
) 
4%
 
 
(3
4)
 
10
.7
%
 
(4
) 
1.
3%
 
(4
2)
 
13
.2
%
 
 
N
O
TE
: C
at
eg
or
ie
s a
re
 n
ot
 m
ut
ua
lly
 e
xc
lu
siv
e,
 th
us
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
es
 d
o 
no
t t
ot
al
 1
00
. 
176 
 177 
 
When I examine who is using each form of the frame, and on which network, a pattern 
emerges.  First, delegitimizing forms of the racism frame appear most often in event-related 
coverage rather than electoral politics coverage.  This is likely because the delegitimizing forms 
of the racism frame describe activists, and descriptions of activists occur most often in event-
related coverage.  Second, there are differences in usage of each version of the frame by speaker: 
journalists use all forms of the frame more often than activists, and guests on news programs use 
the accusatory version of the frame more often than journalists or activists.  Third, each version 
of the frame is used by networks at different rates.  The TPM-friendly network FNC uses the 
“not racist” version of the frame more than any other version, and is one of only 2 networks on 
which this version appears at all.  Journalists and guest on CNN use the accusatory version of the 
frame more than all other networks combined, and the condemning version of the frame (number 
4) only appears on CNN coverage.  In the rest of this section, I provide examples of each version 
of the racism frame in order to illustrate how each version manifests in TV news discourse.  
1. Is the TPM racist? 
Many journalists presented the racism frame in the form of a question, asking pundits, 
TPM activists, or viewers in general whether it might be true that TPM activists are racist.  A 
prime example can be found in a September 14, 2009 episode of Hardball on MSNBC, in which 
host Chris Matthews says: 
Up next: So, we have seen the protests against President Obama. And how much anger 
there is about the issues, and how much may be based on ethnicity, his African-American 
heritage? We will get into that, into how race may be fueling the backlash against 
President Obama, may be. 
 
Matthews does not outright accuse the protesters of being racist; he says race “may” have 
something to do with their motivations, “maybe.”  This form of the racism frame is usually 
combined with at least one of the other forms, such as pundits claiming it is just a fringe element 
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of the TPM that is racist, or pundits accusing TPM activists of being racist outright.  For 
example, Larry King presents the frame in question form, asking guest Bill Maher “Is there a 
racist tone in this? ... is this inherent racism?” on the September 19, 2010 episode of Larry King 
Live on CNN.  Maher exclaims, “Yes, Larry, it’s extremely racist. I mean it’s so funny because 
the tea baggers, the one thing they hate is black people… But they won’t say it.” 
2. The TPM is racist! 
This more direct use of the racism frame was the first of the six to occur in TV news 
discourse.  It first appeared on MSNBC after the April 15, 2009 “Tax day tea protest” in an 
episode of Countdown with Keith Olbermann on MSNBC, which included the following 
exchange between celebrity guest Janeane Garofalo and the program’s host: 
JANEANE GAROFALO, ACTOR: … You know, there is nothing more interesting than 
seeing a bunch of racists become confused and angry…  Let’s be very honest about what 
this is about. It’s not about bashing Democrats. It’s not about taxes. They have no idea 
what the Boston Tea party was about. 
OLBERMANN: That’s right. 
GAROFALO: They don’t know their history at all. This is about hating a black man in 
the White House. This is racism straight up. That is nothing but a bunch of tea bagging 
rednecks. … Again, this is about racism. It could be any issue, any port in a storm. These 
guys hate that a black guy is in the White House. 
 
This clip was replayed on rival network FNC multiple times, as I will discuss below.  Although 
Olbermann does not present the frame himself, he agrees with Garofalo and does not question 
her charges of racism.   
As table 11 shows, this direct form of the racism frame is used by guests most often, but 
journalists use it to accuse TPM activists of being motivated by racism as well.  For example, on 
a September 16, 2009 episode of Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees on CNN, journalist Candy 
Crowley discusses the 9/12 March on Washington, saying, “Racism is there to see online and on 
the signs held by some protesters.”  However, this form of the racism frame is overwhelmingly 
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presented by guests on TV news programs, not by news anchors or program hosts.  Sometimes 
news anchors directly give guests the opportunity to use the racism frame in an attacking way, as 
reflected in the Larry King excerpt in which King presents the frame as a question and Maher’s 
answer is a direct attack, but more often guests initiate the racism frame, as exemplified by the 
MSNBC excerpt above.  
3. Some TPM members are racist, but most are not 
One of the most common uses of the racism frame by the actual news anchors or program 
hosts is to present the frame in order to draw a boundary between regular protesters and an 
extremist minority.  This use of the racism frame portrays most TPM activists as normal, and 
distinguishes between those normal activists and the small, fringe element of racists within the 
movement.  For example, on a March 31, 2010 episode of American Morning on CNN, news 
anchor John Roberts says “the bulk of the TEA Party movement, regular folks who just want to 
have their voices heard about what’s going on in politics, but at the same time, there are some 
extreme elements that have embedded themselves in the TEA Party movement. We’ve seen the 
racist signs at some of these rallies.”  The journalist makes racists out to be an “extreme” 
segment of the population that has infiltrated the TPM, or “embedded” itself into their otherwise 
non-racist protests.   
Something similar happens on a July 26, 2010 episode of Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees.  
In that episode, CNN contributor Erick Erickson has the following exchange about a racist sign 
held by at least one TPM protester (see Image 2) with guest Michael Eric Dyson, a professor at 
Georgetown University: “DYSON: What I’m saying is that the witch doctor motif has been 
perpetuated by the Tea Party… ERICKSON: No, not perpetuated by the Tea Party, just by a few 
people who were crazy enough to hold up signs.”  Erickson distinguishes the majority of the  
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Image 2. Signs featuring President Obama’s face pasted onto the body of what looks to be an 
African witch doctor appeared at the 9/12 March on Washington and were the topic of many 
discussions on TV news programs 
 
TPM from a few “crazy” people, and implies that these people do not represent the TPM as a 
whole.  This usage of the racism frame paints the picture of a small minority of people who have 
infiltrated TPM rallies and twisted the true message of the movement.   
This type of utilization of the racism frame ends up legitimizing the movement by setting 
the racist element apart, minimizing it, and contrasting it to the majority of TPM activists or their 
“true” message.   It also shuts down any conversation about racism, what it means to be racist, 
and why signs such as the witch doctor motif are racist.   
4. Do you condemn the racism we see within the TPM? 
A fourth way journalists use the racism frame is to ask conservatives, including 
Republican politicians and TPM activists and leaders, whether they condemn the racism within 
the movement.  On a September 15, 2009 episode of Anderson Cooper 360 Degrees, host 
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Anderson Cooper asks his guest, Mark Williams, who at the time was the leader of the Tea Party 
Express, whether he would disavow racist signs at TPM rallies.  Cooper presents evidence of 
racism (see Image 2) at the 9/12 March that had just occurred in Washington DC a few days 
prior as he asks his question:  
There is this witch doctor sign that has gotten a lot of play. We’re showing it right now. 
Is that something when you see you think, ok, that is – do you believe that is racist? And 
if you do, is that something you would tell people in your movement who come to your 
rallies, look, don’t be bringing that sign? 
 
In this version of the racism frame, a journalist presents a piece of evidence and offers the guest 
the opportunity to refute or condemn it.  This always goes in one of two directions: with the 
guest claiming there is nothing racist about the evidence presented, or with the guest 
acknowledging the racism and condemning it.  In the example above, Mark Williams 
acknowledges the racism and personally condemns it, but says he would never tell anyone not to 
bring such a sign because he believes in freedom and liberty.   
An example of outright denying racism occurs on a June 12, 2010 episode of Saturday 
Morning News on CNN, in which anchor Drew Griffin interviews a TPM activist, Catherine 
Bleish.  The interview is presented as a pre-recorded video package that Griffin and his co-
anchor, Suzanne Malveaux, watch and discuss together, without Bleish present.  In the video 
clip, Griffin cites a study by the Southern Poverty Law Center and reads it to Bleish: “‘Tea 
parties … are shot through with rich veins of radical ideas, conspiracy theories and racism’ Do 
you find that true?”  Bleish’s response is a terse “No, I don’t.”  The video clip is cut off at that 
point, and the two anchors go on to facetiously discuss how “interesting” Bleish is, and to mildly 
poke fun at her brief answers to Griffin’s questions.  Because Bleish is not present, she is not 
given the opportunity to defend herself or to answer any follow-up questions.  The overall effect 
of this particular use of the racism frame, presented as a question to an activist or pundit, is to 
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delegitimize the TPM.  However, respondents typically condemn the racism presented by the 
news anchor, thus legitimizing the movement.  Therefore, this utilization of the racism frame can 
serve to either legitimize or delegitimize the TPM, depending on the response given by an 
activist or pundit and the reaction to that response by journalists. 
5. Elites have accused the TPM of racism 
Another very common way of presenting the racism frame was to discuss controversies 
that emerged when elites accused the TPM of being racist.  Again, this form of the frame can 
serve to legitimize or delegitimize the movement.  It first became prominent after the 9/12 March 
on Washington, when controversy erupted after President Jimmy Carter, in an interview with 
Brian Williams on NBC’s Nightly News, accused the TPM of being motivated by racism against 
President Obama.  CNN covered this controversy more than any other network, and the 
programs that addressed it always included the viewpoints of two or more guests who debated 
whether or not Carter’s accusation had merit (see Taylor 2011).  This form of the racism frame 
came up again in July 2010 when the NAACP passed a resolution calling on Tea Party leaders to 
condemn racism within their movement, which became a topic for journalists and pundits to 
discuss.   
In 2011, the controversy revolved around NPR.  Conservative activist James O’Keefe 
took a hidden video of the president of the fundraising arm of NPR, Ron Schiller, making 
disparaging comments about the TPM in a meeting with a fake potential donor.  News programs 
played the video clip of Schiller saying the Tea Party people are “not just Islamophobic, but 
really xenophobic … they believe in sort of white, middle-America, gun-toting – I mean, it’s 
scary.”  Ron Schiller ended up resigning from NPR because of the controversy, as did Vivian 
Schiller (no relation to Ron), the CEO of NPR at the time.  CNN and FNC played this clip 
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multiple times over the course of a few days.  On CNN, journalists and guests discussed it as an 
NPR controversy and never addressed whether it was true or false that Tea Partiers are racist or 
scary.  On FNC, journalists and guests used the event to discuss their outrage that anyone would 
dare accuse the TPM of racism, which is the final version of the racism frame. 
6. The TPM is not racist! 
This sixth way of presenting the racism frame occurred almost exclusively on FNC.  The 
only exception occurs when a TPM activist uses this form of the frame on CBS’s Face the 
Nation on September 26, 2010.  During an interview with anchor Bob Scheiffer, Tea Party 
Express chief strategist Sal Russo discusses the challenges the TPM has had to face, including 
being called “a bunch of racists,” and then – as a way of refuting the charge of racism – goes on 
to explain “the one fundamental economic issue” that unites the TPM, that being government 
spending.   
FNC is the only network on which news anchors or program hosts use this racism 
counter-frame.  For example, on the October 14, 2010 episode of Hannity, host Sean Hannity 
reports that a recent Washington Post article says “there are not as many racist signs at Tea Party 
events as people think.”  Hannity uses the fact that there are fewer racist signs than one would 
think as evidence to bolster his argument that the TPM is not motivated by racism.  The same 
day, on The O’Reilly Factor, Bill O’Reilly and his panel of guests have a more in-depth 
discussion about the Washington Post article.  O’Reilly reports, “less than 5 percent of the signs 
dealt with Obama’s ethnicity or religion at all.”  Guest Gretchen Carlson, one of the hosts of 
FNC’s morning news program, Fox & Friends, notes, “the problem is that, if you do watch other 
broadcasts, you would think that it was half and half.”  Another guest, Fox News Analyst 
Margaret Hoover, brings the counter-frame full circle and states: “I’ve always accepted the 
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premise that 10 percent of people out there are crazy… At this [5%] percentage, the Tea Party is 
actually a more sane representative sample of Americans than ordinary Americans.”   While it is 
not clear whether Hoover thinks racism is insane, or carrying blatantly racist protest signs is 
insane, she is able to use the racism frame to perpetuate the pro-status quo orientation of the 
TPM—as less blatantly racist than most “ordinary Americans.”   
FNC program hosts talk about TPM racism for the sole purpose of refuting the frame, 
often by expressing outrage that anyone would dare call the TPM activists racist.  This outrage is 
often directed at other media outlets.  For example, on an April 23, 2009 episode of The O’Reilly 
Factor, the host says, “On MSNBC, Janeane Garofalo said that Americans that attended tea 
parties were racist rednecks. She was not challenged by the anchor.”  Here, O’Reilly is shocked 
that the anchor of a political commentary program would fail to challenge a guest on her 
assertion that TPM activists are racists.  O’Reilly counters the racism frame by specifically 
referring to activists as “Americans.”  These are not your average protesters; these are normal 
Americans.  Looking closely at O’Reilly’s discourse, they are not even “protesters”; they simply 
“attended tea parties.”  These words and phrases normalize and soften TPM activists, thus 
bolstering the counter-frame.  
A few other FNC programs used video clips of the exchange between Garofalo and 
Olbermann in attempt to delegitimize the NBC network, which owns MSNBC.  On an April 20, 
2009 episode of FNC’s The O’Reilly Factor, just 3 days before the excerpt quoted above, 
O’Reilly calls Garofalo’s comments “the most hateful attacks on the tea party demonstrators the 
TV news business has ever seen in its history” and claims: “General Electric boss Jeff Immelt 
and his henchman, NBC president Jeff Zucker, have encouraged personal attacks and hate 
speech on the air for years, trying to boost sagging ratings at NBC. But that strategy has been an 
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enormous failure.”  O’Reilly co-opts progressive discourse when he uses the phrase “hate 
speech” to describe the act of accusing the TPM of being racist.  “Hate speech” is speech used by 
a power holder to attack a person or group based on an oppressed status (e.g. ethnic, racial, 
sexual, or religious minorities), but O’Reilly turns the phrase on its head and uses it to target the 
accusers.  This repurposing of a social justice frame to bolster a conservative argument is not 
new (see Naples 2013), and weakens the power of the phrase “hate speech.”   Thus, O’Reilly’s 
statement does double duty, legitimizing the TPM while also robbing the phrase “hate speech” of 
its exclusive meaning as a social justice frame.  
This monologue on the April 20th episode of The O’Reilly Factor is part of a broader 
discourse around “liberal media” perpetuated on FNC.   O’Reilly’s statements could be 
construed as an attempt to manipulate his audience into being completely loyal to FNC by 
turning them against other networks, rather than representing genuine outrage on behalf of the 
TPM.  O’Reilly continues on the April 23rd episode of his show: “the media has [sic] a vested 
interest in making their audience think the Tea Party are racist people.”  O’Reilly does not 
expand on this thought or offer any evidence as to why any media outlet would have a “vested 
interest” in making their audience think anything in particular about any social movement.  Nor 
does he acknowledge that his program is also a part of “the media.” 
Summary 
 While one might assume that the racism frame would automatically be negative (see 
Weaver and Scacco 2013), my analysis reveals that this frame can be presented in a variety of 
ways.  Table 12 shows each form of the racism frame and whether it was used to legitimize, 
delegitimize, or both.  All but 1 of the 6 forms were used in legitimizing ways, while just 4 of  
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Table 12. A typology of legitimizing and delegitimizing forms of the racism frame 
 Delegitimizing Legitimizing 
1 - Racist? X X 
2 - Racist! X  
3 - Some racist, most not  X 
4 - Condemn racism? X X 
5 - Elites say TPM is racist X X 
6 - Not Racist!  X 
 
 
them were used in delegitimizing ways.  Nevertheless, delegitimizing forms of the racism frame 
did occur more frequently than legitimizing forms. 
It is also notable that the delegitimizing forms of the racism frame were not used by any 
FNC news anchors or program hosts at all.  In fact, the only time discussions of racism within 
the TPM occur on the FNC network is when FNC hosts attempt to legitimize the movement by 
stating that racism has nothing to do with the motivations behind the movement33.  Most 
journalists on other networks bring up the frame in a neutral way in order to spur discussion, and 
most delegitimizing uses of the frame occur either on MSNBC or are presented by guests on 
programs aired on other networks.  By and large it was guests on news programs that used the 
frame to delegitimize the TPM or portray them in a negative way. 
As the transcript excerpts show, the racism frame is never actually used to discuss racism.  
When boundaries are used to set the racist element of the movement apart, minimize it, and 
contrast it to the majority of TPM activists or their “true” message, it shuts down any 
conversation about racism, what it means to be racist, or why protest signs such as the witch 
doctor motif are racist.  Most controversies about racism within the TPM are presented as 
                                                 
33 Once, this attempt to counter the racism frame was met with blatant accusations of racism (a 
counter to the counter-frame) by a liberal pundit on a FNC program.  That is the only instance of 
a negative use of the racism frame on the FNC network in my sample. 
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controversies about political or media elites accusing the TPM of racism.  Rather than having a 
conversation about what it means to be racist and discussing the reasons why anyone would 
think the TPM is a racist movement, racism itself was ignored and the act of accusing the TPM 
of racism was the controversy.  This type of coverage allows journalists to avoid tough 
conversations about racism in the U.S. and to focus instead on the “problem” of being “falsely” 
accused of racism by people who like to “play the race card.”  Even though the current status quo 
in this country supports the idea that racism is a negative thing, the status quo itself is supported 
by racism and thus is served by avoiding meaningful conversations about what racism truly 
means. 
The racism frame did not appear in the sample of OWS coverage.  One of the most 
common negative frames used in coverage of OWS is the amalgam of grievances, which frames 
a movement as one that has no unified message or no clear goals, and often occurs alongside the 
ignorance frame.  In the next section, I describe the ways this frame appeared in TV news 
coverage of OWS, and theorize why it occurs so frequently for OWS and so rarely in TPM 
coverage. 
Amalgam of Grievances:  
Support for the Status Quo is the Only Clear Message 
In a segment of the CBS Evening News on October 17, 2011, the news anchor asks: “A 
Quinnipiac University poll out today asked New Yorkers’ view of the [OWS] protestors and 67 
percent said they agree with them. But agree with what?”  Again and again, across all types of 
TV networks, news coverage returns to the frame that OWS has “no unified message.”  In his 
analysis of the Global Justice Movement, Boykoff  (2006, pp. 220-221) calls this the “amalgam 
of grievances” frame, which occurs when journalists claim that activists are fighting for too 
 188 
 
many disparate issues and thus have no clear message.  
In chapter 4, I found that the amalgam of grievances frame significantly predicts 
coverage of OWS grievances, demands, goals, and/or motivations.  This was not a surprising 
result, since the frame is sometimes presented as “they have no clear goal” but more often is 
presented as a list of goals or grievances they have, framed as being too many or as being 
unfocused.  Boykoff (2006) developed the amalgam frame, and found that it was used in a value-
neutral way about half the time and in a negative way the other half of the time in TV coverage 
of the Global Justice Movement (p. 222).  In this section, I show that the amalgam frame, when 
used negatively in OWS coverage, is often used alongside the ignorance frame.  In addition, its 
negative and neutral uses do not necessarily occur across networks in a way that one would 
expect based on my conclusions from chapter 3, which showed that OWS receives mostly 
neutral coverage from CNN and the broadcast networks, negative coverage from FNC, and 
positive coverage from MSNBC.  I also argue that the amalgam frame, like the racism frame in 
TPM coverage, is used to shut down meaningful conversations about deeper issues. 
Negative Uses of the Amalgam of Grievances Frame  
Table 13 shows frequencies for the amalgam and the ignorance frames in OWS coverage, 
by network.  Based on what we know from my analysis in chapter 3, we might expect the 
broadcast networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC, to use the amalgam frame neutrally, CNN to also use 
it neutrally, and FNC to use it negatively.  However, CBS, NBC, and FNC most frequently 
present the amalgam frame in a negative way and CNN presents the frame in a negative way 
about half the time and neutrally the other half.  MSNBC only presents the amalgam frame in a 
neutral way, and never alongside the ignorance frame.  The most overarching message of OWS 
was that capitalism is a flawed economic system that had caused a large wealth gap between the  
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Table 13. Prevalence of the amalgam and ignorance frames in OWS coverage (N=200) 
 Amalgam of Grievances Ignorance Both together 
 TV 
programs 
% within 
network 
TV 
programs 
% within 
network 
TV 
programs 
% within 
network 
ABC  0 - 2 13.3% 0 - 
NBC  1 12.5% 1 12.5% 1 12.5% 
CBS  4 40% 3 30% 2 20% 
CNN  27 24.5% 11 10% 8 7.3% 
FNC  4 12.1% 15 45.5% 3 9.1% 
MSNBC  5 20.8% 4 16.7% 0 - 
Total TV  41 36 14 
Note: “% within network” refers to the percentage of all programs from that network in the 
sample of 200, hence % column does not add up to 100 
 
 
 
richest 1% and the other 99%, which is a message that directly challenges the status quo.  
Because of this, and because mainstream media have a vested interested in maintaining the 
economic status quo, journalists on networks that are typically neutral toward OWS use the 
amalgam frame to avoid in-depth explanations of the activists’ critiques of capitalism.  Indeed, 
34 of the 41 occurrences of the amalgam of grievances frame (about 83%) are presented by 
journalists. 
When the amalgam frame is used negatively, it almost always occurs with the ignorance 
frame.  Typically the amalgam frame is presented first, and then it is followed by someone, 
whether it is another journalist or a guest of some kind, picking one of many perceived issues or 
goals of the movement and criticizing it as something stupid, misguided, or just plain wrong.  
When a journalist is responsible for bringing both frames up, they often present the amalgam 
frame first, followed by a comment about how ignorant it is to have a movement with no clear 
goal.   
 An example of the most common co-occurrence of the two frames – when a journalist 
presents the amalgam of grievances frame and someone else brings in the ignorance frame – 
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occurs on an October 9, 2011 episode of Sunday Morning on CBS.  The reporter, Rebecca Jarvis, 
describes OWS as “a movement whose goals still remain vague” and then interviews a “man-on-
the-street” who works on Wall Street.  He says: “I kind of think they are misguided in their 
protesting… I think they’re misguided in – in blaming Wall Street.  We had very little to do with 
it.”  Neither the man nor the reporter explains what the “it” is that the man thinks OWS is 
blaming Wall Street for.    
 Nearly all instances of the co-occurrence of the amalgam and ignorance frames are 
somewhat similar to the way the racism frame appears in TPM coverage—with journalists 
making somewhat neutral statements or asking questions, and guests following with the negative 
frame.  An exception to this rule occurs in the following example from an October 3, 2011 
episode of The Five on FNC.  The Five is a show hosted by four conservatives and one liberal; 
they typically sit around a table and discuss current events.  On this episode, conservative co-
host Dana Perino discusses media coverage of OWS.  Eric Bolling and Greg Gutfeld, two of the 
other conservatives on the show, then begin to argue with Bob Beckel, the show’s token liberal.  
PERINO: … one of the things that happened over the weekend on Twitter was people 
complaining that it took so long for media to cover their [OWS] story… 
BOLLING: What story is it? I'm still trying to figure out what is it? Capitalism is bad? 
Corporations are bad? 
BECKEL: That’s one of their problems. They don’t have a unifying message. 
GUTFELD: They don’t have a principle. 
BECKEL: Well, the principle -- 
GUTFELD: All they want to do is take. Take, take, take. 
BECKEL: Excuse me. The principle is that these crooks who ripped off this country and 
sold these bad securities they knew were bad, not one of them were in jail, and they ought 
to be. 
BOLLING: You know what, Bob. Not one of these kids knows anything about that story. 
 
Bolling introduces the amalgam frame, Beckel strengthens the frame by admitting that he thinks 
OWS does not have a unifying message, Gutfeld insults OWS by claiming they have no 
principles other than selfishness, and then Beckel defends OWS principles by offering an 
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explanation of OWS motives.  Bolling combats that defense with the ignorance frame: “Not one 
of these kids knows anything about that.”  Bolling strengthens his negative frame by 
patronizingly adding the word “kids” to describe the activists.  The debate-style nature of this 
program allows the amalgam frame to be introduced in a negative way and strengthened in a 
neutral way, which sparks further negative framing. 
Neutral Uses of the Amalgam of Grievances Frame 
 Still, the amalgam of grievances frame appears most frequently on its own, without the 
ignorance frame.  Journalists on mainstream media outlets seem to be unable to accept the idea 
that OWS has goals, and are unable to let go of the “they have no unified message” frame.  This 
problem is most perfectly encapsulated in an episode of the CBS Evening News on October 17, 
2011, in which news correspondent Seth Doane speaks with an OWS activist:  
DOANE: …Isn’t there a danger that without specific goals that the movement will lose 
steam? That people could be confused about what you want? 
UNIDENTIFIED MALE: Well, we have - we have goals. They may not be specific 
policies, but [what] we want is fundamental economic justice and a more real democracy. 
DOANE (voice over): The movement’s lack of clear message hasn’t hurt its ability to 
collect money. So far, 215,000 dollars has poured in online and another $80,000 was 
raised here in the park. 
 
Even when an activist states two clear goals, “fundamental economic justice and more real 
democracy,” the journalist immediately goes back to this old line of a “lack of clear message.”  
Either there is a fundamental miscommunication happening here, or journalists are simply 
unwilling to go “off-script”—to let go of a frame and realign their statements when presented 
with evidence that their preferred frame is inaccurate.  Mainstream journalists are so wrapped up 
in the idea that the only goal a social movement should have is a legislative goal that when 
activists say they have no specific policy goals – as the activist in this example does – the 
journalists see that as no goal at all.  Mainstream media are entrenched in a political institutional 
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structure that values a narrow range of traditional, legislation-oriented social movement goals.  
Journalists are not asking “what are your goals?” they are asking “why don’t your goals align 
with our idea of what a goal should be?”  If a social movement’s goals cannot be met by working 
within the existing political institutional structure – a structure the mainstream media have a 
vested interest in maintaining – then the media will say the movement has no goals at all, or that 
the goals are too “confusing.” 
 The amalgam frame also comes up in a somewhat different way.  Instead of repeating 
that there is no clear goal, a journalist or pundit will complain about the long list of goals OWS 
has.  For example, in a May 5, 2012 episode of Your Bottom Line on CNN, Will Cain, a 
conservative pundit, and Todd Gitlin, a liberal academic affiliated with OWS, are guests.  
Program host Christine Romans acts as moderator while they debate the merits of OWS.  Cain 
says, “it’s impossible to have [a conversation] with Occupy because you can change the purpose, 
you can change the movement every time I speak. If [I say] it’s about capitalism – [you say] no, 
it's about money and politics. You will answer a laundry list of things.”  Cain somehow fails to 
see that capitalism is the reason that money in politics is a problem.  Gitlin actually argues that 
economic inequality is the product of capitalism, that capitalism is to blame and that we should 
not accept the byproducts of capitalism, which include poverty and economic injustice—that we 
should not “genuflect to capitalism” as he says.   
 Because being “anti-capitalist” is akin to being “anti-American” in this country, many 
OWS supporters deny that OWS is an anti-capitalist movement and attempt to break that down 
into a more sympathetic list of problems, such as money in politics, the gap between the rich and 
poor, and the bailout of the banks while working class families lost their homes.  Wanting a 
remedy to those problems does not necessarily make one “anti-capitalist” (though many OWS 
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activists do consider themselves anti-capitalist), but it does make them, at the very least, 
supporters of policies that would regulate capitalism.  That is what Gitlin is trying to get at, but 
the conservative pundit will not allow him to. 
 The activist quoted above on CBS, who said OWS’s goals are economic justice and real 
democracy, is saying the same thing: they want more economic regulation to narrow the gap 
between the rich and the poor – a gap that deregulated capitalism caused, they argue – and real 
democracy in the form of one vote for one person instead of one vote for one million dollars.  
This is all related to capitalism, and regulation of this economic system is the unifying message 
throughout OWS protests. 
 We are left, then, to wonder whether the media is complicit in silencing this overriding 
theme of capitalism being the problem because, perhaps, they do not want regular people to 
realize that.  The hosts of FNC programs recognize it and use it to delegitimize the movement by 
framing OWS activists as communists or as being anti-American, while the journalists in 
mainstream media ignore it and complain that there is no unifying message, that there is this 
amalgam of grievances.  The mainstream media acknowledge separate concerns OWS has, such 
as student loan debt and the housing crisis and immigrant rights, yet they refuse to acknowledge 
that all these different things are connected to one problem—unregulated capitalism.  
Pro-Corporate Goals Do Not Need to be Clear 
“The media speak mainstreamese, and movements are pushed to adopt this 
language to be heard since journalists are prone to misunderstand or never hear 
the alternate language and its underlying ideas… Movements that accept the 
dominant cultural codes and do not challenge what is normally taken for granted 
will have less of a problem, but for many movements, this would involve 
surrendering fundamental aspects of their raison d’etre” (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 
1993: 119).   
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Boykoff (2006) found that about 25% of news stories about the Global Justice Movement 
in 1999 contained the amalgam of grievances frame.  I found that 41 of the 200 OWS transcripts 
in my sample contained the amalgam of grievances frame, about 20%.  This frame did not appear 
in my TPM sample of 200 at all, and it only appeared 5 times in the sample of 319 from the 2009 
TPM protests (Taylor 2011).  Those findings are in line with Boykoff’s and Laschever’s (2011), 
who similarly found in their analysis of TPM news coverage that only 37 of the 2,299 TV news 
transcripts they examined from 2009-2010 contained the amalgam frame (less than 2%).  So why 
do journalists on TV news use this frame so often when discussing OWS, but not the TPM? 
 TPM goals were just as “unclear” as the OWS goals described above, but they were not 
framed as unclear in TV news coverage.  For example, “less government” was mentioned as a 
goal or motivation of the TPM in 80 of the 319 transcripts from 2009.  Not once does any 
journalist or pundit question what “less government” would entail, even though TPM activists 
and their supporters never mention any specific policies related to shrinking government. 
 When OWS activists say their goals are “real democracy” or to “get money out of 
politics,” journalists say these goals are not clear.  However, when TPM activists state equally 
unclear goals such as “we want smaller government,” with no specific policies to go along with 
that, the statements are taken at face value without question and presented as legitimate concerns.  
TPM goals are generally pro-capitalist and support the economic status quo, and OWS goals are 
just about the opposite; what is it about the media that makes them want to frame these things so 
differently?  According to McChesney (2008: 34) one of the biases of journalism is that it 
“smuggles in values conducive to the commercial aims of the owners and advertisers as well as 
the political aims of the owning class.”  This pro-corporate bias leads journalists to present pro-
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capitalist goals without question, while being highly critical of goals that threaten the economic 
status quo.  
 Perhaps the TPM’s most vague goal was to “take our country back.”  This goal was 
discussed by journalists on FNC and CNN frequently, and without any criticism, let alone 
follow-up questions to find out what that means; no journalists in my samples asked who or what 
the TPM wanted to take the country back from.  Another of the vague TPM goals most 
frequently discussed on TV news coverage was that activists wanted to “make their voices 
heard.”  This was discussed in the news as a legitimate goal of the movement—just being heard.  
In fact, over ten percent of the 200 TPM mission statements I analyzed in previous research 
(Taylor 2011) listed “making our voices heard” as one of their goals.  Journalists on TV news 
often parroted this goal – “they’re here to make their voices heard” – without ever telling us what 
those voices were actually saying.  
 The TPM was not treated any more fairly than OWS by some media outlets, though.  
CNN and MSNBC frequently featured both journalists and guests challenging many of the TPM 
goals and motivations.  However, they at least made the attempt to see what those goals and 
motivations were—even if they were sometimes wrong.  For example, on CNN and MSNBC, 
journalists would criticize the “taxed enough already” slogan of the TPM by arguing that 
President Obama had actually lowered taxes.  They missed the point that the TPM was more 
concerned with government spending, and that most TPM activists seemed to understand that 
Obama had lowered their taxes, but they believed it would be short-term and that their children 
would be over-taxed in order to pay for all the spending Presidents Barack Obama and George 
W. Bush had done.   
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I introduced the gateways model of TV news framing of social 
movements.  This process is specific to TV news and does not apply across all media formats.  
TV news often presents a back and forth between journalists and their guests in ways that 
newspapers and magazines cannot.  This back and forth allows frames to be used in ways that 
news producers cannot always anticipate.  When TV news coverage goes negative on a 
movement, journalists tend not to attack the movement on its issues; they attack by ignoring the 
issues and distracting with charges of racism, or the way that protesters frame the issues rather 
than the merit of the issues themselves.  However, if a second person is there to respond, then the 
viewer may end up receiving more substantive information about the issues. 
I illustrated another aspect of the partisan media paradigm: in TV news coverage, positive 
frames are used to emphasize aspects of a social movement that support the status quo, whether 
the movement is perceived as left-wing or right-wing.  Negative frames can emphasize aspects of 
a movement that challenge the status quo, but are also often used to divide activists into an anti-
status quo minority and a contrasting majority of normal, patriotic, and peaceful activists.  Most 
substantive coverage includes a mix of negative and positive frames, and even networks that are 
more likely to use an unbalanced mix of negative or positive frames still offer substantive 
coverage, even though the slant of that coverage is overly negative or positive.  I then 
demonstrated the gateways model, which shows how negative and positive frames take specific 
paths to substantive coverage, exposing a communication pattern in which the use of one frame 
opens up the path for other frames, not just counter-frames, to be used.  These framing paths can 
apply to any news story—not just stories about social movements.  Deciphering this 
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communication pattern helps us to understand why issues that are central to fundamental social 
problems are pushed out of public discourse. 
For example, I showed how the racism frame is typically juxtaposed with a counter-frame 
and rarely leads to substantive coverage of TPM issues.  It also fails to lead to substantive 
coverage of race and racism.  The racism frame was used in ways that either legitimized or 
delegitimized the TPM, but kept the actual issue of racism at a distance.  Rather than having a 
conversation about what it means to be racist and discussing the reasons why anyone would 
think the TPM is a racist movement, journalists ignored racism itself and presented the act of 
accusing the TPM of racism as the controversy.  While the current status quo in this country 
supports the idea that racism is a negative thing, the status quo itself is supported by white 
racism and thus is served by avoiding meaningful conversations about what racism truly means. 
I also showed how the amalgam of grievances frame is used to avoid discussions of 
issues that challenge the status quo.  Despite many of the TPM activists’ goals and grievances 
being no clearer than any OWS goals or grievances, journalists legitimized TPM concerns and 
avoided meaningful discussions of OWS concerns—which stems from pro-corporate bias 
(Bagdikian 2004; McChesney 2008).  The broad message of OWS directly challenged the 
economic status quo, and the overarching goal of the movement was to bring awareness to the 
problems inherent in a capitalist economy—namely, that American capitalism produced a tiny 
class of obscenely wealthy people at the expense of a huge class of exploited workers.  These 
“problems” are not problems for the political, corporate, and media elite; indeed, their wealth, 
power, and prestige would not exist without those problems.  Because so many OWS activists 
were completely unwilling to compromise those fundamental aspects of their purpose, TV news 
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media were unable or unwilling to hear, let alone articulate, the movement’s underlying ideas 
(Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993). 
 Whether a social movement represents the political left, right, or something else 
altogether, TV news will use frames that support the status quo in their coverage of the 
movement—that is, if the movement gets any coverage at all.  Aspects of movements that 
challenge the status quo will be framed negatively, and aspects that support the status quo will be 
framed positively.  Depending on the media outlet’s target audience, aspects of a movement that 
oppose the status quo may be accentuated or downplayed, and aspects that support the status quo 
might be reciprocally accentuated or downplayed.  The trajectories of negative and positive 
frames in TV news coverage that I described in this chapter can potentially be applied to 
coverage of any story, especially for news items that are within the sphere of legitimate 
controversy (Hallin 1986).   
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CHAPTER 6.  
CONCLUSION 
 
  
 
 
In this chapter, I return to the questions I put forward in the introduction.  First, I summarize my 
findings and outline the contributions this dissertation makes to sociological knowledge.  I then 
discuss the implications of these findings for social movement research, media research, and the 
broader implications for news discourse in general.  Finally, I outline ideas for future research in 
these areas. 
Summary of Findings 
In chapter 3, I asked whether and how TPM and OWS television coverage differed, 
whether the amount and type of TPM and OWS coverage changed over time, and what factors 
explain those changes.  I also asked whether the protest paradigm framework is still relevant in a 
contemporary TV news field in which some networks target narrow niches based on political 
ideologies.  I found that news coverage of each movement differed based on the tactics each 
movement used and on their respective alignments with the status quo.  In line with the protest 
paradigm framework, coverage of OWS was driven by violence and arrests and then virtually 
ceased when OWS switched tactics from disruptive protest actions to tactics such as direct 
assistance to the poor and to victims of natural disasters.  In the meantime, coverage of the TPM 
switched from mostly adhering to the protest paradigm to ignoring TPM protest events and 
focusing on the TPM’s involvement in electoral politics.  
More importantly, the movements’ respective alignments with the spheres of discourse 
that correspond to each TV news outlet affected the type of coverage the movements received 
from each outlet.  While both OWS and the TPM received more neutral coverage than positive 
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or negative, this varied by network, with CNN and the broadcast networks providing 
overwhelmingly neutral coverage of both movements, FNC providing mostly positive coverage 
of the TPM and negative coverage of OWS, and MSNBC airing mostly negative coverage of the 
TPM and positive coverage of OWS.  While many of the same frames were used in coverage of 
both movements, the frequency of framing devices also varied by network.   
Finally, I explained that these variations by network do not necessarily contradict the 
protest paradigm framework, as some have suggested (e.g. Weaver and Scacco 2013).  Rather, 
they are evidence of a more nuanced process that takes place in our segmented TV news 
landscape.  By incorporating an interpretation of Hallin’s spheres (1986) that recognizes the 
importance of a news outlet’s intended audience, I reformulate the protest paradigm so that it can 
be generalized to all social movements and news media formats.  Where a social movement falls 
in terms of a news outlet’s sphere of consensus, deviance, or legitimate controversy will 
determine whether the news outlet adheres to the protest paradigm, a more negative version of 
the protest paradigm, or uses positive and supportive frames to describe the movement.   
My solution to the problem of the protest paradigm is distinct from Trivundza and 
Brlek’s (2017), who stick to Hallin’s original idea that a movement can shift over time from one 
sphere to another within one media outlet’s coverage.  In contrast, I argue that Hallin’s spheres 
should be conceptualized in a new way that recognizes media segmentation – some news outlets 
cater to different audiences based on political ideology – and this reconceptualization addresses 
all of the problems with the protest paradigm that scholars have identified over the past decade.  
My framework also has the potential to be applied to a variety of news stories and is not 
necessarily constricted to the protest paradigm or to social movement coverage.  In contrast to 
Reul and colleagues (2016), who present Chan and Lee’s (1984) idea of journalistic paradigms 
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as if it is their own unique concept, my results are distinct from Chan and Lee’s and present a 
novel approach to explaining variations in coverage between news outlets.  Chan and Lee’s 
(1984) original framework does not explain how news stories that are not explicitly tied to party 
ideologies would be covered by media outlets from each “journalistic paradigm” in contexts 
outside of Hong Kong.  My explanation of journalistic paradigms based on spheres of consensus 
is generalizable across national contexts.   
In chapter 4, I tested whether TV news transcripts covering multiple years of social 
movement activity support or contradict prior research on framing and substantive coverage of 
social movements.  While some researchers have argued that coverage of violent protests opens 
the door to more coverage of the underlying issues (DeLuca and Peeples 2002; Rojecki 2002), 
others found that the violence frame does not lead to more in-depth coverage of protesters’ issues 
(Boykoff 2006).  Still other research has found that coverage of protest events does lead to 
increased coverage of activists speaking in their own words (i.e., “standing”), but that coverage 
of institutionalized tactics leads to more coverage of the movement’s overall message (Amenta et 
al. 2012).  
While my results support some prior findings, they contradict others.  The violence 
frame, even when broken into four components, does not predict substantive coverage.  This 
supports Boykoff’s (2006) findings and challenges DeLuca and Peeples’s (2002) and Rojecki’s 
(2002) claims that violence or civil disobedience can lead to in-depth coverage of the issues.  
While event-related coverage does predict activist standing, a finding that supports Amenta and 
colleagues’ work (2012), it also predicts more in-depth coverage of a movement’s issues, at least 
for the TPM, which contradicts their findings.  My findings are important because they show that 
substantive coverage of a movement’s goals and motivations can co-occur with shallow coverage 
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of activists’ behaviors and appearances; shallow or negative coverage does not necessarily 
preclude an in-depth explanation of the issues.  My findings also lead to new questions: are the 
differences between my findings and Amenta and colleagues’ explained by new norms in 
journalism; by differences between newspaper and television coverage; by differences between 
coverage of a progressive movement (Townsend Plan) and a conservative movement (TPM)?  
More empirical research needs to be done in this area to begin answering these questions. 
My results also add to existing research by expanding on the list of framing devices used 
in prior research (e.g. Boykoff 2006; Dardis 2006; Taylor and Gunby 2012).  While prior 
research only examines negative frames, I add positive frames to my analysis.  Taken together, 
these results provide a more nuanced picture of the relationship between various framing devices 
and substantive reporting (a combination of activist standing and in-depth coverage of the issues) 
than prior research has been able to offer.  The most substantive coverage of social movements 
includes a mix of negative and positive frames, although some networks are more likely to use 
frames that are either more positive or more negative and yet still offer substantive coverage, 
even if that coverage is biased in favor of or against a movement. 
The results in chapters 3 and 4 form the partisan media paradigm.  This framework for 
understanding media coverage of social movements recognizes the ideologically segmented 
structure of the TV news field and the hegemonic limits of mainstream media.  The partisan 
media paradigm holds that the way in which news is presented depends more on the perceived 
ideology of the media outlet’s intended audience than on the tactics, targets, and message of a 
social movement. 
In chapter 5, I explained how the relationship between negative and positive frames and 
substantive coverage of social movements works.  This process is specific to TV news and does 
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not apply across all media formats, though I suspect it is similar in radio news.  TV news often 
presents a back and forth between journalists and their guests in ways that newspapers and 
magazines cannot.  This back and forth allows frames to be used in ways that news producers 
cannot always anticipate.  When TV news covers a movement in negative ways, journalists tend 
not to attack the movement on its issues; they attack by ignoring the issues and focusing on the 
ways protesters appear or behave, or the way protesters frame the issues rather than the merit of 
the issues themselves.  However, if a second person is there to respond to the journalist, then the 
news consumer may end up receiving more substantive information about the issues. 
I illustrated how, in TV news coverage, positive frames are used to emphasize aspects of 
a social movement that adhere to the status quo, whether the movement is perceived as left-wing 
or right-wing.  Negative frames can emphasize aspects of a movement that challenge the status 
quo, but are also often used to divide movements into an anti-status quo minority and a 
contrasting majority of normal, patriotic, and peaceful activists.  By developing the gateways 
model of media framing, I showed how negative and positive frames take specific paths to 
substantive coverage, exposing a communication pattern in which the use of one frame can open 
up paths to other frames.  These framing paths can apply to any news story—not just stories 
about social movements. 
I also showed how, in TPM coverage, the racism frame is typically juxtaposed with a 
counter-frame and rarely leads to substantive coverage of TPM issues.  It also fails to lead to 
substantive coverage of race and racism.  While I showed how frames open pathways to other 
frames, they can also close off pathways to in-depth discussions that challenge hegemonic 
norms.  The racism frame was used in ways that either legitimized or delegitimized the TPM, but 
kept the actual effects of racism – or even what it means to be racist – out of frame.  Rather than 
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having a conversation about what it means to be racist and discussing the reasons why anyone 
would think the TPM is a racist movement, journalists ignored racism itself and presented the act 
of accusing the TPM of racism as the controversy.  While the current status quo in this country 
supports the idea that racism is a negative thing, the status quo itself is supported by white 
racism and thus is served by avoiding meaningful conversations about what racism truly is.   
This avoidance of meaningful conversations about racism was more recently evident in 
news coverage of the Charlottesville, Virginia “Unite the Right” rally that took place in August 
2017.  White nationalists gathered to protest the removal of a Robert E. Lee statue and were met 
by anti-racist counter-protesters.  News coverage of this two-day event, which began with white 
protesters carrying torches and encircling a statue of Thomas Jefferson on the University of 
Virginia campus, and culminated with a white racist driving his car into a crowd of counter-
protesters, killing one, focused on the sensationalism of conflict and displays of overt racism 
(e.g. Nazi flags) rather than the deeper issues of ongoing, structural racism that have shaped this 
country’s history.   
In a similar way, the amalgam of grievances frame was used to avoid discussions of 
issues that challenge the status quo.  Despite many of the TPM activists’ goals and grievances 
being no clearer than any OWS goals or grievances, journalists legitimized TPM concerns and 
avoided meaningful discussions of OWS concerns—which, I argue, stems from pro-corporate 
bias (Bagdikian 2004; McChesney 2008).  The broad message of OWS directly challenged the 
economic status quo and the overarching goal of the movement was to bring awareness to the 
problems inherent in a capitalist economy—namely, that American capitalism produced a tiny 
class of obscenely wealthy people (the 1%) at the expense of a huge class of exploited workers 
(the 99%).  This problem with capitalism is not a problem for the political, corporate, and media 
 205 
 
elite; their wealth, power, and prestige would not exist without the inequality produced by 
capitalism.  Because of this, TV news media were unable or unwilling to hear, let alone 
articulate, the movement’s underlying ideas (Gamson and Wolfsfeld 1993).  The trajectories of 
negative and positive frames in TV news coverage that I described in this dissertation can 
potentially be applied to coverage of any story, especially for news items that are within the 
sphere of legitimate controversy (Hallin 1986).   
Implications 
Cumulatively, these results provide improved frameworks for analyzing media coverage 
of contemporary social movements and media framing processes.  The partisan media paradigm 
has two components: 1) the extent to which a media outlet covers a social movement in a 
negative or positive way is dependent on the political orientation of the movement and the 
perceived ideology of the media outlet’s intended audience; 2) substantive coverage of social 
movements can, and often does, occur even when negative frames are used in news reports, and 
regardless of whether or not the coverage is focused on protest activity.  Related to the partisan 
media paradigm is the gateways model, which describes a process by which framing devices act 
as gateways to either open paths to substantive coverage or to shut off communication.  The 
partisan media paradigm is applicable to all for-profit media, and likely applies to mainstream 
nonprofit media outlets such as PBS and NPR as well.  The gateways model applies to frames 
used in news coverage that is broadcast on television, and likely radio as well. 
TV news outlets cover social movements in different ways based on the perceived 
orientations of their target audiences, as well as the tactics, targets, and motivations of the social 
movement.  The partisan media paradigm accounts for the realities of today’s ideologically 
segmented TV news landscape, thus contributing to knowledge across the disciplines of 
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sociology and communications studies.  In addition, by identifying the trajectories frames can 
take in TV news coverage, I provide important insights into the process of media framing for 
other types of political and cultural discourse.  My findings explain how for-profit media’s 
adherence to the status quo bounds the mainstream news field with hegemonic limits that confine 
political discourse. 
Movements that do not pose a significant challenge to the status quo are more successful 
at getting positive media coverage that addresses issues of substance.  This may be because of 
journalistic norms and practices, because the media are owned and censored by a small number 
of powerful corporations, or because media impose cultural meanings on society.  I lean toward 
the view that all three of these theories of media are partly true most of the time.  For a 
movement to have a better chance of getting the kind of mainstream media coverage that would 
cast it in a positive light and bring public attention to the issues with which it is concerned, the 
movement must not be radical in ideology (right or left) nor radical in its tactics (peaceful 
protests get more positive coverage).  If the movement has allies among the political elite or 
gains corporate sponsorship, its legitimacy is boosted significantly.   
Additionally, if the movement’s concerns can be narrowed to one goal that fits within 
hegemonic limits (Gitlin 1982), mass media will do a better job of articulating that goal clearly.  
As an example, the TPM began as an ideologically radical movement opposed to status quo 
institutions such as the Federal Reserve.  Once the TPM was co-opted by mainstream 
conservative interests such as the Republican Party and others in the political and corporate elite, 
its media coverage grew substantially and its message narrowed.  Media presentations of a 
movement with the primary concerns of high taxes and government overreach led to mainstream 
conservatives becoming activists for the first time, and the more radical originators of the 
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movement were pushed out and marginalized.  The harshest critiques of the TPM framed the 
movement as extremist and/or racist.  However, the racism frame as it was used in mainstream 
media failed to effectively illustrate how the TPM’s message, motivations, or rhetoric were 
actually racist.   
 The pathways I identify in chapter 5 illustrate how meaningful discussions of nuanced 
issues can be cut off; this is not relegated to TV coverage of social movements, and can be used 
to explain media coverage of other issues as well.  For example, President Trump has been 
criticized for his racist views and policies by alternative media outlets, but not by mainstream 
media outlets.  Although some have recently called on journalists to use the term “racist” when 
covering Trump’s racist statements, rather than using euphemisms such as “racially charged” 
(Vernon 2017), that would still not guarantee any in-depth discussion of the implications of the 
President’s racist rhetoric.  As I demonstrated in chapter 5, the hegemonic limits of media 
discourse prevent real understanding of the racism that may or may not underlie TPM 
motivations and goals; this also applies to Trump’s discourse around the Charlottesville 
protests34 and the NFL35, as well as his policies on immigration.  Because the mainstream media 
get wrapped up in the controversy of whether or not Trump is racist, or whether or not the 
comments he makes or the policies he tries to implement are “racially charged,” they neglect to 
discuss the actual implications of having a President who is motivated by racism, or the 
implications of racist policies.  
                                                 
34 Shear, Michael D. and Maggie Haberman. 2017. “Trump Defends Initial Remarks on 
Charlottesville; Again Blames ‘Both Sides.’” The New York Times. August 15, 2017. Available 
at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-press-conference-charlottesville.html, 
accessed October 1, 2017. 
35 Griffiths, Brent D. and Henry C. Jackson. 2017. “Trump Sparks War with NFL – And 
LeBron.” Politico. September 23, 2017. Available at: 
http://www.politico.com/story/2017/09/22/trump-nfl-protests-football-243046, accessed October 
1, 2017. 
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More on the Status Quo 
 What the Tea Party did successfully was to get their own members to run for elected 
office and/or to endorse candidates that claimed to support their agenda. They then pressured 
legislators to stick to their campaign promises once elected.  Whether it can be said that the TPM 
was successful in reaching their goals is up for debate.  The TPM-affiliated members of 
Congress push a hardline agenda without support from other Republicans, and have failed to 
reach their goals of repealing the Affordable Care Act or decreasing the national debt. 
 OWS had the same level of public support that the TPM did in its first two years (around 
20%, according to various nationally representative public opinion surveys), but they insisted on 
acting outside of political institutional structures and rejected affiliating themselves with any 
political party.  This refusal to act within the bounds of state structures—while in line with their 
integrity, and a good example of prefigurative politics—severely limited their potential to 
influence legislative agendas, and the reforms their liberal and progressive members sought have 
yet to be actualized. 
Throughout this dissertation, I have argued that OWS and the TPM were covered so 
differently because of their respective orientations with the status quo.  Because the ideology of 
the TPM is more closely aligned with the mainstream media, the TPM gets much more 
mainstream attention; it does not threaten the political or economic status quo.  But this answer 
may be too simplistic. 
A more nuanced answer incorporates tactics and targets, along with cultural infusion of 
media coverage.  Both movements received very similar tone of coverage: a little positive, a little 
negative, and a lot neutral.  However, OWS only received coverage at all when they protested 
and when they got arrested – because their tactics are disruptive – whereas the TPM got coverage 
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for their protests, but their tactics were not disruptive and so they did not get arrested.  The 
TPM’s primary tactic during their second year was to infiltrate government and the Republican 
Party; once they began moving away from the protest tactic and into the traditional political 
realm, they continued to get media coverage.  They continued to get coverage for years because 
they were achieving some of their stated goals, because those goals support the status quo, and 
because the media are going to cover electoral politics anyway.  
Movements also tend to get more news coverage when they accomplish a goal that is 
recognized by the media as a traditional political goal (i.e., in line with the status quo).  For 
example, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, along with members from about two hundred other 
native tribes, began protesting a proposed oil pipeline (the Dakota Access Pipeline) on August 
10, 2016.  They occupied an area of North Dakota for weeks before they got any national TV 
coverage at all.  Lawrence O’Donnell on MSNBC was the first to report it, on August 25, and 
was also the second to report on it, on August 29 when he interviewed the Chairman of the 
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, Dave Archambault II.  The third nationally broadcast TV report on 
the protest did not occur until September 5, nearly one full month after the protest had begun.  
This report, on a CNN program called The Lead with Jake Tapper, focused on the violence that 
erupted when the private security guards hired by the oil company unleashed dogs and pepper 
spray on the protesters.  McLeod and Hertog (1992) similarly found that mainstream news 
coverage of anarchist protests appeared only after violence broke out.  FNC was the last of the 
cable networks to report on the Dakota Access Pipeline protest, on September 9, 2016 (Special 
Report with Bret Baier), which was the day the federal government called for a halt to the 
pipeline.   
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Protesters camped out 24-7, yet received hardly any news coverage in their first 30 days 
of protest.  As soon as the government stepped in and legitimized the protesters’ demands, the 
national news started to cover the issue; coverage shot up from five programs during the first 
four weeks to twelve TV programs during the week following the government action.  When the 
target of a social movement is a corporation or capitalism in general, it tends to take violence or 
legitimization from elites to get the mainstream corporate media to take notice.  
I disagree with Wang and Piazza (2016: 1694), who claim: “non-state targets, such as 
firms and educational institutions, lack the capacity and the legitimacy to use physical force to 
repress violent tactics.”  The case of the Dakota Access Pipeline activists, attacked by dogs and 
pepper spray at the hands of private security hired by Energy Transfer Partners, refutes this, as 
does the case of Occupy UC Davis protesters who were pepper sprayed by campus police while 
they sat, silently and peacefully, protesting their university’s tuition hikes—not to mention the 
seven steel workers who were murdered by private security hired by Andrew Carnegie when 
they protested working conditions in 1892.  In addition, the state, in the form of the police and 
the military, also violently represses people who protest against non-state targets.36  The fact that 
Dakota Access Pipeline and OWS protests involved both corporations and the state complicates 
this—and shows that U.S. corporate and state interests have become deeply intertwined.  
 The partisan media paradigm and the gateways model of media framing can be used to 
analyze discourse beyond news coverage of social movements.  Virtually any news story could 
fall into a different sphere of discourse depending on which TV news outlet is covering it.  
                                                 
36 See articles accessed September 4, 2017: UC Davis protest, November 18, 2011 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/education/emboldened-uc-davis-students-protest-tuition-
hike/2011/11/28/gIQAder85N_story.html?utm_term=.cd09f185551f; an elderly woman, a priest, 
and a pregnant woman pepper sprayed at Occupy Seattle protest, November 15, 2011 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/pregnant-woman-pepper-sprayed-at-occupy-seattle/    
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Depending on the sphere in which a story falls, a news outlet could provide negative, neutral, or 
positive coverage of the story.  The process of media framing that I outlined, by which frames 
take paths that lead to other frames, to in-depth coverage of issues, or that block off deeper 
discussions, can also explain news media discourse of stories beyond those relegated to social 
movements.  In the next section, I outline directions for future research, including some that go 
beyond social movement studies. 
Directions for Future Research 
Now that we know that different TV news outlets in the U.S. operate within different 
spheres of political discourse and that these spheres influence how political topics are discussed 
by these different outlets, that negative and positive frames can take different paths to 
substantive coverage, and that messages that challenge the status quo are ignored or 
misinterpreted by mainstream media, we should explore other issues related to these findings.  In 
this section, I outline several possibilities for future research that were sparked by findings in this 
dissertation and currently remain unexplored by sociological research.  I also discuss directions 
for future research that are tangentially related to my findings. 
Future research should test whether my solution to the problems of the protest paradigm 
can be applied to media and movements outside the U.S.  While the protest paradigm was 
developed in the U.S. context, several studies have tried to apply the framework to protests in 
other countries, with mixed results (e.g. Boyle et al. 2012; Shahin et al. 2016; Trivundza and 
Brlek 2017).  I suspect that my solution addresses the problems scholars such as Triundza and 
Brlek (2017) identified, but empirical research will need to be undertaken in order to 
demonstrate the generalizability of the spheres of discourse in non-U.S. media contexts.  
 212 
 
Future research should also quantify the framing paths I found in chapter 5.  How often 
does each pathway occur, are some paths more common than others, and are there differences 
between networks in terms of the frequencies of each path?  Does this process look similar in 
radio broadcasts such as Rush Limbaugh on the right of the political spectrum, Stephanie Miller 
on the left of the spectrum, and programs on NPR in the middle of the spectrum?  Comparing 
radio and TV discourse in this way can tell us whether the TV news framing process I outlined in 
chapter 5 is applicable to non-televised media.  This would clarify the extent to which the 
partisan media paradigm can be generalized across different forms of media.  
In my analysis of frame trajectories, I found that the racism frame cut off discourse about 
racism itself.  However, TV programs can, and often have, pushed the hegemonic limits that 
constrict news media (Gitlin 1982).  For example, on a July 31, 2017 episode of ABC’s The 
Bachelorette, contestants on the reality TV show gathered to discuss the events that transpired 
during the regular season—which happened to be the first season that featured an African 
American in the lead role, as bachelorette.  A refreshingly open and informative discussion about 
race and racism occurred.37   One black contestant explained color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva 
2006) to a white contestant: “The racism that is ingrained in your behavior to the point of 
invisibility is still pushing you to behave…in a way that you don’t even recognize [as racist].”  
Similarly boundary-pushing conversations about race and gender have happened on CBS’s 
Survivor.38  Future research should examine the potential that other forms of media, such as 
                                                 
37 Beck, Lia. August 1, 2017. “The Race Conversation on ‘The Bachelorette: Men Tell All’ Is 
Bigger Than Lee.” Bustle. Available at: https://www.bustle.com/p/the-race-conversation-on-the-
bachelorette-men-tell-all-is-bigger-than-lee-73804. Accessed September 4, 2017. 
38 See: Dehnart, Andy. October 2, 2009. “Jaison’s Stand Against Vile Ben’s Racism Takes 
Control from Russell.” Reality Blurred. Available at:  
https://www.realityblurred.com/realitytv/2009/10/survivor-samoa-ben_out/. Accessed September 
4, 2017; and Smith, Zeke. May 3, 2017. “‘Survivor’s’ Zeke Smith: Why Being Vulnerable Was 
 213 
 
reality TV programs, have to fill the cultural spaces that news media fear to tread, and should test 
whether the frame trajectories I outlined in chapter 5 apply to non-news media.   
 Following Walgrave and Vleigenthart (2012), who found that increased media attention 
on protest movements in Belgium had a positive effect on political agenda setting (the issues 
raised by those movements received parliamentary, governmental, and legislative attention), 
future research should examine how media framing may affect U.S. political outcomes, such as 
electoral or legislative outcomes, and cultural outcomes such as public opinion.  However, this 
research should also take into consideration the ways in which media coverage and social 
movement outcomes are influenced by social movements’ targets, as well as their orientations 
toward the status quo.  The TPM targeted the state, got mostly neutral coverage, and had some 
success in terms of electing candidates for public office.  OWS targeted the state, but also 
targeted corporations and capitalism, and also got mostly neutral coverage; few, if any, of its 
goals were met.  OWS employed non-violent tactics and endured state suppression, while TPM 
used the threat of violence (by bringing guns to rallies or holding signs such as “we came 
unarmed – this time”) and enjoyed some success without any state suppression.  Future research 
should also explore the intersecting effects of political ideology, race, and protest tactics as they 
relate to movement outcomes, including state suppression.  
Weaver and Scacco (2013) found that CNN mentioned the issues underlying TPM 
protests significantly more often than FNC.   They explain this by conjecturing: “the lack of 
issue mentions potentially suggests Fox was less concerned about building the movement’s 
authenticity” (Weaver and Scacco 2013: 76), possibly because FNC’s conservative viewers 
                                                                                                                                                             
Worth the Risk.” The Hollywood Reporter. Available at: 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/live-feed/survivor-zeke-smith-journey-being-outed-guest-
column-999524. Accessed September 4, 2017. 
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might automatically find the TPM to be authentic.  However, another explanation could be that 
FNC was more concerned with building the movement into something FNC and its conservative 
commentators and owners wanted it to be: less about the constitution, less about anti-status quo 
goals such as abolishing the Federal Reserve, and more about lower taxes and limited 
government.  Future research should look into how media framing processes may have enabled 
the Republican Party to co-opt the TPM. 
 In chapter 5, I briefly discussed FNC program hosts’ proclivity to discount any news 
presented on other media outlets as “liberal media” or “mainstream media” and thus not real 
news.  I suggested this might be an attempt to manipulate the FNC audience, turning them 
against all other networks and making them completely loyal to FNC.  This is similar to 
President Donald Trump’s active efforts to delegitimize the mainstream media.  Future research 
should examine the framing processes used by Trump, his supporters, and the journalists 
covering Trump’s and his supporters’ statements. 
Recently, much has been made of the “Resistance” movement against President Trump.  
Journalists have been writing about how this resistance movement may be the left’s answer to 
the Tea Party, and they are expecting a 2018 mid-term election similar to that of 2010.39  
However, without the strong media presence and mobilization mechanism that the TPM had in 
FNC, the resistance movement is unlikely to move Congress as far to the left as the Tea Party 
was able to move Congress to the right.  Future research should explore possible parallels 
between FNC’s coverage of the TPM and MSNBC’s coverage of the Resistance. 
                                                 
39 Kabaservice, Geoffrey. March 15, 2017. “Are Democrats Becoming Extremists?” Politico. 
Available at: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/03/democrats-resistance-extremists-
tea-party-democracy-214906. Accessed September 4, 2017. 
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Finally, I used television news – in contrast to most studies, which use newspaper data – 
because it is the primary way the majority of Americans get their news.  However, the Internet is 
the fastest growing source of news for Americans—though it has still not outpaced television 
news as of this writing.40  Future research should focus on the framing processes in digital 
media, as well as the power online news sources may have in influencing public opinion, 
electoral, and legislative outcomes. 
                                                 
40 See http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/06/younger-adults-more-likely-than-their-
elders-to-prefer-reading-news/ and http://www.people-press.org/2011/01/04/internet-gains-on-
television-as-publics-main-news-source/. Accessed June 24, 2017. 
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Appendix A: Differences Between OWS and TPM Supporters 
 
Each movement’s unique relationship to mass media is related to the political ideologies 
of each media outlet’s target audience.  Scholars of political communication such as Levendusky 
(2013) claim that consuming partisan media, such as FNC and MSNBC, leads viewers to have 
more politically polarized views, while others (e.g. Arceneaux and Johnson 2013) argue that 
partisan media simply reinforce existing ideologies.  Are people who view the TPM positively 
more likely to get their news from FNC than those who view the TPM negatively?  Are people 
who get their news from FNC less likely to support OWS?  In this section, I use a public opinion 
survey that asks questions about TV news consumption and political views to examine the 
differences between supporters of OWS and the TPM and provide further insight into the 
relationship between the media and these movements. 
Trusted TV News Sources and the Values of OWS and the TPM 
 Only one publicly available survey, conducted in August 2012 by the Public Religion 
Research Institute (PRRI), asked respondents about their opinions on both OWS and the TPM 
and asked what their most trusted television news source is.  The survey was conducted over 
both landline and cell phones with a random sample of 2,501 adults living in the U.S.; the margin 
of error is +/- 2.2% at the 95% confidence level (Jones and Cox 2012).  After removing missing 
cases, I was left with a total of 2,213 respondents.  I use this dataset to examine whether there is 
a relationship between most trusted news source and opinions on each social movement.  PRRI 
includes a weight variable to conform the sample to the population; I use the weight variable in 
this analysis. 
 Support for each of the two movements is measured by the following questions: “Would 
you say the Tea Party movement shares your values, or not?” and “And do you think the Occupy 
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Wall Street movement shares your values, or not?”  These are both dichotomous measures, 
where 1=“yes, shares my values” and 0=“no, does not share my values.”  I removed from the 
analysis respondents who selected “haven’t heard about” at least one movement.   
 The PRRI survey asked a range of questions about political issues and media 
consumption.  Most pertinent to my research is the question: “Which of the following television 
news sources do you trust the MOST to provide accurate information about politics and current 
events?”  Response options include: Broadcast networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC, which were 
already combined in the original response option); CNN; Fox News Channel (FNC); MSNBC; 
public television; other; and “do not watch television news.”  Based on the analysis I present in 
chapter three, I expect those who share TPM values to trust FNC the most, and those who share 
OWS values to trust MSNBC the most.  I expect CNN and the Broadcast networks to be less 
popular among both groups. 
 I also include opinions on issues related to movement concerns.  One of OWS activists’ 
main issues was the widening gap between the rich and the poor, which they often blamed on the 
current economic system itself.  One of the TPM’s main concerns was government spending, and 
they often expressed strong opposition to funding for social welfare programs.  In the PRRI 
survey, respondents were asked whether they agree or disagree with the following statements: 
“The economic system in this country unfairly favors the wealthy” (which relates to an OWS 
issue) and “Poor people have become too dependent on government assistance programs” (which 
relates to a TPM issue).  Answer choices for both were completely disagree, mostly disagree 
(which I combine), mostly agree, and completely agree (also combined).  PRRI also asked 
whether respondents favor or oppose “Increasing the tax rate on Americans earning more than 1 
million dollars a year.”  This addresses both OWS and TPM concerns, as OWS protesters 
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frequently expressed that tax rates on the wealthy should be increased, and TPM activists 
frequently expressed that all tax rates should be lowered.  Response options were: strongly 
oppose, oppose (combined), favor, and strongly favor (combined).  Since so many TPM activists 
were very concerned about the 2nd amendment, I also include gun ownership, a dichotomous 
variable that is measured by the yes or no question “Do you or does anyone in your home own a 
gun?”  
 Additionally, I include a range of demographic variables, including race, religion, 
education, political ideology, and party identification. White is coded 1 for white and 0 for all 
other races.  Christian is coded 1 for Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, Orthodox, and Other 
Christian, and 0 for all other religious affiliations.  Education is measured by the question “What 
is the last grade or class that you completed in school?” and I use the following categories: high 
school graduate or less, some college or technical/vocational school, college graduate, and post-
graduate work.  The class identification variable is measured by the question, “If you were asked 
to use one of these five names for your social class, which would you say you belong in?”  I 
combine working class and lower class into one category, leave middle class as its own category, 
and combine upper-middle and upper class into the third category.  Political ideology is 
measured by the question “In general, would you describe your political views as…” and offers 
response options of very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, and very liberal.  I 
compress these into 3 categories by combining liberal and very liberal, and conservative and 
very conservative.  Party identification is measured by the question “In politics today, do you 
consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or Independent?”  
 Table 14 displays percentages for three categories of respondents: the full sample (all 
respondents), those who responded “yes” to the question “do you think the Occupy Wall Street 
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movement shares your values, or not?”, and those who responded “yes” to the question “Would 
you say the Tea Party movement shares your values, or not?”   I ran independent samples t-tests 
to compare each of the two “yes” category respondents with the respondents that answered “no.”  
Percentages that are displayed in bold are significantly different (p<0.01) from respondents who 
said that they do not share OWS values, or that they do not share TPM values, respectively. 
On the issues, those who say that OWS shares their values are more likely to agree that the 
American economic system favors the wealthy, more likely to disagree that poor people have 
been too dependent on government assistance, more likely to favor raising taxes on the wealthy, 
and less likely to own a gun.  They are more likely to identify as politically liberal and to have 
higher education levels, and less likely to be Christian.  Somewhat surprisingly, those who share 
OWS values do not significantly differ from the general population in terms of self-identified 
class status. 
 Those who share TPM values just about opposite those who share OWS values in regard 
to their opinions on the issues.  Those who say the TPM shares their values are more likely to 
disagree that the American economic system favors the wealthy, more likely to agree that poor 
people have been too dependent on government assistance, less likely to support raising taxes on 
the wealthy, and more likely to own a gun.  They are more likely to identify as politically 
conservative and as Republican, and they are more likely to be Christian. 
As I expected, those who share TPM values trust FNC over all other news sources; 
however, while those who share OWS values trust MSNBC and public television significantly 
more and FNC significantly less than those who do not share OWS values, they trust the 
moderate broadcast networks and CNN at about the same rate as the general population.  These 
results could mean that FNC’s overwhelmingly positive coverage of the TPM and negative 
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Table 14. Characteristics of those who share OWS and TPM values (percentages) 
 Full Sample OWS Values TPM Values 
N 2,213 502 721 
Most Trusted TV News Source    
Broadcast Network 24.73 21.45 18.37 
CNN 19.21 22.62 11.22 
FNC 24.7 8.14 50.84 
MSNBC 5.45 9.72 2.56 
Public television 11.1 19.65 6.6 
Other/Don’t watch TV news 14.82 18.42 10.4 
 
Issues 
   
Economy unfairly favors wealthy    
Completely/Mostly agree 67.89 86.42 44.53 
Completely/Mostly disagree 32.11 13.58 55.47 
    
Poor too dependent on gov’t    
Completely/Mostly agree 71.34 52.95 88.23 
Completely/Mostly disagree 28.67 47.05 11.77 
    
Raise taxes on wealthy    
Favor/Strongly favor 63.84 83.01 41.1 
Oppose/Strongly oppose 
 
36.16 17.00 58.9 
Demographics    
Gun owner 44.58 30.38 62.01 
Christian 74.88 58.27 87.33 
White 68.08 63.06 76.07 
    
Education    
High School or less 40.74 29.79 39.83 
Some College/Tech school  28.93 30.00 34.00 
College Graduate 19.1 24.5 17.54 
Post-Graduate education 11.23 15.72 8.64 
    
Class    
Lower/Working class 42.16 42.99 41.35 
Middle class  44.54 40.02 46.67 
Upper-Middle/Upper class 13.3 16.99 11.98 
    
Political Ideology     
Conservative 39.3 19.17 64.14 
Moderate 37.19 37.17 28.22 
Liberal 23.51 43.76 7.65 
    
Party ID    
Republican 25.49 10.17 47.99 
Democrat 33.78 50.51 14.1 
Independent 37.89 35.99 35.67 
Notes: Bold percentages are significantly different (p<0.01) from those who say they do 
not share the values for each movement (non-TPM values, N = 1492; non-OWS values, 
N = 1711); independent samples t-test, two-tailed. Due to rounding, not all column 
sections add to 100 percent. 
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coverage of OWS (see chapter 3) have a measurable effect on viewers, which would support 
Levendusky’s (2013) claim that partisan cable news networks have a polarizing effect on 
viewers.  However, it could also mean that people who support the TPM are ideologically 
conservative already and they watch FNC because it gives them a take on the news that confirms 
their existing ideology, and that those who are ideologically liberal would support OWS anyway, 
and watch MSNBC for the same reason (Arceneaux and Johnson 2013).  Either way, there is a 
clear relationship between the type of TV news one consumes and opinion on these two political 
social movements.  The issue questions were all significantly different for each movement’s 
value-sharers, and align with self-identified political party identification, which lends more 
credence to the theory that people have those values already and trust those news sources 
because they align with their worldviews.   
Understanding these differences between OWS and TPM supporters gives us insight into 
the potential effects that the framing processes I describe in this dissertation had on mobilization 
of each of these movements.  While previous research has suggested there was an increase in 
TPM mobilization due to the amount of overall media coverage (Banerjee 2013), I focus on the 
types of coverage, looking at specific negative and positive frames media outlets use to describe 
social movements.  Based on the results presented in table 14, it is unlikely that many people 
watching CNN or broadcast networks were mobilized to join the TPM, and much more likely 
that FNC viewers were the ones mobilized by media coverage.  In this dissertation, I examine the 
differences between amounts and types of coverage between media outlets and add to our 
knowledge of media framing practices in the context of an ideologically segmented media 
landscape.  While I do not directly address social movement outcomes such as mobilization, my 
results will better inform future research on media effects on such outcomes. 
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Appendix B 
 
Tables B1 through B3 test model fit for negative and positive frames regressed on each 
of 3 forms of in-depth coverage of OWS. 
 
Tables B4 through B6 test model fit for negative and positive frames regressed on each 
of 3 forms of in-depth coverage of the TPM. 
 
Each table is followed by likelihood ratio tests (poisson vs. zero-inflated poisson 
(ZIP); poisson vs. negative binomial (NB); ZIP vs. zero-inflated negative binomial 
(ZINB); and NB vs. ZINB). 
 
Each set of likelihood ratio tests are followed by HPC tests. 
 
 
Table B1. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Quoting OWS 
activists  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   (o1)             (o2)             (o3)             (o4)    
                  Poisson             ZIP        NegBinom            ZINB    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Freak               1.232***        0.645***        0.975+          0.832*   
                  (0.208)         (0.153)         (0.550)         (0.414)    
 
Ignorant            0.049           0.088*          0.043          -0.010    
                  (0.048)         (0.043)         (0.120)         (0.104)    
 
Insanity           -0.230          -0.520+         -0.111          -0.260    
                  (0.283)         (0.269)         (0.498)         (0.442)    
 
Ridicule           -0.513***       -0.309***       -0.139          -0.188    
                  (0.128)         (0.092)         (0.213)         (0.186)    
 
Amalgam             0.292***        0.123*          0.328+          0.250+   
                  (0.051)         (0.049)         (0.168)         (0.142)    
 
Normal              0.176***        0.082**         0.275*          0.200+   
                  (0.028)         (0.030)         (0.140)         (0.112)    
 
Patriotic          -0.140          -0.141           0.054           0.033    
                  (0.242)         (0.211)         (0.693)         (0.573)    
 
Peaceful            0.202***        0.052           0.214+          0.127    
                  (0.036)         (0.037)         (0.115)         (0.096)    
 
_cons              -0.047           1.126***       -0.181           0.294    
                  (0.081)         (0.091)         (0.183)         (0.197)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount                          -0.001***                       -0.011**  
                                  (0.000)                         (0.004)    
 
_cons                               1.277***                        4.303**  
                                  (0.276)                         (1.418)    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                           
lnalpha                                             1.142***        0.711*** 
                                                  (0.182)         (0.209)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               875.840         655.835         597.824         573.404    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses; + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Likelihood-ratio tests: 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =    224.00 
(Assumption: o1 nested in o2)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    280.02 
(Assumption: o1 nested in o3)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     84.43 
(Assumption: o2 nested in o4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =     28.42 
(Assumption: o3 nested in o4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
         HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -0.555 
         Prob > t  =  0.710 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  2.277 
         Prob > t  =  0.011 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
         HPC test: ZINB vs. NB 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -2.810 
         Prob > t  =  0.998 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  4.565 
         Prob > t  =  0.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
All tests point to ZINB as the best model. 
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Table B2. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Paraphrasing OWS 
activists  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   (p1)             (p2)             (p3)             (p4)    
                  Poisson             ZIP        NegBinom            ZINB    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Paraphrase                                                                   
Freak              -0.067          -0.230           0.007          -0.216    
                  (0.244)         (0.256)         (0.370)         (0.285)    
 
Ignorant            0.061          -0.056           0.062          -0.048    
                  (0.062)         (0.067)         (0.085)         (0.072)    
 
Insanity            0.167          -0.117           0.153          -0.140    
                  (0.253)         (0.302)         (0.379)         (0.320)    
 
Ridicule            0.059           0.182           0.047           0.178    
                  (0.113)         (0.135)         (0.161)         (0.150)    
 
Amalgam             0.205**         0.147           0.232+          0.160    
                  (0.077)         (0.090)         (0.121)         (0.099)    
 
Normal              0.093+          0.037           0.087           0.042    
                  (0.050)         (0.056)         (0.085)         (0.061)    
 
Patriotic          -0.734          -0.542          -0.497          -0.528    
                  (0.474)         (0.471)         (0.623)         (0.491)    
 
Peaceful            0.172***        0.041           0.216*          0.054    
                  (0.052)         (0.059)         (0.090)         (0.067)    
 
_cons              -0.550***        0.157          -0.595***        0.084    
                  (0.108)         (0.149)         (0.140)         (0.176)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount                          -0.004**                        -0.004**  
                                  (0.001)                         (0.002)    
 
_cons                               2.217***                        2.330*** 
                                  (0.608)                         (0.687)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha                                            -0.156          -1.987    
                                                  (0.330)         (1.253)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               510.323         462.458         491.241         463.634    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =     51.86 
(Assumption: p1 nested in p2)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     21.08 
(Assumption: p1 nested in p3)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      0.82 
(Assumption: p2 nested in p4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.3639 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =     31.61 
(Assumption: p3 nested in p4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -1.668 
         Prob > t  =  0.952 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  5.524 
         Prob > t  =  0.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZINB vs. NB 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -1.770 
         Prob > t  =  0.962 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  5.557 
         Prob > t  =  0.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
 
 
All tests point to ZIP or ZINB as the best model (no significant difference between 
the two). 
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Table B3. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on OWS Message  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   (e1)             (e2)             (e3)             (e4)    
                  Poisson             ZIP        NegBinom            ZINB    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Message                                                                      
Freak               0.258+          0.191           0.367           0.313    
                  (0.141)         (0.128)         (0.326)         (0.272)    
 
Ignorant            0.198***        0.134***        0.243***        0.207*** 
                  (0.025)         (0.025)         (0.067)         (0.059)    
 
Insanity            0.169          -0.037           0.376           0.265    
                  (0.137)         (0.131)         (0.285)         (0.251)    
 
Ridicule           -0.202**        -0.160*         -0.185          -0.194+   
                  (0.076)         (0.068)         (0.127)         (0.115)    
 
Amalgam             0.247***        0.144***        0.414***        0.342*** 
                  (0.036)         (0.035)         (0.101)         (0.090)    
 
Normal              0.097***        0.045           0.177+          0.141+   
                  (0.028)         (0.029)         (0.097)         (0.082)    
 
Patriotic          -0.160           0.140           0.640+          0.552+   
                  (0.144)         (0.130)         (0.367)         (0.319)    
 
Peaceful            0.155***        0.121***        0.196*          0.141*   
                  (0.029)         (0.032)         (0.080)         (0.069)    
 
_cons               0.642***        1.157***        0.377**         0.639*** 
                  (0.058)         (0.062)         (0.119)         (0.128)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount                          -0.002***                       -0.014    
                                  (0.000)                         (0.010)    
 
_cons                               1.012**                         3.530    
                                  (0.331)                         (2.162)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha                                             0.041          -0.282    
                                                  (0.164)         (0.188)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC              1102.891         939.676         836.112         811.625    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =    167.21 
(Assumption: e1 nested in e2)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    268.78 
(Assumption: e1 nested in e3)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    130.05 
(Assumption: e2 nested in e4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =     28.49 
(Assumption: e3 nested in e4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -4.329 
         Prob > t  =  1.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  5.604 
         Prob > t  =  0.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
         HPC test: ZINB vs. NB 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -3.661 
         Prob > t  =  1.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  6.836 
         Prob > t  =  0.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
All tests point to ZINB as the best model. 
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Table B4. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Quoting TPM 
activists  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                   (q1)             (q2)             (q3)             (q4)    
                  Poisson             ZIP        NegBinom            ZINB    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
quote                                                                        
Freak               2.257***        0.670           2.745           1.155    
                  (0.439)         (0.478)         (2.549)         (1.451)    
 
Ignorant            0.768***       -0.119           1.752           0.439    
                  (0.124)         (0.684)         (1.125)         (0.543)    
 
Insanity           -1.322***       -0.153           0.267          -0.649    
                  (0.307)         (0.445)         (1.061)         (0.692)    
 
Ridicule            0.403**         0.616          -0.833          -0.034    
                  (0.127)         (0.701)         (1.084)         (0.446)    
 
Racism              0.300*         -0.265           0.512           0.099    
                  (0.144)         (0.214)         (0.839)         (0.574)    
 
Normal             -0.377***       -0.112           0.004          -0.164    
                  (0.100)         (0.143)         (0.567)         (0.299)    
 
Patriotic           1.632***        0.205           2.286+          1.026    
                  (0.230)         (0.347)         (1.225)         (0.638)    
 
_cons              -1.246***        1.233***       -1.633***        0.149    
                  (0.139)         (0.220)         (0.334)         (0.533)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount                          -0.001                          -0.006*   
                                  (0.002)                         (0.002)    
 
_cons                               2.806*                          4.177*** 
                                  (1.374)                         (1.102)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha                                             2.475***        1.146*   
                                                  (0.300)         (0.499)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               445.589         263.473         255.962         240.242    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =    186.12 
(Assumption: q1 nested in q2)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =    191.63 
(Assumption: q1 nested in q3)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     25.23 
(Assumption: q2 nested in q4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =     19.72 
(Assumption: q3 nested in q4)                         Prob > chi2 =    0.0001 
 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  =  0.116 
         Prob > t  =  0.454 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  0.424 
         Prob > t  =  0.336 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZINB vs. NB 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -0.244 
         Prob > t  =  0.596 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  1.750 
         Prob > t  =  0.040 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
 
 
 
All tests point to ZINB as the best model. 
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Table B5. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on Paraphrasing TPM 
activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  (tp1)             (tp2)             (tp3)             (tp4)    
                  Poisson             ZIP        NegBinom            ZINB    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Paraphrase                                                                   
Freak             -11.304         -12.542         -15.463         -12.761    
                (868.491)      (2027.978)      (7640.282)      (1561.566)    
 
Ignorant            0.087           0.791           0.401           0.092    
                  (0.410)         (0.813)         (0.623)         (0.591)    
 
Insanity            0.395          -1.344          -0.414           0.041    
                  (0.596)         (1.464)         (1.175)         (1.007)    
 
Ridicule           -0.594          -2.379          -1.225          -0.859    
                  (0.834)         (2.235)         (1.616)         (1.268)    
 
Racism              0.307           0.451           0.310           0.190    
                  (0.277)         (0.333)         (0.354)         (0.342)    
 
Patriotic           0.690**         2.501*          1.389           0.810    
                  (0.225)         (1.018)         (0.862)         (0.763)    
 
_cons              -2.669***       -2.314*         -2.677***       -2.130*** 
                  (0.285)         (1.039)         (0.321)         (0.597)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount                           0.001                          -0.005    
                                  (0.002)                         (0.003)    
 
_cons                              -1.022                           1.580    
                                  (3.608)                         (1.810)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha                                             1.088           0.398    
                                                  (0.795)         (1.452)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               127.039         122.018         126.102         129.053    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      9.02 
(Assumption: tp1 nested in tp2)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.0110 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =      2.94 
(Assumption: tp1 nested in tp3)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.0866 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     -5.04 
(Assumption: tp2 nested in tp4)                       Prob > chi2 =    1.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =      1.05 
(Assumption: tp3 nested in tp4)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.5920 
 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  =  0.110 
         Prob > t  =  0.456 
         Number of obs = 199 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  1.391 
         Prob > t  =  0.082 
         Number of obs = 199 
 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZINB vs. NB 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  =  0.110 
         Prob > t  =  0.456 
         Number of obs = 199 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  1.391 
         Prob > t  =  0.082 
         Number of obs = 199 
 
 
 
 
 
There is little difference between the four tests, but HPC tests show the zero-
inflated models are significantly better than the poisson and negative binomial 
models. There was very little paraphrasing of TPM activists (it occurred in just 14 
out of 200 transcripts). 
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Table B6. Coefficients for each type of model: Frames regressed on TPM Message 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                  (te1)             (te2)             (te3)             (te4)    
                  Poisson             ZIP        NegBinom            ZINB    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Message                                                                      
Freak               1.334***        0.927**         1.436*          1.125*   
                  (0.310)         (0.312)         (0.721)         (0.562)    
 
Ignorant            0.437***        0.391***        0.638***        0.536*** 
                  (0.054)         (0.054)         (0.163)         (0.132)    
 
Insanity            0.166           0.019           0.566*          0.404+   
                  (0.112)         (0.117)         (0.247)         (0.211)    
 
Ridicule            0.254***        0.237***        0.068           0.124    
                  (0.049)         (0.050)         (0.147)         (0.123)    
 
Racism              0.004           0.026          -0.087          -0.131    
                  (0.105)         (0.139)         (0.185)         (0.163)    
 
Normal              0.143**         0.103*          0.319*          0.233*   
                  (0.052)         (0.051)         (0.140)         (0.105)    
 
Patriotic           0.435***        0.416***        0.284           0.273    
                  (0.124)         (0.120)         (0.259)         (0.207)    
 
_cons               0.171*          0.606***        0.089           0.406*** 
                  (0.068)         (0.078)         (0.102)         (0.113)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount                          -0.006***                       -0.010**  
                                  (0.002)                         (0.004)    
 
_cons                               1.765**                         2.198*   
                                  (0.546)                         (0.886)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha                                            -0.200          -0.881**  
                                                  (0.216)         (0.297)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               754.614         675.723         660.747         639.153    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =     82.89 
(Assumption: te1 nested in te2)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     95.87 
(Assumption: te1 nested in te3)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(1)  =     38.57 
(Assumption: te2 nested in te4)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
Likelihood-ratio test                                 LR chi2(2)  =     25.59 
(Assumption: te3 nested in te4)                       Prob > chi2 =    0.0000 
 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZIP vs. Poisson 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -4.358 
         Prob > t  =  1.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  6.737 
         Prob > t  =  0.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
 
         HPC test: ZINB vs. NB 
 
         Ho: Model A is valid 
         t  = -4.154 
         Prob > t  =  1.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
         Ho: Model B is valid 
         t  =  6.866 
         Prob > t  =  0.000 
         Number of obs = 200 
 
 
All tests point to ZINB as the best model. 
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Appendix C 
 
Tables C1 through C3 show stepwise models for negative frames in OWS transcripts. 
 
Tables C4 through C6 show stepwise models for negative frames in TPM transcripts. 
 
 
Table C1. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on quoting OWS activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      oq1             oq2             oq3             oq4    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                       
Freak               0.828***        0.828***        0.466           0.450    
                  (0.177)         (0.179)         (0.335)         (0.330)    
 
Ignorant           -0.024          -0.023           0.034           0.033    
                  (0.107)         (0.108)         (0.094)         (0.092)    
 
Insanity           -0.313          -0.292           0.106           0.092    
                  (0.283)         (0.304)         (0.354)         (0.357)    
 
Ridicule           -0.228*         -0.225*          0.093           0.091    
                  (0.105)         (0.105)         (0.151)         (0.148)    
 
Amalgam             0.252*          0.253*          0.166+          0.159+   
                  (0.099)         (0.103)         (0.095)         (0.094)    
 
Event                               0.088           0.214           0.207    
                                  (0.547)         (0.552)         (0.553)    
 
FNC                                                -1.704***       -1.710*** 
                                                  (0.440)         (0.467)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -0.206    
                                                                  (0.484)    
 
_cons               0.568**         0.471           0.514           0.555    
                  (0.189)         (0.509)         (0.503)         (0.507)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.010**        -0.011*         -0.009*         -0.010*   
                  (0.004)         (0.005)         (0.004)         (0.004)    
 
Event                              -1.314          -0.630          -0.978    
                                  (1.098)         (1.059)         (1.998)    
 
FNC                                                -2.197+         -2.212*   
                                                  (1.142)         (1.030)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -0.752    
                                                                  (3.079)    
 
_cons               4.207**         5.374**         4.791**         5.248+   
                  (1.464)         (2.022)         (1.836)         (2.994)    
----------------------------------------------------------------------------                                                                          
lnalpha             0.782***        0.810***        0.667**         0.669**  
                  (0.191)         (0.209)         (0.210)         (0.219)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               574.677         577.328         573.274         577.002    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table C2. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on paraphrasing OWS activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      op1             op2             op3             op4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Paraphrase                                                                   
Freak              -0.235          -0.161          -0.365          -0.371    
                  (0.231)         (0.228)         (0.289)         (0.282)    
 
Ignorant           -0.068          -0.071          -0.007          -0.002    
                  (0.073)         (0.077)         (0.096)         (0.097)    
 
Insanity           -0.261          -0.043           0.117           0.174    
                  (0.378)         (0.382)         (0.394)         (0.376)    
 
Ridicule            0.213           0.184           0.281+          0.270+   
                  (0.135)         (0.130)         (0.155)         (0.152)    
 
Amalgam             0.133           0.097           0.038           0.022    
                  (0.092)         (0.091)         (0.098)         (0.102)    
 
Event                              -0.507+         -0.446          -0.474+   
                                  (0.285)         (0.293)         (0.285)    
 
FNC                                                -0.929*         -1.015**  
                                                  (0.369)         (0.375)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -0.254    
                                                                  (0.315)    
 
_cons               0.188           0.661*          0.672*          0.758*   
                  (0.157)         (0.293)         (0.301)         (0.297)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.004**        -0.005***       -0.005***       -0.006*** 
                  (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.001)         (0.002)    
 
Event                              -4.691***       -4.788**        -4.967**  
                                  (1.390)         (1.758)         (1.790)    
 
FNC                                                -0.431          -0.448    
                                                  (1.587)         (1.662)    
 
MSNBC                                                               2.384+   
                                                                  (1.370)    
 
_cons               2.341***        7.124***        7.289***        7.636*** 
                  (0.630)         (1.713)         (2.184)         (2.267)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha            -1.989+         -2.252+         -2.531          -3.040    
                  (1.121)         (1.332)         (1.779)         (2.653)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               460.273         445.594         444.615         443.919    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 252 
 
 
Table C3. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on covering OWS activists’ 
message 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      oe1             oe2             oe3             oe4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Message                                                                      
Freak               0.316*          0.344*          0.314+          0.398+   
                  (0.159)         (0.168)         (0.190)         (0.224)    
 
Ignorant            0.185**         0.196**         0.210***        0.214**  
                  (0.063)         (0.060)         (0.060)         (0.073)    
 
Insanity            0.222           0.187           0.224           0.180    
                  (0.156)         (0.135)         (0.143)         (0.155)    
 
Ridicule           -0.221**        -0.225**        -0.194**        -0.206**  
                  (0.072)         (0.069)         (0.073)         (0.077)    
 
Amalgam             0.313**         0.319***        0.324***        0.385*** 
                  (0.107)         (0.091)         (0.086)         (0.091)    
 
Event                              -0.370          -0.420          -0.297    
                                  (0.325)         (0.304)         (0.220)    
 
FNC                                                -0.149           0.124    
                                                  (0.283)         (0.294)    
 
MSNBC                                                               0.962*** 
                                                                  (0.274)    
 
_cons               0.917***        1.208***        1.230***        0.864*** 
                  (0.244)         (0.285)         (0.282)         (0.205)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.008          -0.009          -0.013          -0.015+   
                  (0.012)         (0.008)         (0.009)         (0.008)    
 
Event                               0.909           1.231           1.839    
                                  (0.762)         (0.841)         (1.300)    
 
FNC                                                 1.866           2.691    
                                                  (1.633)         (1.915)    
 
MSNBC                                                               1.837    
                                                                  (1.532)    
 
_cons               2.163           1.773           2.233           1.979    
                  (2.734)         (2.024)         (1.890)         (1.724)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha            -0.271          -0.302          -0.252          -0.397*   
                  (0.386)         (0.270)         (0.214)         (0.163)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               819.977         819.003         819.794         804.233    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table C4. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on quoting TPM activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      tq1             tq2             tq3             tq4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
quote                                                                        
Freak               0.721           0.169          -0.005           0.210    
                  (0.854)         (0.744)         (0.477)         (0.428)    
 
Ignorant            0.248           0.460          -0.224           0.215    
                  (0.735)         (1.011)         (0.477)         (0.938)    
 
Insanity           -0.310          -0.032          -0.443           0.041    
                  (0.552)         (0.720)         (0.578)         (0.761)    
 
Ridicule            0.055           0.159           0.733          -0.310    
                  (0.645)         (0.946)         (0.621)         (0.348)    
 
Racism              0.148           0.656           0.295           0.719    
                  (0.576)         (0.735)         (0.627)         (0.760)    
 
Event                               1.712+          1.123+          1.771*   
                                  (0.993)         (0.612)         (0.747)    
 
FNC                                                -0.946+         -0.841    
                                                  (0.557)         (0.651)    
 
MSNBC                                                               2.544    
                                                                  (3.619)    
 
_cons               0.434          -0.646           0.564          -0.190    
                  (0.566)         (0.994)         (0.569)         (0.796)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.006*         -0.006          -0.003***       -0.007+   
                  (0.002)         (0.004)         (0.001)         (0.004)    
 
Event                               0.112          -1.038           0.066    
                                  (1.834)         (0.741)         (1.361)    
 
FNC                                                -0.886          -0.798    
                                                  (0.919)         (1.720)    
 
MSNBC                                                              10.281    
                                                                  (7.030)    
 
_cons               4.173***        4.049**         3.744***        4.466**  
                  (1.171)         (1.271)         (0.812)         (1.710)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha             1.223**         1.211*          0.071           0.621    
                  (0.458)         (0.546)         (0.813)         (0.572)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               240.233         238.408         240.450         229.133    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table C5. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on paraphrasing TPM activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      tr1             tr2             tr3             tr4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Paraphrase                                                                   
Freak             -10.685***      -16.829***      -12.142***      -14.913*** 
                  (0.935)         (1.254)         (0.997)         (1.021)    
 
Ignorant            0.985           2.191*         -0.284          -0.121    
                  (0.735)         (1.025)         (0.555)         (0.284)    
 
Insanity            1.479**         1.578+          1.116           0.590    
                  (0.543)         (0.826)         (0.744)         (0.570)    
 
Ridicule           -1.659*         -2.209          -0.825          -0.500*   
                  (0.772)         (1.368)         (0.763)         (0.230)    
 
Racism              0.271           0.230           0.358           0.105    
                  (0.256)         (0.178)         (0.318)         (0.278)    
 
Event                              -1.400           1.406           0.323    
                                  (1.161)         (1.613)         (1.115)    
 
FNC                                                 0.590          -2.587+   
                                                  (1.915)         (1.476)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -1.259    
                                                                  (0.998)    
 
_cons              -1.284          -0.987          -1.697          -1.171    
                  (0.823)         (0.654)         (1.118)         (0.728)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount           0.000           0.000          -0.000          -0.006    
                  (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.000)         (0.005)    
 
Event                             -15.687***        0.569          -1.032    
                                  (3.986)         (1.817)         (3.757)    
 
FNC                                                 2.204          -3.618+   
                                                  (1.949)         (2.055)    
 
MSNBC                                                             -18.743*** 
                                                                  (2.258)    
 
_cons               1.019           1.427+          0.481           4.158*   
                  (1.024)         (0.808)         (1.523)         (1.942)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha           -16.094***      -15.915**       -26.869***       -2.614    
                  (0.761)         (4.953)         (0.454)        (19.770)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               131.274         132.966         135.575         132.607    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table C6. ZINB coefficients: regressing negative frames on covering TPM activists’ 
message 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      ts1             ts2             ts3             ts4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Message                                                                      
Freak               1.110***        1.006**         1.058**         1.099**  
                  (0.170)         (0.357)         (0.334)         (0.384)    
 
Ignorant            0.506*          0.552**         0.550**         0.557**  
                  (0.206)         (0.208)         (0.208)         (0.210)    
 
Insanity            0.449+          0.429           0.450           0.458    
                  (0.267)         (0.295)         (0.296)         (0.292)    
 
Ridicule            0.075           0.112           0.108           0.114    
                  (0.148)         (0.161)         (0.165)         (0.164)    
 
Racism             -0.116          -0.005          -0.023          -0.038    
                  (0.172)         (0.177)         (0.177)         (0.170)    
 
Event                               0.826*          0.760*          0.757*   
                                  (0.323)         (0.317)         (0.308)    
 
FNC                                                 0.124           0.086    
                                                  (0.356)         (0.348)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -0.121    
                                                                  (0.239)    
 
_cons               0.555***        0.290*          0.266           0.299+   
                  (0.144)         (0.128)         (0.162)         (0.175)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.010**        -0.010**        -0.010**        -0.011**  
                  (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.004)         (0.004)    
 
Event                              -0.669          -1.611          -1.654    
                                  (1.007)         (2.579)         (2.079)    
 
FNC                                                -1.608          -1.953    
                                                  (2.807)         (2.574)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -1.081    
                                                                  (1.197)    
 
_cons               2.258*          2.205*          2.624*          3.087**  
                  (0.886)         (0.908)         (1.070)         (1.197)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha            -0.299          -0.455          -0.426          -0.420    
                  (0.336)         (0.281)         (0.268)         (0.265)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               671.588         658.166         659.237         661.940    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Appendix D 
 
Tables D1 through D3 show stepwise models for positive frames in OWS transcripts. 
 
Tables D4 through D6 show stepwise models for positive frames in TPM transcripts. 
 
 
 
Table D1. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on quoting OWS activists  
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      oq1             oq2             oq3             oq4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
quote                                                                        
Normal              0.186*          0.183*          0.137+          0.150+   
                  (0.087)         (0.091)         (0.077)         (0.082)    
 
Patriotic           0.229           0.223           0.145           0.183    
                  (0.160)         (0.165)         (0.176)         (0.138)    
 
Peaceful            0.164*          0.171*          0.112           0.106    
                  (0.076)         (0.081)         (0.074)         (0.072)    
 
Event                               0.218           0.298           0.279    
                                  (0.552)         (0.531)         (0.506)    
 
FNC                                                -1.358***       -1.410*** 
                                                  (0.381)         (0.376)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -0.482    
                                                                  (0.527)    
 
_cons               0.462*          0.247           0.431           0.512    
                  (0.195)         (0.524)         (0.505)         (0.492)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.011**        -0.012*         -0.010*         -0.010*   
                  (0.004)         (0.006)         (0.004)         (0.004)    
 
Event                              -1.499          -0.722          -1.164    
                                  (1.281)         (1.020)         (1.291)    
 
FNC                                                -1.931+         -2.028*   
                                                  (1.058)         (0.990)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -1.157    
                                                                  (1.828)    
 
_cons               4.305**         5.722*          4.952**         5.504**  
                  (1.477)         (2.235)         (1.832)         (2.108)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha             0.867***        0.893***        0.708***        0.688**  
                  (0.181)         (0.196)         (0.206)         (0.212)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               574.544         576.755         571.900         574.502    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table D2. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on paraphrasing OWS activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      op1             op2             op3             op4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Paraphrase                                                                   
Normal              0.042           0.040           0.032           0.035    
                  (0.048)         (0.050)         (0.052)         (0.047)    
 
Patriotic          -0.427          -0.402          -0.436          -0.414    
                  (0.298)         (0.292)         (0.290)         (0.330)    
 
Peaceful            0.054           0.038           0.020           0.016    
                  (0.054)         (0.050)         (0.051)         (0.050)    
 
Event                              -0.498+         -0.440          -0.461+   
                                  (0.268)         (0.275)         (0.267)    
 
FNC                                                -0.479          -0.537    
                                                  (0.476)         (0.479)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -0.251    
                                                                  (0.328)    
 
_cons               0.150           0.624*          0.650*          0.726**  
                  (0.182)         (0.254)         (0.257)         (0.250)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.004*         -0.005***       -0.005**        -0.006**  
                  (0.002)         (0.001)         (0.002)         (0.002)    
 
Event                              -4.964**        -5.050*         -5.148**  
                                  (1.602)         (2.033)         (1.972)    
 
FNC                                                -0.589          -0.571    
                                                  (1.832)         (1.866)    
 
MSNBC                                                               2.427+   
                                                                  (1.421)    
 
_cons               2.254**         7.366***        7.587**         7.838**  
                  (0.744)         (1.954)         (2.575)         (2.556)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha            -1.774          -1.923+         -2.104          -2.487    
                  (1.145)         (1.025)         (1.280)         (1.726)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               457.207         442.393         444.232         443.875    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table D3. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on covering OWS activists’ 
message 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      om1             om2             om3             om4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Message                                                                      
Normal              0.110           0.111           0.120           0.099    
                  (0.083)         (0.080)         (0.081)         (0.076)    
 
Patriotic           0.625***        0.651***        0.694***        0.631*** 
                  (0.085)         (0.094)         (0.101)         (0.088)    
 
Peaceful            0.114*          0.117*          0.137*          0.143*   
                  (0.054)         (0.055)         (0.069)         (0.060)    
 
Event                              -0.218          -0.293          -0.219    
                                  (0.275)         (0.276)         (0.237)    
 
FNC                                                 0.176           0.287    
                                                  (0.245)         (0.242)    
 
MSNBC                                                               0.548*   
                                                                  (0.246)    
 
_cons               1.152***        1.321***        1.287***        1.111*** 
                  (0.140)         (0.238)         (0.241)         (0.225)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.005+         -0.006          -0.011          -0.013    
                  (0.003)         (0.005)         (0.013)         (0.010)    
 
Event                               0.961           1.306           1.866    
                                  (0.724)         (0.899)         (1.296)    
 
FNC                                                 1.788           2.477    
                                                  (2.426)         (2.457)    
 
MSNBC                                                               1.594    
                                                                  (1.659)    
 
_cons               1.514+          1.027           1.749           1.655    
                  (0.813)         (1.252)         (2.397)         (1.701)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha            -0.184          -0.180          -0.045          -0.060    
                  (0.251)         (0.275)         (0.252)         (0.183)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               838.359         839.089         840.536         839.220    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table D4. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on quoting TPM activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      tq1             tq2             tq3             tq4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
quote                                                                        
Normal             -0.069          -0.124          -0.122          -0.125    
                  (0.218)         (0.181)         (0.198)         (0.216)    
 
Patriotic           0.664           0.537           0.752           0.738    
                  (0.511)         (0.431)         (0.799)         (0.566)    
 
Event                               0.743           0.849           1.453*   
                                  (0.861)         (0.978)         (0.665)    
 
FNC                                                -1.002          -0.738    
                                                  (0.624)         (0.528)    
 
MSNBC                                                               2.141*   
                                                                  (1.049)    
 
_cons               0.375           0.285           0.392          -0.067    
                  (0.496)         (1.087)         (1.306)         (0.901)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.006*         -0.005          -0.005          -0.007    
                  (0.002)         (0.004)         (0.007)         (0.005)    
 
Event                              -0.846          -0.931           0.054    
                                  (1.565)         (1.710)         (1.622)    
 
FNC                                                -1.272          -0.684    
                                                  (1.652)         (1.406)    
 
MSNBC                                                              10.553    
                                                                  (9.037)    
 
_cons               4.177***        3.941***        4.251*          4.541**  
                  (1.139)         (1.105)         (2.101)         (1.657)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha             1.258**         0.950           0.965           0.559    
                  (0.409)         (0.808)         (1.128)         (0.710)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               234.108         234.789         236.429         222.265    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table D5. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on paraphrasing TPM activists 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      tp1             tp2             tp3             tp4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Paraphrase                                                                   
Patriotic           1.134***        1.181***        1.145***        1.214*** 
                  (0.120)         (0.147)         (0.130)         (0.180)    
 
Event                               0.695           1.718***        2.170*** 
                                  (0.589)         (0.504)         (0.535)    
 
FNC                                                -0.729          -0.487    
                                                  (1.081)         (1.123)    
 
MSNBC                                                               0.734    
                                                                  (0.711)    
 
_cons              -2.609***       -2.736***       -2.704***       -2.958*** 
                  (0.282)         (0.355)         (0.369)         (0.531)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount           0.141*          0.121***       -0.004          -0.004    
                  (0.062)         (0.016)         (0.004)         (0.003)    
 
Event                            -619.834          39.302+         39.971*   
                                      (.)        (21.409)        (17.681)    
 
FNC                                                37.037+         37.791*   
                                                 (21.071)        (17.037)    
 
MSNBC                                                              21.025*   
                                                                  (8.532)    
 
_cons            -217.859*       -111.257***      -36.838*        -37.579*   
                 (93.700)        (14.363)        (18.744)        (15.096)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha           -11.024         -17.253***      -25.049***      -19.916*** 
                      (.)         (0.193)         (1.873)         (0.103)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               116.743         117.349         119.902         120.404    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table D6. ZINB coefficients: regressing positive frames on covering TPM activists’ 
message 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                      (1)             (2)             (3)             (4)    
                      tm1             tm2             tm3             tm4    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Message                                                                      
Normal              0.157*          0.120+          0.152*          0.136+   
                  (0.075)         (0.069)         (0.069)         (0.078)    
 
Patriotic           0.378**         0.402**         0.385**         0.442**  
                  (0.136)         (0.129)         (0.128)         (0.135)    
 
Event                               0.295           0.214           0.293    
                                  (0.246)         (0.236)         (0.237)    
 
FNC                                                -0.287          -0.118    
                                                  (0.338)         (0.341)    
 
MSNBC                                                               0.476    
                                                                  (0.323)    
 
_cons               0.670***        0.618***        0.688***        0.498**  
                  (0.127)         (0.156)         (0.167)         (0.170)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
inflate                                                                      
WordCount          -0.009**        -0.008**        -0.008**        -0.008**  
                  (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.003)         (0.003)    
 
Event                              -1.314          -2.902          -2.982    
                                  (1.143)         (2.453)         (2.851)    
 
FNC                                                -2.578          -2.635    
                                                  (2.494)         (2.548)    
 
MSNBC                                                              -0.310    
                                                                  (1.046)    
 
_cons               2.078**         2.007**         2.426**         2.466*   
                  (0.779)         (0.722)         (0.835)         (1.013)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
/                                                                            
lnalpha            -0.286          -0.345          -0.324          -0.361    
                  (0.267)         (0.274)         (0.284)         (0.289)    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                     200             200             200             200    
AIC               672.043         671.278         670.107         669.196    
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
 
 
 
